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Abstract 
Abstract 
Current conventional power systems consist of large-scale centralised generation and 
unidirectional power flow from generation to demand. This vision for power system design is 
being challenged by the need to satisfy the energy trilemma, as the system is required to be 
sustainable, available and secure. Emerging technologies are restructuring the power system; 
the addition of distributed generation, energy storage and active participation of customers are 
changing the roles and requirements of the distribution network. Increased controllability and 
monitoring requirements combined with an increase in controllable technologies has played a 
pivotal role in the transition towards smart grids. The smart grid concept features a large 
amount of sensing and monitoring equipment sharing large volumes of information. This 
increased reliance on the ICT infrastructure, raises the importance of cyber-security due to the 
number of vulnerabilities which can be exploited by an adversary.  
The aim of this research was to address the issue of cyber-security within a smart grid context 
through the application of self-organising communication architectures. The work examined 
the relevance and potential for self-organisation when performing voltage control in the 
presence of a denial of service attack event.  The devised self-organising architecture used 
techniques adapted from a range of research domains including underwater sensor networks, 
wireless communications and smart-vehicle tracking applications. These components were 
redesigned for a smart grid application and supported by the development of a fuzzy based 
decision making engine. A multi-agent system was selected as the source platform for 
delivering the self-organising architecture  
The application of self-organisation for cyber-security within a smart grid context is a novel 
research area and one which presents a wide range of potential benefits for a future power 
system.  The results indicated that the developed self-organising architecture was able to avoid 
control deterioration during an attack event involving up to 24% of the customer population. 
Furthermore, the system also reduces the communication load on the agents involved in the 
architecture and demonstrated wider reaching benefits beyond performing voltage control.   
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2 Introduction 
 
 OVERVIEW 
The current power system has been reliant on centralised generation and fossil fuel 
resources, but an increasing demand for sustainable energy production is driving significant 
changes. This challenge forms part of the energy trilemma which outlines that the power 
system needs to achieve sustainability, availability and security. One of the proposed 
solutions to this challenge is the concept of a smart grid. This is often used as an umbrella 
term for a collection of methods, tools and technologies designed to operate the electrical 
network more intelligently and with a longer term view of electrifying additional sectors 
such as heat and transportation. As a result the power system is moving towards an energy 
landscape which is significantly supported by an increasing amount of ICT components. 
Smart grid research covers a wide spectrum of topics including data management, 
embedded intelligence and control algorithms.  
The rise in electric vehicle usage and distributed generation through renewables has created 
a divergence from the traditional unidirectional power flow process, originating from large 
scale central generation and flowing to the distribution network. As a result the challenges 
faced by network management processes have become more complex, challenges which 
have encouraged the development of new techniques and technologies. Smart grids have 
also been cited as a method of deferring expensive network reinforcement programs 
through the use of intelligent systems designed to actively manage the current assets such 
that they are capable of handling the challenges of increasing customer demand and 
stochastic generation. Many of these intelligent systems are supported by new technologies 
in the form of energy storage systems, soft open points and demand side response 
approaches.  
Plans for increased observability and controllability will result in the installation of a vast 
array of sensors, monitoring equipment and emerging controllable technologies. As a result 
these systems will produce and consume increasing quantities of data. This increase in data 
quantities produced by the number of devices present in the smart grid domain will need a 
suitable ICT infrastructure. In addition to the physical aspects of a communication 
infrastructure, the interaction between entries also requires appropriate design. This design 
considers the architecture involved with passing messages and control signals between 
controllable entities, sensors and controllers. When the communication architecture is 
hosting critical commands responsible for triggering protection devices or requesting 
frequency response the timing of the messages is crucial. An architecture which is unable 
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to manage data retrieved from sensors will likely be subject to delays in message 
transmission and therefore fail to deliver signals triggering protection measures in time. 
However the inclusion of emerging technologies in the network management and data 
collection roles within the smart grid also creates more potential vulnerabilities. Cyber-
security has played a pivotal role in a wide variety of industries adopting a more digitally 
oriented service, however industrial control systems have not followed the same path. In 
many cases this oversight has been the result of these systems being isolated from a wide 
reaching communication network and therefore access was limited. The increasingly 
ubiquitous nature of information and communication technologies within the power system 
and the movement towards an increasingly cyber-physical grid has created new 
opportunities for attackers. 
The core message behind the developments in the smart grid domain is the requirement for 
flexibility. Customers are encouraged to be more flexible in terms of their consumption; 
control approaches require flexibility in terms of processing an increasingly dynamic set of 
variables. Therefore it is reasonable to expect that the supporting ICT infrastructure would 
also benefit from building flexibility into designs and implementations. This would take 
both the form of the communication infrastructure of routers, switches and wireless links, 
but also the population of sensors and controllers managing the physical network. Even in 
the presence of advanced forecasting techniques and predictive methods the amount of 
uncertainty within elements of the smart grid is estimated to increase and therefore it 
becomes more applicable to investigate and devise systems which can function under that 
uncertainty. Systems which have the capability to react and modify themselves in response 
unpredictable events such as a cyber-attack will become more relevant.  
 THE AUTONOMIC POWER SYSTEM 
An advanced concept within the smart grid domain aims to encapsulate a range of research 
topics in creating an autonomic power system (APS); this concept as defined by the authors 
[1] refers to a long term vison of network automation. The APS is presented through the 
development of tools, techniques and technologies which aim to serve the needs of a future 
network, one which contains very different control demands and components in 
comparison to the networks presently in use. The following figure taken from [1] presented 
in Fig. 1.1 demonstrates the components and concepts defined within the APS project. The 
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figure illustrates that the system operates under the assumption of a decentralised control 
environment, formed by a series of connected control zones. One of the core properties of 
the APS is its ability to provide flexibility in the face of a highly changeable and uncertain 
environment and operates under a self* control paradigm. 
 
Fig. 1.1 – Autonomic Power System Outline Concept 
The self* approach considers elements of the system to be self-optimising, self-healing, 
self-configuring and self-protecting, therefore being able to provide the desired level of 
flexibility a changing power system landscape will require.  Within the zones of control 
themselves, a suite of control approaches can be deployed based on the requirements of the 
zone and the state of the network, demonstrating that flexibility and adaptability remain 
one of the core objectives throughout the whole concept. As the APS is a forward looking 
architecture it also considers greater controllability and observability than the present 
network with observability present deeper in the network. Consequently this will increase 
the amount of data and control signals which will need to be supported by the 
communication architecture, and ultimately increase the pressure on the ICT infrastructure. 
The timescale of the project would imply that the absolute performance of the 
communication channels would be capable of transmitting the volume of data and the 
processing power of the recipient controllers would not be overwhelmed. But, as previously 
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indicated a system with this degree of ICT integration would also include more potential 
weaknesses of points of entry for an adversary.  
One of the potential mechanisms which can be applied within the control zones is that of 
multi-agent systems, which in turn can fulfil the objective of providing a decentralised 
control and communication architecture. The work presented in this thesis is in association 
with the APS project and therefore aims to deliver the flexibility and contribute to the 
overall self* process through the investigation into the potential for self-organising 
architectures. 
 MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS 
One of the goals of the APS project is to implement decentralised control approaches within 
individual zones, wherein each zone will be supplied with increased monitoring capabilities 
and more controllable components. This mechanism creates a need for a distributed 
problem solving approach which recognises each of the components in the system as 
individual entities which can contribute to completing control objectives. One method 
which allows the creation and management of interactive populations is multi-agent 
systems (MAS). The MAS approach involves communities of agents communicating and 
cooperating with one another being used to represent system components.  
The concept of a multi-agent system is one where a collection of agents are in operation 
within a defined environment [2], and can be applied to a variety of differing problem 
domains depending on the classification of the entity representing the agent. Some MAS 
may consider a human user as an agent, others considering autonomous robots, 
alternatively an agent can be defined in software. A specific definition of software agents 
is contested within the research community, whereby individual cases have been defined 
based on the context of the scenario [3]. Individual authors define their software agents in 
terms of the problem they are designed to solve and therefore by the behaviours and goals 
installed within them. Agents can be physically located within sensors or embedded 
software in controllable devices, and therefore can be applied within the smart grid domain 
to achieve the desired level of observability and controllability.  
In software based multi-agent systems the intelligence of the individual agents is based on 
their ability to complete tasks autonomously, negotiating internally within the agent 
community rather than resorting to relying on user intervention. The specific definition of 
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agent intelligence requirements depends on the problem domain, and the nature of the tasks 
and control objectives required. Some systems will require a degree of shared automation 
where a human user issues a command, but the agent population can calculate the optimum 
implementation of the command, this format may be applicable to fly-by-wire systems or 
robotics. Others will be supplied with a set of input parameters and conditions to satisfy 
and work towards achieving those goals without further input from a user. Although the 
applications and design approaches vary, a core set of characteristics is defined by the 
authors of [4]. These characteristics outline the requirements for a set of agents operating 
within the same overarching domain, and serve as a foundation for system development. 
Autonomous – Demonstrating the ability to operate without human intervention and 
supervision, where the agents can come to conclusions and make decisions within the agent 
community. 
Responsiveness – The ability of the agents to be able to respond to the changes within the 
environment, demonstrating that the agents exist in more than simply a monitoring capacity 
waiting for a user to affect the changes. In this instance the agents should be able to detect 
values exceeding thresholds and take action to resolve further problems. 
Socially Active – This pertains to the necessity for communication between agents, each 
individual will not have all the information to make all decisions, and therefore will need 
to ask others in the domain. In addition to information gathering, agent communication is 
used to issue commands from one agent to another. 
Proactive – A higher level of agent intelligence where, in addition to reacting to the 
conditions present in the environment, the MAS prevents threshold situations from 
developing, by making decisions ahead of a potential problem.                                                   
Other characteristics include an ability to learn from previous decisions, such that future 
decisions can be made with better knowledge [5]. In other cases some agents possess a 
degree of mobility, where they are able to move from platform to platform in support of 
standard communication [6]. This range of capabilities and applications indicates the 
flexibility of MAS and indicates that they can be applied to a range of scenarios; 
demonstrating that the core characteristics can be built upon when developing systems with 
increasing complexity. 
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One of the primary challenges facing MAS performance is related to scalability, according 
to [7] it can be considered to be one of the key limiting factors in the deployment of a multi-
agent implementation. Within the context of power system monitoring and control – the 
interactions governing a single protection operation can consume 1.5GB of data an hour 
[8], which only accounts for one data source corresponding to a single control problem. If 
additional control problems are considered and further data sources are included, the data 
management issue within the MAS can escalate quickly. In the case of the APS vision, the 
objective of increasing observability and controllability will naturally contribute 
significantly to the volumes of data production and therefore have an impact on the agents 
involved. These impacts take the form of being able to process the information, make 
control decisions and disseminate the commands to other agents with the community. In 
addition to an increasing quantity of raw data, a growing agent population can produce 
scalability problems in terms of communication [9]. The net outcome is the increased risk 
of delays within data transfer between elements within the agent community.  
 CYBER-SECURITY ISSUES  
The use of self-organisation provides flexibility to a system operating in a dynamic control 
environment, where the integration of distributed generation, electric vehicles and energy 
storage present emerging monitoring and control challenges. But in addition to the 
challenges posed by the properties of the APS network, the technologies involved create 
vulnerabilities which can be exploited by cyber-attacks and therefore creates a reliance on 
cyber-security. 
Cyber security refers to a set of tools, techniques and procedures which are employed for 
the purposes of protecting any element or elements of a computerised system from damage 
or intrusion. These systems have become a fundamental part of the digital era, and products 
and services relating to protecting data or personal devices have become almost as 
ubiquitous as the technologies they are designed to protect. However as stated by the 
authors of [10] any network security mechanism exists under threat from a potential attack 
event where an adversary or adversaries intends to damage the network, extract confidential 
data or manipulate information transmitted between components.  
As modern power systems grow and evolve towards the target of becoming smart grids, 
the additional monitoring, control and communication technologies required to achieve that 
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goal also increases the number of potential points of vulnerability [11]. The threat of cyber-
attacks is not limited to the realm of future network solutions and technologies, design 
choices made during procurement and development of current SCADA systems installed 
during the mid-1990s and early 2000s lead to a concept of openness where few 
considerations were made for system security [12]. One of the reasons that new and 
emerging smart grid concepts may become increasingly vulnerable is the transition from a 
small number of controlled devices to a widespread interconnected network [13]. 
Furthermore the authors of [11] indicate that several smart grid access points are low cost 
devices with limited security provisions and are at risk from malicious tampering. 
Several different cyber-threats have been investigated with respect to the smart grid 
research domain, and several different targets have been identified. For example several 
papers have been published on the topic of false data attacks - [14] [15] [16], this attack 
format involves manipulating messages produced by monitoring devices to misrepresent 
measurements. Therefore control processes begin performing state estimation and control 
decisions based on an incorrect representation of the systems’ properties. Other research 
conducted by the authors of [13] considers a denial of service attack whereby elements of 
the smart grid network become inundated with a stream of noise messages. While 
researchers have suggested the creation of techniques to detect the presence of false data, 
the authors of [13] explain that other than purchasing more bandwidth there are limited 
solutions to the problem of denial-of-service attacks.  The authors of [17] consider the 
aspect of cyber security from the perspective of preventing unauthorised access to 
substations which can host networked devices and servers. Most substations are unmanned 
and have limited physical security mechanisms and therefore present further vulnerability 
whereby an attacker can gain physical access to control hardware and software. A further 
attack approach can be implemented through the use of malware, 
In addition to the smart grid being vulnerable to a range of different attack methodologies 
it also plays host to several potential targets which may be of interest to an adversary. For 
example threats against SCADA systems are considered by the authors of [18] and [19]. 
As the SCADA system contains data reflecting a wide area of the network, an attack has 
potential for influencing or triggering blackouts akin to those described by the authors of 
[20]. Other functions at risk from a cyber threat include state estimation functions [21]; 
state estimation is responsible for the provision estimating voltage magnitudes and angles 
at key buses. However it is also used in power markets, forecasting and contingency 
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analysis among other functions, an attacker can prevent the state estimator from building 
an accurate model of the network through the injection of false data. As a result incorrect 
control signals can be issued as a result of the estimator indicating the presence of faults or 
anomalies in the system which bypassed bad-data filtering processes. A method for 
influencing the state estimation involves compromising Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) 
such that they begin to transmit false measurements as described by the authors of [22] and 
is also considered from the perspective of a network of sensors involved with the 
transmission of false data by the authors of [23]. The attack mechanisms discussed have 
also been suggested with the impact of damaging voltage control procedures  
In addition to focussing on the attack strategies research is also drawn to the detection and 
analysis of cyber threats. For example the authors of [24] present a method for detecting 
attacks against voltage control processes though the analysis of the sources of bad data. The 
source of the attack against voltage control is centred on the falsification of measurements 
and therefore triggering unnecessary tap changes which can shorten the lifespan of the 
transformer. A similar consideration is applied when taking into account overall system 
reliability [19] which surrounds applying defences and security protocols at the SCADA 
level. 
Further work considers threat analysis as presented by the authors of: [25] [26] [27]. The 
authors of [25] explain that the supporting ICT infrastructures involved with operating a 
smart grid solution do not go through the same rigorous simulation and analysis that the 
electrical elements do. Therefore understanding impacts of outages and attack induced 
failures is weaker than it is in comparison electrical outages. The consequence of this is 
that vulnerabilities may not be detected and the impact of those vulnerabilities is not fully 
considered and as a result the correct actions required to close the vulnerability are not 
taken. Furthermore the authors of [26] indicate that the processes involved in modelling an 
attack event from the perspective of its impact on the physical system is limited. These 
limitations are a result of modelling techniques having limited hardware integration and 
end-to-end system modelling. As a result the ability to ultimately assess how an attack 
event would influence a given network is restricted. The authors indicate that simulation is 
restricted by the degree of variance involved in the cyber-security domain 
The impacts of such an attack on the power system can have significant consequences for 
performing control and potentially lead to physical component damage, financial losses 
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and outages all triggered by loss of control signals. This underlines the significance of being 
able to devise solutions and methods for mitigating and limiting the effects of this format 
of attack strategy. Cyber-attacks have been specifically targeting power systems, for 
example Stuxnet [28], Israel [29] and Ukrainian [30] events. The latter containing a denial 
of service component to the attack strategy. Therefore cyber-security issues are a prominent 
driver for developing control and communication architectures which can offer robustness, 
as the authors of [25] documented electrical networks are heavily analysed, but the 
supporting architectures are not. 
 SELF-ORGANISATION 
The challenge created by the threat of cyber-attacks is one that is the responsibility of the 
supporting ICT infrastructure. That infrastructure may contain a multi-agent system 
operating under the jurisdiction of the APS and therefore tools and techniques involved in 
forming a defence against a cyber threat will need to be integrated such a system. One 
approach is the use of self-organising systems. A self-organising system can be defined as 
one that can satisfy the requirements of: scalability, robustness, flexibility and adaptability 
[31] and one that in distributed systems where the set of components and their interactions 
change and evolve in response to the problem domain [32]. The concept of self-organising 
architectures is not a new idea within the field of computer science, with specific reference 
to computer networks and P2P configurations as noted in [31]. A concept for self-
organising software architectures was initially proposed in 1996 [32], [33]. As this is a 
research topic that originated within computer science with respect to network interactions 
such as [34], a volume of research considers self-organisation from a network perspective. 
However these concepts are being increasingly applied to wider subject areas – solving 
business energy consumption levels [35], and transportation networks featuring intelligent 
vehicles [36]. In alternative applications the process of self-organisation is focused on 
modifying the internal behaviours and how they approach their goals and objectives as 
documented by the authors of [35].  According to [37], the concept of a self-organising 
architecture or network has several key properties.  
The first property is scalability, whereby both natural and engineered systems achieve 
scalability through two main requirements. Firstly a lack of complexity – using a set of 
simple behaviours aims to prevent the number computational demand increasing as the 
number of system components increases. The second driver in achieving scalability is a 
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focus on local decision making instead of a centralised approach. Using local, simple rules 
prevents a significant growth in operations for an increasing population as local controllers 
are only exposed to local population changes not global increases.  
The second property centres on stability – wherein the network or agent community must 
remain stable when transitioning from one configuration to another. The stability property 
also encompasses the idea of robustness to the extent that in the process of making a 
transition from one configuration to another the functionality is not lost. The third property 
is agility, which describes the ability of the system to transition from one configuration to 
another within a reasonable timeframe. Furthermore the transition must not be an over-
reaction which would result in an oscillation in network states. 
These principles are taken from a paper discussing cellular communication networks – but 
the general property requirements can be applied to self-organising architectures in smart 
grid control and monitoring. The three properties of Scalability, Stability and Agility are 
all relevant performance factors when transitioning between configurations. A system with 
strong scalability will likely offer strong agility as slower transitions could be influenced 
by issues pertaining to the provision of scalability. Furthermore the less time the 
architecture spends in an intermediary inter-transitional state reduces the likelihood that 
communications will be transmitted before all the connections have been formed resulting 
in greater stability. Additional research completed by the authors of [38] introduced further 
properties which include the ability to form initial structures and connections automatically, 
and the ability to perform self-monitoring. 
The Authors of [37] also compares various classifications of self-organisation, 
classifications which define the level of adherence to the self-organisation concept. 
Adaptive Networks – Configuration changes are made in direct response to changes in 
system state, no consideration for scalability or agility. Triggered based on fixed threshold 
values  
Autonomous Networks – Similar concept to adaptive networks, but implemented 
autonomously – without human or external intervention. One of the core components of a 
self-organised system but on its own doesn’t fulfil the three primary principles. 
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Cognitive Networks – Autonomous networks with learning capabilities, such that trigger 
points are learned based on interaction with the environment. Cognitive networks maintain 
a level of interaction across layers in the system to facilitate the learning process. 
Self-Organised Networks – Take traits from adaptive and autonomous networks and add 
continuous monitoring to decide the appropriate network transition, with the potential to 
lean from the decision for future reference. An advanced self-organised system would also 
be capable of self-optimisation and self-healing. 
The work presented in this thesis includes the development of a self-organising architecture 
which takes advantage of continuous monitoring techniques, a self-initialisation stage and 
a decision making engine. Therefore the final solution can be classified as a self-organising 
architecture. 
 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of the research presented in this thesis is to investigate the potential for self-
organising architectures within a cyber-physical power systems domain and their role in 
providing robustness through cyber-security. At the conclusion of this investigation a self-
organising architecture was developed to address security concerns in the smart grid 
domain and deliver resilience in the presence of a cyber threat which could not be provided 
by a static architecture design. The core objectives in achieving this target are outlined 
below. 
1. Evaluate comparative performances across differing control and communication 
architectures in the context of distribution network management with a view to 
determining the potential role for implementing self-organisation. This 
investigation aimed to determine what the benefits would be of providing self-
organisation within the control and communication architecture and why self-
organisation is an appropriate approach for cyber-security. 
2. Develop and implement an agent population with functioning self-organisational 
properties including architecture formation, contemporaneous monitoring and 
decision making.  
3. Examine the performance of the developed self-organised system in the presence 
of external network threats in the form of cyber-attack events with respect to control 
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and communication performance. These performances are also examined with 
respect to a static architecture undergoing the same cyber-attack conditions with the 
objective of learning which variables are affected by an ongoing attack. A further 
learning outcome is to identify whether a communication variables have an impact 
on the electrical performance of a network while under attack. To determine 
whether the self-organising architecture can improve electrical performance by 
improving communication layer performance.   
 
 
 THESIS OUTLINE 
The remaining chapters of this document will be as follows: 
Chapter 2 will examine the concept of the power system as a cyber-physical system, 
investigating the role of ICT in the modern and future system operation. Further to this the 
chapter will continue to discuss the role of multi-agent systems as one of the techniques 
considered for deployment in smart grids heavily influenced by the integration of ICT 
solutions. The section will also cover examples of control and communication architectures 
implemented smart grid environments and the trends that can be extracted when looking at 
the development of such a system. Finally the section will then discuss the potential 
vulnerabilities that a power system with a high dependence on ICT can face, with a focus 
on cyber-security issues. 
Chapter 3 presents the work completed as a series of control and communication 
architecture designs were investigated in a static state. The goal of the investigation was to 
determine the performance advantages and disadvantages associated with the architecture 
designs and explore the potential for implementing a self-organising architecture. The 
chapter documents the results of those experiments in terms of responding to a voltage 
deviation across increasing agent populations and under the influence of a cyber threat. 
Chapter 4 presents a review of literature, investigated with respect to the design and usage 
of existing self-organising system applications across a range of research domains. The 
purpose of the review was to examine a series of techniques which could be adapted and 
for the implementing within the smart grid domain.  
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Chapter 5 presents the development of the implemented self-organising architecture. The 
chapter documents the three stages of operation and the components involved in the 
developed self-organising architecture. The architecture transition processes are also 
described along the method with which the cyber-attack events were triggered. 
Chapter 6 documents the development of the decision making engine which was 
responsible for the interpreting performance monitoring data and converting that 
information into a transition action. The chapter indicates the initial creation of a decision 
tree approach which was then replaced by a fuzzy based decision making engine which was 
more appropriate when processing ambiguous input data in an environment with multiple 
sources of uncertainty. 
Chapter 7 illustrates the evaluation framework used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
self-organised approach, including the design of the underlying electrical network, agent 
settings and attack conditions. The chapter also includes introduction of the integrated test 
environment used for connecting the MAS in JADE with a power system load flow engine 
in Matpower.  
Chapter 8 contains the results from the sequence of test performed on the self-organising 
architecture where electrical and communication performances were compared with 
respect to a static architecture.  
Chapter 9 is a discussion chapter where in the tool, techniques and approaches taken 
throughout the path of conducting the research are analysed. The chapter considers the 
wider applications of the research contributions and makes suggestions for future work 
within the research area. 
Chapter 10 presents overall conclusions from the completed research, documenting the key 
findings, and evaluating the outcomes in comparison to the initial research objectives.   
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Chapter 2: The Cyber-Physical Power 
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 INTRODUCTION 
As reliance on renewable energy sources and distributed generation increases, new 
challenges arise in monitoring and managing the network. Observability is notoriously 
limited at the lower voltage levels [39] consequently this leaves gaps in the ICT 
infrastructure governing monitoring and control of distribution level assets [40]. Due to the 
emergence of smart grid solutions featuring a cyber-physical infrastructure the volume of 
data present within the network is set to increase. Incorporating emerging smart 
technologies, energy storage, and electric vehicles produces an interesting problem for data 
collection and management. 
As the role of ICT within power system control becomes increasingly important, especially 
with the growing interest in smart grid technologies, new solutions are needed. This 
promotes ICT concepts such as cyber-security and cloud computing further into the 
traditional power system domain. Approaches including Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) and 
self-organising architectures are a potential solution to aiding a developing energy network 
as it becomes more distributed and decentralised. Control algorithms within smart and 
micro grid contexts have been evaluated in terms of control speed and accuracy [41] and 
economic gain [42]. Additionally the ICT challenges facing future power systems are 
known [43]. However the authors in [43] and in [44] suggest that as potential MAS 
implementation offers suitable scalability for a microgrid control scenario.  
The control architecture responsible for hosting a potential agent based solution and the 
volume of data associated with it will be subject to several design criteria. For example a 
multi-agent architecture can be heavily influenced by scalability as suggested by the 
authors of [7]. In MAS design scalability is considered to be a product of two factors – 
complexity and load [45]. The problem of complexity is the more dominant driving force 
in existing research rather than data processing capacity and delays. Scalability assessments 
have been made of MAS platforms outside of the power systems domain [46], [47] 
indicating that MAS are capable of handling large volumes of data. However these 
investigations were conducted within the context of a fixed number of messages, instead 
of supporting continuous data input in a real-time control environment.  
It is envisaged that future grids will be more reliant on decentralized control architectures, 
mainly due to increased penetration of distributed generation and the customer’s active role 
in the energy market. Decentralised cells or zones of control as discussed in [48] and [49] 
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are used to account for the growth in complexity and in uncertainty of power system control 
problems. A decentralised network featuring smart technologies and distributed generation 
presents new control requirements and challenges.  Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are often 
suggested as a potential distributed control solution for the projected decentralised power 
network. These systems are not only governed by the communication infrastructure linking 
network nodes to one another but the configuration of the communication hierarchy. MAS 
have been suggested for use in power systems control for various solutions - for example 
[50] and [51] examine multi-agent solutions for microgrid control – where agents equate to 
components within the microgrid. 
 MAS FOR POWER SYSTEMS  
The Power System industry has adopted MAS for the purposes of research in emerging 
smart grid approaches; the predominant driver for this research in these investigations is 
the application of multi-agent systems for control. An overview paper illustrates the 
relevance of MAS within Power Systems and a series of requirements for a fully 
operational multi-agent control approach Part 1 [52] and 2 [53]. These papers document 
the importance of MAS within the power system domain and that research interest has been 
growing since 2001. The primary focus of that research lies in control procedures, using 
agent based solutions to derive solutions to control issues within the power system domain 
– or in the simulation of complex scenarios. Subsequent research has been drawn to specific 
case studies or individual control challenges. For example the authors of [54] examine the 
potential for MAS in microgrid control; the paper introduces a control approach 
implemented through MAS where each agent in the system equates to a component within 
the microgrid. While the solution demonstrates the applicability of MAS to power system 
problems, the issue of scale isn’t actually considered beyond the abstract of the paper. This 
suggests that there is an interest in making MAS based control solutions scalable, but 
specific contextual research is limited. It has been determined that MAS have the potential 
to operate on a larger scale, but the consequence on performance of a real-time system lacks 
coverage. Another example is [9] where the impact of scale is mentioned through the 
problem of communication demand yet the number of agents at which this problem is 
encountered is not mentioned; nor is the impact on controllability as the system approaches 
this population. In this instance the communicative approach is different to some of the 
other methods in the domain, as messages are sent to a server from the points of 
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measurement instead of via the FIPA-ACL protocol. Some of the scalability problems may 
have been associated to this approach, as the ACL had already been analysed for its 
efficiency within the same agent platform (JADE) [55]. However interactions between 
agents in a power system environment across different hardware will need some 
communication – likely internet based – to disseminate information and commands. Note 
that both the previous examples are aimed at the power system in an islanded state which 
is a representation of MAS as a closed environment to which interactions are encapsulated 
within the specified control domain.  This example suggests that the MAS assumes control 
in the event that the target network becomes islanded as part of the restoration process [56]. 
Here MAS devises an island microgrid after a fault event has occurred, it is a solution which 
relies on the presence of storage within the islanded section of the network in order to meet 
the demand requirements of those customers in the island. It is not clear whether the MAS 
remain an intrinsic part of maintaining control in the case study while a fault condition has 
not arisen or after the fault has been cleared and the island reintegrated into the grid.  
 MAS PLATFORMS 
In a survey of “Multi-Agent Systems” within IEEE journal publications (Smart Grid, Power 
Systems and Sustainable Energy) of those in which an agent based implementation was 
featured – the primary development tool was JADE (7 out of 16 papers 2010-2014) as 
presented in Table 2.1. The nearest alternative featured mathematical abstractions of an 
agent population (3 MATLAB models and 3 algorithmic representations) for the 
demonstrative purpose of control algorithms, agent discovery and research into power 
system markets. These alternatives represented the agent community as a series of 
networked nodes through graph theory, and do not necessarily represent an agent 
community which operates in accordance with the FIPA standards. 
Table 2.1 – Survey of MAS Platforms 
 
The two divisions of analysis are often governed by the difficulty in unifying MAS 
development software with power system simulation engines – each one requiring an 
abstracted form of the other to generate results. Several instances have connected JADE 
year JADE
Mathematical 
Model
Matlab 
Model
EPOCHS
KQML 
Agents
JACK
2014 1 0 3 0 0 0
2013 5 0 0 1 0 0
2012 0 1 0 0 1 1
2011 0 2 0 0 0 0
2010 1 0 0 0 0 0
Totals 7 3 3 1 1 1
Agent approach
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with alternate software packages such as MATLAB/Simulink - [57] [58] [59] InterPSS [60], 
and PSCAD to introduce deeper modelling into the process. However the larger problem 
lies in the differentiation in the two opposing forces, a JADE development is effectively a 
multi-threaded software package which obeys and adheres to the communication and 
operational principles of the accepted FIPA standards. Therefore it runs in real-time, 
allowing data flow and communicative response times to be effectively measured. However 
an associated power-flow/modelling engine operates on the principles of time-steps and 
incremental assessments of the system state, achieved by passing sets of variables between 
the MAS and the power system model. This can test the ability of the agent community to 
solve complex problems in a co-ordinated manner when provided with valid information, 
but often omits the communication load and data management issues present within the 
communication architecture. 
Some implementations where agent co-ordination is the primary goal utilise JADE as a 
stand-alone solution without developing an interface with a second application for further 
modelling [61]. Yet contrasting work considers MAS involvement from a theoretical 
perspective, using the agent principles of inter-connectivity as base material [62].But the 
general consensus is that for the agent development phase of a research activity, JADE 
appears to be the most prevalent platform of choice within power-system research topics.  
 CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURES 
Literature in MAS architectures as presented by the authors of [63] illustrates the intrinsic 
connection between the context of a MAS implementation and the control/communication 
structure. Certain designs such as the hierarchy and the federated architecture illustrated in 
Fig. 2. are more applicable to a problem domain with an inherent embedded structure such 
as a smart microgrid.  
 
Fig. 2.1 – Multi-Agent Architectures 
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A hierarchical structure as illustrated in Fig. 2.a, can support a variety of control approaches 
but as the literature has indicated is prone to hosting several tiers of control at once to cover 
different aspects of the problem. The overall hierarchical concept is one that does conform 
to the conventional structure of the electrical network, whereby smaller components are 
positioned at the bottom of the architecture, transformers occupy the intermediary layers 
and the primary substation is the head of the structure. If the architecture was governing a 
higher voltage level the steps within the hierarchy would change and contain differing 
components. Communication in this environment does not pass between nodes on the same 
hierarchical tier and is only transmitted vertically to other tiers. 
On the other hand the federation structure in Fig. 2.b is aimed more towards local sub-
domain controllers – where the head agent serves as an intermediary between a cluster of 
agents and the rest of the community. In this format the head agent contains greater 
responsibilities than many of the nodes in the hierarchical format; this represents a more 
complex structure whereby individual head agents can communicate with each other unlike 
in the hierarchical structure where communication was only vertical. As a result local 
controllers will be able to work with one another to solve network problems and may be 
more appropriate when dealing with global network challenges rather than local incidents 
such as performing frequency control. A final example considers the holonic architecture 
presented in Fig. 2.c, the holonic architecture consists of a series of nested sub-domains 
which exist as independent cells of the overall architecture with their own goals and 
intentions but also fit together to operate a larger system. Within power systems holonic 
multi-agent systems have been suggested to offer a number of benefits in smart grid 
operations, including autonomy, dynamic reconfiguration and security considerations as 
indicated by the authors of [64].  
In addition to the core architecture information from a MAS perspective it is also important 
to consider the architecture implementations from a power systems perspective, so that 
common traits can be identified. Furthermore the investigation intends to discover to extent 
to which self-organisation is considered in existing implementations. With the growing 
trend and interest in decentralisation and distributed energy multiple examples are present 
within the power system domain, especially as emerging research focuses on developing 
and investigating the grid as a cyber-physical system. The first example stems from a paper 
entitled: “Scalable Distributed Communication Architectures to Support Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure in Smart Grid” [65]. The paper describes potential communication 
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architecture within the context of the smart grid, where smart-meters are considered to be 
the lowest hierarchical entity and therefore make up the bulk of the population. The authors 
examine the issue of architecture design in two phases in the event of the deployment of an 
advanced metering infrastructure – which drives the necessity for communication 
architecture design. 
The initial diagrams taken from [65] and presented in Fig. 2.2 illustrate communication 
architectures associated with data collection from a smart-metered customer population. In 
the diagrams Concentrators receive several input signals from the customer population and 
relay a single signal to the operation centre. While the paper is aimed at communication 
architectures, the initial diagram in Fig. 2.2a, implies a centralised control methodology 
oriented around a central database structure. The authors focus the attention of the paper 
on the processes involved with data management and collection rather than the 
implementation of control algorithms, in the initial structure all data processing is 
conducted centrally 
 
Fig. 2.2 – Traditional and Alternative Advanced Metering Infrastructures 
The paper goes on to suggest improvements using the objective of scalability performance. 
In Fig. 2.2Error! Reference source not found.b, additional Concentrators are suggested 
per quadrant. In effect this becomes a closer partner to the Tiered or Clustered Architectures 
where the Distributed MDMS placements act as upper-tier aggregates. The addition of 
more Concentrators acts in the same way as the clustering process used in both the Tiered 
and Clustered communication architectures. The purpose is to relieve the load pressure on 
the aggregation points by dividing up the set of connected agents or entities. The central 
operation centre remains a focal point for any decision making processes, the Distributed 
MDMS entities conduct local level information processing but the information is ultimately 
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still passed to the operation centre to be interpreted by the various management systems. 
Because communication load is reduced at the concentrator and at the D-MDMS, the 
bandwidth requirements and costs are reduced. 
A third approach is suggested, where a second tier of data collection points contained within 
a series of Distributed Operation Centres as presented in Fig. 2.3 .The Distributed 
Operation Centres process localised control decision making in addition to data collection. 
The central operation centre retains some control responsibilities and the paper references 
the consistency of the interface between the Operation centre and the distributed operation 
centres. As scale increases, through the inclusion of additional smart-metered customers, 
the operation centre retains the same number of interactions, as the Concentrators and the 
Distributed Operation Centres absorb the additional load.   
 
Fig. 2.3 – Advanced metering infrastructure with additional local controllers 
However although three solutions are presented within the paper the authors do not indicate 
a mechanism which would consider switching between the different configurations. Each 
of the architectures illustrated is intended as a static architecture without the abilities and 
knowledge required to perform a transition event. 
A second paper [66], examines the collection of data from PMUs across a wider 
geographical area than the first example, using substations rather than smart-meters as the 
smallest entity. It indicates that due to the various latency requirements of different system 
events, the placement of control within the system architecture would depend on the nature 
of the control problem. For example applications for responding to transient stability issues 
would need to be placed close to the source as the response times need to be within 100ms. 
Alternatively applications focussed on voltage stability or post-event system analysis can 
be positioned more centrally. Fig. 2.4 illustrates the two contrasting approaches for data 
collection and dissemination of control signals. The first case represents a centralised 
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structure, wherein all substations communicate with a single controller overseeing the 
entire monitored population. The authors indicate that such a configuration could be useful 
in terms of injecting control commands directly into the substation without navigating 
through a series of intermediaries. The connection between the two is not anticipated to be 
a direct link given the potential geographical distance between source and controller but 
routed through a communications network involving several routers but those 
communication hops perform no processing. The authors indicate that the centralised 
approach may be more suitable to less time-dependant applications such as voltage stability 
and state estimation – wide area management tasks. But the architecture may prove 
unsuitable for fast response applications such as protection wherein responses are required 
in the time frame of a few cycles. The issue surrounding the response times is due to 
scalability and the number of connections with the central control centre producing a 
greater workload and ultimately influencing response times.  
 
Fig. 2.4 – Centralised and Decentralised Communication Architectures 
Fig. 2.4b illustrates an alternative approach which features intermediary Hubs which 
retrieve data per network division. As documented in the paper, these hubs do not contain 
any controlling functionality – local control algorithms are in place at the substation level 
and wider area management tasks are completed by the central controller. The purpose of 
the Hubs is primarily data management and routing, such that the control centre is not 
overloaded with incoming communications. Hub connections are physically located agents 
and are affiliated with specific buses within the electrical network – indicating that non-
component agents remain part of the physical architecture. As the network sections at the 
hub layer are electrically connected, there is a case for communication between agents in 
the same tier and stepping away from a hierarchical system with a purely vertical 
communication structure. The authors also imply that the control centre can change the 
a)       b) 
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configuration of this architecture depending on the power system conditions – while the 
concept of self-organisation is briefly hinted at, supplementary details on how the 
architecture would change and what the alternative configurations would be are not 
documented in the paper. Each of the network divisions then communicate with the central 
controller. Table 2.2 provides an insight into the scale and composition of the architectures 
involved – not all of which constitute a communicative entity within the architectures. It 
indicates that the network divisions are roughly even with Area-2 being the largest network 
division.  
Table 2.2 – Network Division per Architecture Design 
 
This indicates that in the case of the second topology the distribution of connections intends 
to remain fixed; in the eventuality that one of the hubs becomes congested there is no 
immediate mechanism for transferring substations from one hub to another. As a result the 
hinted self-organising concepts will only apply to control functionality and agent 
responsibility rather than communication architecture changes. Furthermore there is no 
redundancy in the system in the case of hub failure when using the second topology. This 
is more severe in the case of the first topology as there is a single point of failure, therefore 
in the event of a cyber-attack on the central controller – all of the connected substations 
and by extension a large number of customers will be affected.  
A third example of architecture design within the power system and smart grid research 
domain aims at implementing autonomic computing principles as part of the system design 
[67]. The structure presented in Fig. 2.5 encompasses 2316 LV customers (red rectangles 
on the diagram) spread across several intermediaries. The customer population is divided 
between two towns connected at the exchange point below the grid controller – the leftmost 
branch includes 1679 customers and the right branch the remaining 637. The customers are 
grouped into local clusters of 58 customers each under the supervision of a Transformation 
Connector (TC), and the TCs in turn are then grouped into subsets of 5 TCs per one Demand 
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Manager (DM). The TC forwards information from the customer to the DM, and the DM 
enacts balancing policies and responds with control signals to be passed via the TC to the 
customer. Additional architectural structures in the form of sector connectors separate 
different groups of customers from one another, so that policies can be applied to a specific 
classification of customer. This configuration is considerably more deconstructed than the 
other examples investigated thus far. Like the first example, the ALR-SCM network 
considers the customer to be the minimum entity for monitoring – while the network 
presented in Fig. 2.4 considers substations as the smallest entity.  
 
Fig. 2.5 – Autonomic System Architecture 
In practice, microgrid control scenarios would require multiple layers of control, because 
an active network has multiple variables to manage simultaneously – as noted in [66], the 
location of the control can be dependent on the timescale the control operates within. 
Control objectives with a longer time horizon can be processed by an agent further away 
from the agent under control, whereas more critical objectives requiring faster responses 
would be hosted close to the controllable entity. The purpose is to limit the influence of 
latency and interference on critical control signals. 
In that respect the set of requirements desired by a particular network and control condition 
may differ from one another. For example a power restoration problem as presented in [68], 
is centred on the agents at the lowest part of the network being the first responders. Post-
fault the customer agents act to isolate themselves from the network through 
communicating with their immediate neighbours. This involves closing switches in the 
network within a timeframe in the order of milliseconds – thus reinforcing the idea that 
events with the smallest operating window are best placed as close to the source as possible. 
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This example demonstrates that self-organisation within a MAS can be used to trigger 
active reconfiguration of the electrical network instead of the communication network. 
However the agents themselves do not exhibit any self-organising capabilities and do not 
restructure themselves. 
Overall the architectures presented in literature maintain a hierarchical trait, some offering 
centralised control and data collection while others implementing a distributed control and 
communication architecture. The specifics governing some of the control architecture 
design choices involve the visibility and availability of data and measurements, in many 
cases a controller will require information from several sources and therefore cannot within 
the same tier as the controllable entity. Certain control requirements favour a more 
centralised viewpoint and are less sensitive to architectural design. Therefore it would be 
reasonable to assume that a control and communication architecture would benefit from 
being able to transition from one configuration to another for the purposes of fulfilling 
different control requirements.  
 SMART GRID PROJECTS 
At present, the electrical network largely operates with limited degrees of observability and 
controllability especially at the distribution level, which is a consequence of the historically 
unidirectional nature of power delivery. As emerging technologies became more prominent 
within the energy system in the form of energy storage, electric vehicles and distributed 
generation, the unidirectional model is becoming increasingly less applicable. The 
development and integration of these technologies in conjunction with the supporting 
cyber-physical infrastructure moves the power system closer to the concept of a ‘smart 
grid’. In many respects the term ‘smart-grid’ is often applied as an umbrella description of 
a wide spectrum of concepts and solutions involving new grid hardware such as energy 
storage, power electronics and smart meters. Smart grid concepts also extend to the 
inclusion of distributed control and intelligence, active customer participation schemes and 
forecasting techniques.  
Internationally investment in smart grid research and projects has been significant as 
illustrated in the following table in Table 2.3 as published by the authors of [69]. 
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Table 2.3 – Smart Grid Funding Summary 
Country / 
 Region 
Forecasted Smart 
Grid Investments 
Funding for Smart 
Grid Development 
Smart Meter deployment 
European  
Union 
€56 billion by 2020 €384 million 45 million installed as of 
2011, 240 million by 2020 
United States €238-€334 billon 
by 2030 
€4.9 billion in 2009 8 million as of 2011, 60 
million by 2020 
China €71 billion €7.3 billion in 2009 360 million by 2020 
South Korea 16.8 billion 580 million in 2009 500,000 by 2010 
750,000 by 2011 
24 million by 2020 
Australia n/a 253 million in 2009 2.4 million by 2013, state 
of Victoria 
India n/a n/a 130 million by 2020 
Brazil n/a 143.6 million in 2009 63 million by 2020 
Japan n/a 621.3 million in 2010 n/a 
The report also documents a list of 219 smart grid related projects which were in effect at 
the time of publication spanning both the UK and the wider EU community. These projects 
covered a wide range of components of the smart grid domain including grid automation, 
smart metering, customer behaviour and overall integrated system approaches. Within the 
context of the research presented in this thesis it was relevant to consider projects with a 
focus on investigating and deploying a control and communication architecture. This 
architecture could include the collection of data from smart-metered customers and the 
placement of either local and/or centralised controllers.  
2.5.1 Smart Grid Projects in the UK 
The first set of examples documenting smart grid demonstrations and deployments 
considers projects within the UK. 
Northern Isles New Energy Solutions (NINES) 
The NINES [70] project aims to develop smart grid solutions for the electrically islanded 
network of the Shetland Islands. Prior to the instigation of the project the islands were 
supplied solely by two aging convention generation plants and a single wind generation 
site. Potential for further wind generation capabilities was limited by network integration 
issues surrounding voltage levels and power flow. Adding storage capabilities, demand side 
response solutions and an active network management system, additional wind capacity 
can be added to the existing network and overall network operation can be improved.  
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The NINES network is a predominantly LV network serving the Shetland Islands, the 
network is electrically islanded from the mainland grid and prior to the project taking place 
was supplied by aging fossil fuel plants. The highest voltage level is 33kV, delivered via 
overhead cables and subsea lines when connecting between islands. It is composed of 1000 
domestic customers, two conventional generation plants, one wind farm, a 1MW Battery 
Storage device and one 150MWh Thermal store with a 4MW boiler. The network 
encompasses 1,000 customers. Total customer demand peaks at 48MW and drops to a 
minimum of 11MW in summer – yearly average consumption of 215GWh.  As per the hub 
network diagram the system covers 11, 11kV network branches serving the population 
centres. The diagram doesn’t disclose where the 1,000 customers involved in the trial are 
located. Across the Shetland Islands there are an estimated 10,144 households1, therefore 
the NINEs network encompasses approximately 10% of the total population.  
Control of the network is conducted via a network management system [71], which 
retrieves sensor measurements from points in the network and in conjunction with internal 
models of different aspects of the network including demand forecasting. The active 
network management (ANM) control system has three core priorities: Balancing and 
scheduling, transient stability, and power flow and voltage management. In each instance 
the ANM appears to be a single centralised control unit receiving updates from various 
components within the system. Separate algorithms handle each of the control objectives; 
it is not clear whether separate control stations are used to distribute the different processes. 
While there are different algorithms managing the three core management conditions, they 
can cooperate and interact with one another and do not work completely independently. 
Therefore it can be suggested that the AMN system could be represented as three central 
agents operating in parallel and containing their own control jurisdictions, with negotiation 
capabilities. The remaining agents would sit within the points of generation and the smart 
loads within customer premises. The overall structure of the network and its control system 
are presented in Fig. 2.6 
                                                          
1National Records of Scotland: http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/files2/stats/council-area-data-
sheets/shetland-islands-factsheet.pdf 
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Fig. 2.6 – Electrical Diagram and Controller Locations 
In terms of controllable elements within the network, the idea is that a proportion of the 
control will delivered through demand side response, 234 homes within the network are 
equipped with smart heaters which can be controlled remotely. Users can enter a series of 
parameters, but control signals themselves are communicated from the AMN. These signals 
are delivered per 15 minute intervals to the set of controllable loads to set their charging 
and discharging patterns for each quarter hour period. Control over storage and water 
heating operates in a more decentralised manner – local hubs are situated throughout the 
network as noted in Fig 2. The majority of the control hubs independently oversee certain 
physical locations, whereas the control domain of other hubs overlaps with each other. It 
appears that these hubs do not cover the same customer populations, for example the 
southernmost hub corresponds with the 11kv network branch serving Sumburgh – a 
population centre containing around 100 residents, whereas other hubs can contain 
populations closer to 1,000 residents. However given it is not stated how many participating 
customers exist per hub controller.  
Voltage control processes operate on the basis that only pre-defined points on the network 
are monitored, these points represent areas which are specifically at risk of a voltage 
excursion. If the constraints are met at these locations, the remainder of the network will 
be operating within limits. Points of vulnerability are determined through prior analysis on 
the basis of whether adjustments to controllable devices could cause either power flow or 
voltage to violate the operating limits. This reduces the number of inputs requiring 
processing by the AMN’s power flow and voltage management module. The update 
resolution for incoming data for this monitoring process is not stated.  
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As noted, the evidence tends to suggest that control is centralised with information retrieved 
from components. The different aspects of the control system operate under differing data 
transmission requirement, for example the customer demand forecasting for space and 
water heating processes information in groups of 100-150 customers, instead of the entire 
1,000 customer population. A trial house contained 19 smart devices, each communicating 
12-14 data channels at a resolution of 1-5 minutes [72]. Charging instructions are delivered 
in 15 minute intervals from central control, as forecasting covers 15 minute intervals.   
Electricity North West – LV Network Solutions Project 
The LVNS project [73] is aimed at improving monitoring across LV networks with the 
vision of better preparedness for future developments in domestic generation, storage and 
EV ownership. The project is focussed on investigating measurement approaches within 
the LV network to gain a greater insight into the performance of these networks. Data 
extracted from the monitoring approaches is then used academically as an input to network 
model design to investigate capabilities for projected increases in low carbon technologies.  
The scope of the project contains 200 distribution substations – ground-mounted 
transformers and areas with PV installations were the core focus of the selection. This 
coverage represents a small proportion of the total ENW network containing 33,000 
distribution substations. Across the 200 selected substations the scope of the project 
included over 1000 feeders. Some feeders connect less than 25 customers, while over 50% 
of the total number of feeders within the trial population connects over 50 customers.  
The control and communication configuration is presented in Fig. 2.7, overall the ENW 
LVNS project isn’t specifically concerned with performing control actions, instead 
primarily focussing on monitoring and data collection. The monitoring devices do not 
receive any form of control input from the central server, but a degree of interaction is 
involved in enacting the communication protocol. Therefore the monitoring devices do 
have command reception capabilities in addition to transmission. Modelling and analysis 
procedures are often conducted offline via the data files siphoned off to Manchester 
University, the iHost server itself does not perform any analysis or control duties – purely 
data collection, organising and archiving. Data collection and processing was handled by a 
central server, information from monitoring units transmitted using GPRS/3G mobile 
phone communication channels. Each monitoring device logs data in 1-10 minute intervals 
and transmits the information using an installed SIM card. 
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The central server also exported data to Manchester University for processing and further 
investigation. Data transmission from monitoring devices to the central collection server 
was conducted at 10 minute intervals – initially a sampling rate of 1 minute was 
implemented, but issues involving high data flow rates and volumes affecting data retrieval 
and storage drove a change in sampling rate. Sampling rates with a longer time interval 
than 10 minutes would lead to underestimating voltage impacts.  
The following variables are included in the LV monitoring approach: 
 RMS line to neutral voltage per phase 
 Bi-directional currents per phase, and neutral currents 
 Power factor per phase 
 Phase angle per phase 
 
Fig. 2.7 – Communication Links in LVNS 
From this information real and reactive power was calculated, along with total harmonic 
distortion. Each measurement packet is communicated with a sequence of header data 
including date, time, feature number, serial number and phase. The majority of monitoring 
devices were installed at the substation level, and on the LV bus at the head of a feeder. A 
small subset of the trialled network was monitored at the mid and end points of selected 
feeders – 25 feeders (50 sensors) included in the initial deployment. Plans for expansion 
into monitoring for 100 feeders with 200 sensors are in place. Individual customer 
monitoring is not in place in this scenario, customer profiles are replicated using the CREST 
tool, and simulated profiles were validated against a 51 customer test cell [74]. Therefore 
interpreting the monitoring devices in place from an agent based perspective – each feeder 
would be represented by three agents: one at the feeder head, plus mid and end point 
monitoring. Additional agents would monitor substations and transformers. In the overall 
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trial network this would total 3,200 agents, not taking into account duplicate points of 
measurement where a feeder head monitoring and substation monitoring  would be under 
the control of a single agent.   
Present measuring timescales and focusses are planned to be replaced by smart-meter data 
as and when widespread installation occurs.   
SoLa Bristol Project 
The solar Bristol project [75] [76],is of a much smaller scale than the other two examples 
provided thus far, with a focus on integration of PV generation and DC microgrids instead 
of widespread data management as noted in the LVNS example. The project fits within the 
Smart grid approach through integration of a cyber-physical system and demand side 
response approaches. 
The SoLa Bristol project consists of 30 domestic customers, 5 schools and an industrial 
customer – therefore containing far fewer customers than the other example projects which 
spanned a much larger section of the host network. All customers in the trial are fitted with 
PV generation, battery storage and a DC connection.  Multiple levels of control are applied 
within the project, instead of a purely centralised control solution. The lowest level of 
control exists within the domestic properties themselves. A combined charger inverter 
device is a micro-computer controlled unit aimed at managing the energy derived from the 
PV generation and current battery storage levels. The local controller determines the 
charging pattern of the connected batteries and handles exporting excess power to the grid. 
These controllers can be receive update commands and remotely monitored. Unlike the 
local smart-devices in the NINES network a degree of local automation is present with less 
remote intervention, this is because of the objectives of the system the SoLa approach is 
more customer centric whereas the NINES network is more network centric. Execution of 
demand side response requests is also handled locally at the customer layer via a Siemens 
LV connection manager device which instigates automated demand management.  
Monitoring and analysis is performed at the substation level acting as a middle-agent 
between the customer and the central data store. The substation receives periodic 
measurements from the connected customers which are then processed by the LV Network 
Manager. The LV Network manager is another Siemens control device which determines 
if a demand side action is required and which customer/customers are eligible to provide 
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the appropriate response. The substation control level is aimed at monitoring network 
conditions and initiating control actions in the event that constraints are reached. Whereas 
the customer connection manager aims to enact the control action in the based on customer 
needs, battery levels and PV output.  
The communication network in the project is primarily focussed around GPRS data 
transmission, ultimately conveying the information to a central data repository. Monitoring 
and analysis of received data is conducted at the substation level where each substation is 
in contact with a subset of the overall customer population as noted in Fig. 2.8. These 
substations would act in the same role as aggregation agents in the existing MAS 
implementation. Updates from each substation are then passed on to the central data 
repository - to an extent forming a similar communication structure to the clustered MAS 
architecture.  
 
Fig. 2.8 – SoLa Bristol Communication Architecture 
To avoid interference from the customer’s existing internet connection and subsequent 
usage of the available bandwidth, each premises involved in the trial is fitted with a 
dedicated router to facilitate secure export of customer information. The process of data 
collection takes place in three stages depending on the nature of the date currently being 
transferred. Stage 1 is a local data store, readings are taking at one minute intervals and 
stored on-site, this data can be retrieved remotely if necessary and can be accessed from 
inside the customer home. Stage 2 is a set of periodic updates that are communicated 
outside of the house through the GPRS network to the data repository – these status updates 
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are transmitted at 15 minute intervals. The final stage relates to immediate signals which 
are transmitted spontaneously, in the event of a fault – information is transmitted to the 
substation and is passed onto the DNO.  
The requirements presented in the project proposal [77] indicate that a LV network manager 
device – substation level controller – should allow communication with up to 32 LV 
connection managers. This effectively indicating that the aggregate level controller 
operates covers clusters of 32 customers, a clustering size that matches the customer 
population used per aggregate in the clustered communication architecture – presently over 
feeders containing 90 customers. The proposal also recommends communication 
thresholds between the network and connection managers. 
2.5.2 Smart Grid Projects in Europe 
Outside the UK, smart grid deployments remain a core component of developing and 
researching technologies and concepts for future grids. Due to the interconnected nature 
and scale of Europe the challenges facing smart-grid research can involve co-ordinating 
between several countries and several different organisations. As with the UK approach to 
smart-grid research some projects are local to one country or city with the focus on 
improving specific technologies. With respect to the research conducted in this thesis is 
was more relevant to consider cased whereby a physical deployment was discussed for the 
purposes of assessing the communication and control architectures involved. The first 
example is the Grid4EU project as discussed below. 
Grid4EU 
The Grid4EU project covered multiple aspects of smart grid research in the pursuit of 
investigating an integrated smart system with involvement from 6 different distribution 
system operators in as many countries (Germany, Spain, Italy, Czech Republic, France and 
Sweden). The core objectives of the project are outlined in the report as presented in [78] 
– the report also documents that an outcome of the project was the deployment of six 
demonstrators one in each of the six contributing countries. Across the six demonstrators a 
total of 275,000 customers, however due to the level at which the control and 
communications are applied to the network the same number of components are not 
involved in the communication architecture. Substations were often used as the smallest 
component in the architecture and therefore a small number of substations accounted for a 
much larger number customers for example in the German demonstration project.  
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In the German demonstrator project the control and communication is facilitated by a three-
tier hierarchical multi-agent system, each tier of the hierarchy contains a different agent 
classification as illustrated by Fig. 2.9 
 
Fig. 2.9 – Grid4EU German Demonstrator Agent Hierarchy 
 
The lower tier is populated by M-Agents, which represent non-switchable substations and 
therefore have not control influence on the network, in comparison to several UK projects 
the scope of the project is aimed at the MV level and does not consider agents at the 
customer level. Each of the M-Agents represents a large customer population therefore 
allowing a relatively small amount of agents to cover a wide geographic are. The purpose 
of the M-Agents is to perform measurements from the substation and other relevant 
information, and each of the M-Agents is associated with a single agent in the next tier. In 
the second tier are a series of S-Agents, these also represent substations and exist on the 
same electrical tier as the M-Agents but account for substations with switchable capabilities. 
The S-Agents are responsible for responding for collecting data from M-Agents and 
responding to control events, unlike the M-Agents, S-Agents can communicate with one 
another to co-ordinate control and share information. The top tier is occupied by the CC-
Agent which acts as a gateway agent to the SCADA system, therefore it is responsible for 
global data collection and overall agent management. In some circumstances depending on 
the potential configuration of the agent architecture, an S-Agent can assume the 
responsibilities of the CC-Agent, therefore all of the agents involved in the architecture will 
be associated with substation components in the electrical network as the digital and 
electrical architectures take on differing structures.  
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Web2Energy 
A second example of a European project is Web2Energy as outlined in  [80], the 
Web2Energy project is another multinational example spanning five countries. The project 
focuses on three elements of smart-grid research in the form of Distribution Automation, 
Smart Aggregation and Smart Metering. In each of the three research criteria the over-
arching theme is the analysis of the data requirements and parameters for communication. 
For example in the work package focussing on Smart Aggregation is concerned with 
retrieving data from loads, generation units and storage devices with the goal of 
representing the components as a virtual power plant. The data resolution for each of the 
elements of the virtual power plant is set at 15 minutes. As in the previous example the 
project contains a number of demonstrator sites to evaluate research objectives, a 
demonstration site in Germany is configured for the purpose of processing smart-meter data.   
In terms of scale, the test network consisted of 200 smart metered customers and relied on 
the existing communication infrastructure to transmit smart-meter data. The 
communication between smart-meter and the metering infrastructure varies based on the 
type of customer and their connectivity methods. Some of the customers will be using their 
own broadband connection, this approach transmits instantaneous power data with a 
transition resolution of 1-2 seconds. The customers will also have access to the real-time 
data through the use of an in-home display station. Alternatively if the customer does not 
connect though a broadband connection the connectivity is provided via the 2G mobile 
network, customers providing data in this manner produce updates at 24hr intervals, while 
pricing information is passed back to the meter. The smart meter also displays information 
based on local measurements at 15 second intervals in addition to billing information 
transmitted from the supplier, the in-home displays are less sophisticated in the absence of 
a broadband connection. In both circumstances the communication between smart meter 
and the metering infrastructure is bidirectional and therefore the hardware is required to 
process incoming data in addition publishing updates. A third and final set of customers 
serves a different purpose and therefore are assigned a different communication approach, 
these customers are capable of performing demand side response and as a result are 
connected via PLC to a data concentrator. This concentrator acts as a controller and delivers 
the signals triggering demand side response from selected controllers. 
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UPGrid 
A final example of a European smart-grid project featuring a deployment exercise is the 
UPGrid project, which is another multi-national project which indicates the challenges 
faced by electrical networks within Europe and their interdependence on neighbouring 
countries. In this case demonstration activates were completed in Sweden, Portugal, Poland 
and Spain as described in [81], each of which features variations in the control and 
communication architectures. An example architecture is represented within the Spanish 
demonstration project as illustrated in Fig. 2.10. As the figure demonstrates, a flat 
communication architecture has been implemented where data is transmitted through a 
secure medium to a central system. The central system is then responsible for control, 
power system analysis and visualisation, what is not discussed is the intermediary 
communication infrastructure between the layer of intelligent devices and the centralised 
control system. It may be the case that a series of data concentrators are implemented but 
if so, these components will play no role in the control and decision making process.  
In a similar approach to the German demonstration component of the Grid4EU project, the 
smallest components within the intelligent devices layer are substations, which results in a 
large effective customer population while integrating a comparatively small number of 
agents. The demonstration project covers 190,000 customers in the city of Bilbao, as 
illustrated by the communication structure in Fig. 2.10 the information flow is indicated to 
be unidirectional and therefore the objective of the Spanish demonstrator is primarily 
focussed network monitoring and data collection than overall control performance.  
 
Fig. 2.10 – Communication Architecture of the UPGrid Spanish Demonstrator Project 
The other demonstrator sites within the overall UPGrid project are designed to evaluate 
differing requirements and therefore present with alternate communication methodologies. 
For example the Portuguese demonstration project is more involved with the collection and 
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dissemination of market pricing information as documented in [82]. The inclusion of the 
energy pricing data results in a communication format which involves cyclical messaging 
as market data is returned the customer as customer consumption information is passed to 
the suppliers. 
2.5.3 Smart Grid Projects in the Rest of the World 
Looking further afield other countries in the rest of the world are subject do differing 
constraints. For example Australia and the United States host grids which can cover vast 
geographic areas within the same county and where multi-national cooperation is less of a 
dominant factor. Coordination and collaboration may still be required between 
states/territories and operators however.  
Perth Solar City 
The first example is part of a national solar cities initiative in Australia in which seven 
urban locations across the country selected as demonstration sites for solar city concepts as 
documented in [84] the solar cities program aims to improve renewable energy integration, 
smart meter implementations and energy conservation. The programme also takes into 
account the social and behavioural elements of a smart grid solution for the purposes of 
developing demand side response objectives.  
Many of the demonstration projects follow a similar format and involve the installation of 
PV units both domestically and on community buildings, installation of smart meters and 
the distribution of solar water heaters. One of the these projects was cited in Perth as 
documented in [83], and involved the deployment of 9,000 smart meters, the 
communication infrastructure for the metering scheme is presented in Fig. 2.11 and 
indicates a holonic architecture. Smart meters represent a Home Area Network (HAN) 
which is then composed of a series of smart devices responsible for heating, load control 
and metering. Smart meters themselves connect to the network management system in one 
of two manners, standard meters use the conventional 3G network via a meshed radio 
frequency service in the immediate vicinity of the customer area. The meshed system would 
offer greater reliability as each connection isn’t specifically reliant on one relay or access 
point to the 3G network allowing data and commands to follow multiple paths to the 
network management system. A second variant of smart meter deployed as part of the 
demonstration project is a point-to-point connection, meters using this method are in direct 
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connection with the network management system and bypass the conventional 
communication infrastructure.  
 
Fig. 2.11 – Perth Solar City Communication Architecture 
In the Perth solar city demonstration project control is handled centrally by the network 
management system and additional software packages responsible for assessing business 
and operational conditions. In many respects this format bears similarity to the UPGrid 
European project whereby an advanced metering infrastructure doesn’t host any of the 
control responsibility and all decision making processes are handled at a central location. 
However the Perth solar city project does cater more for applying control rather than 
focussing on network monitoring as the customer HAN is designed to facilitate the 
integration of smart loads and heating systems which can be accessed as a form of demand 
side response.  
AEP Ohio GridSMART Demonstration Project 
A further example is taken from a project implemented in the United States in the State of 
Ohio as documented in [85], which focuses on the delivery of four core smart grid 
objectives. The first of which considers the implementation of an advanced metering 
infrastructure and the installation of 100,000 smart meters within the scope of the project. 
Each of the meters are designed to accept bi-directional communication which is in line 
with the specifications of the meters installed in the Solar Perth Project, customer updates 
are transmitted to the operator and control signals are received by the set of smart meters. 
The motivation behind the inclusion of bi-directional communication is to achieve the 
second of the project objectives in the form of the provision of customer engagement for 
the purposes of demand side management. Demand side management schemes are a 
recurring concept in the series of smart grid project examples in conjunction with a smart 
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metering infrastructure. The third of the core objectives is to increase network automation 
through increasing the embedded intelligence within the network to automate assets and 
provide network reconfiguration capabilities. A final objective of the project is to optimise 
voltage control procedures through the integration of new control algorithms and 
approaches.  
While the core objectives previously outlined are consistent with properties of the other 
smart grid research projects, the AEP Ohio project specifically outlines procedures for 
dealing with security incidents. Initially a central monitoring system contains software 
which can detect meter tampering for the purposes of electricity theft.  However in addition 
to the prevention of meter tampering the project also includes scope for the development 
of a suite of cyber-security processes – this was introduced through more thorough testing 
and evaluations of technologies involved in the demonstration project. The technologies 
were subject to a threat analysis and penetration testing procedures – such an approach had 
not been explicitly highlighted any of the preceding examples on smart grid deployment. 
In addition to the pre-emptive security analysis performed on the components, 
collaboration between project contributors and additional agencies added scope for further 
analysis of an active system. American Electrical Power (AEP) as one of the lead 
contributors was involved in the development of a cyber-security operations centre (CSOC) 
as documented in [86]. The core objective of the centre is to recognise the threat posed by 
cyber-attacks to the smart grid and facilitate collaboration between energy companies in 
the US to exchange information relating to attacks and mitigation strategies.  
 VULNERABILITY TO CYBER THREATS 
In a system which is increasingly reliant on ICT infrastructure, there are additional points 
of vulnerability and therefore potential weaknesses which a malicious user may wish to 
exploit. Given that several industrial control systems presently offer very little in the way 
of security adding increased connectivity between controllers and other nodes in a unified 
cyber-physical system does increase the accessibility of these unprotected systems. 
Therefore the role of threat resistance and attack response become increasingly important 
in the role of managing the power system. The following figure in Fig. 2.12 taken from the 
Internet Security Threat Report [87] illustrates the rise in detected vulnerabilities within 
industrial control systems across an increasing range of vendors. 
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Fig. 2.12 - Increase in ICS Vulnerabilities 
There are no defined models or definitive attack processes because an adversary will not 
adhere to a set of particular guidelines and instead will develop the attack based on the 
desired goals of the adversary and the resources available. It is often considered that a 
potential attacker with an unlimited amount time, skill and resources will be able to break 
through any potential security measure circumventing all defensive measures. Therefore it 
is not feasible to develop and build a completely impenetrable system. The following sub-
sections outline a series of potential attack methodologies and the potential impacts; this is 
not an exhaustive list of strategies and consequences but demonstrates the range of 
vulnerabilities and consequences of an attack event. 
2.6.1 False Data Attacks 
One attack approach is in the form of false data, whereby an attacker injects information 
into the system, adding false data into a network can take place in a number of formats, 
from misrepresenting sensor data to trick state estimation systems [88] or falsify network 
topologies [89]. False data based attacks can trigger controllers to make incorrect decisions 
resulting in economic losses and operational issues [90]. 
False data based attacks have been demonstrated to pose a threat to a range of elements of 
network operation. For example research has examined the case for the vulnerability of 
state estimation tools to this attack format: [90], [88], [91], whereby false information is 
accepted by the estimator bypassing bad data filtration processes. These processes are also 
able to identify and remove malicious measurements which injected into the system, a false 
data attack aims present data which passes through error detection solutions and is then 
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used in the process of performing state estimation. An inaccurate state estimation 
compromised though data injection could lead to incorrect decision making or reduced 
awareness of component failure. Another attack strategy involving the use of a false data 
injection approach involves misleading the control centre via falsifying network topology 
information [89]. In this attack approach the attacker exploits the lack of authentication 
between terminals and a control centre; as a result the attacker can convince the control 
system that the network is operating under an alternate topology. Therefore making it easier 
to conceal network stresses and prevent control actions being initiated to relieve those 
stresses. The authors of [89] indicate that the lack of authentication is a result of the volume 
of legacy devices and communication equipment active in the power system – it is these 
devices which indicate the scope of the problem of defending a large scale cyber-physical 
infrastructure against attackers.  
2.6.2 Malware Attacks 
A second approach is to infect devices within the system with malicious software designed 
to either compromise a device such that it can be used as a launch platform for an attack on 
another part of the network or modify/disrupt the functionality of the host device. Malware 
based attacks such as Havex [92], and BlackEnergy [93] have been traced and monitored 
by the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) in the 
US. This illustrates the validity of the threats posed by malware [30] to the power system, 
the use of malware may be one component in a multi-faceted attack on the network - for 
example an attack on the Ukrainian power system as described in [30] included several 
attack vectors one of which was the delivery of malware – using a variant of the 
BlackEnergy malware previously noted. The same attack also included the distribution of 
manipulated Microsoft office documents with embedded malware to allow the help the 
attackers gain control of the system. 
2.6.3 Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks 
DoS attacks involve transmitting a large volume of traffic at a target or targets with the 
view of interrupting or disabling the service delivered by the target. Like malware based 
attacks, DoS of Distributed DoS events can be conducted using bespoke software or tools 
available online. As per the information provided in [87] such an attack can be purchased 
for as little as $10 per day indicating that in many respects a DoS based attack method may 
be the most universally accessible to a wider range of potential attackers as the required 
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technical knowledge is lower. The scale and scope of a DDoS attack can vary considerably 
depending on the connectivity of the target and the resources of the attacker – for example 
recent DDoS event targeting the BBC as reported in [94] reached a peak attack traffic 
transmission rate of 602Gbps. In the context of a smart grid network scenario this level of 
attack traffic can be considered unlikely given the capabilities of the control and monitoring 
equipment involved. While the authors of [13] indicate that the present cyber-physical 
network has little in the way of defensive approaches in the face of a denial of service attack 
other than purchasing additional bandwidth.  
While large scale denial of service events can prove to be destructive and have the potential 
to grind digital systems to a halt operating over several days or weeks – they are easier to 
detect than some other of the more latent attack formats. However a form of the denial of 
service approach relies on targeted bursts of low-rate data over a period of time aiming to 
interfere with the operation of a system when it is most vulnerable. This as referenced in 
[95] and [96] is called a shrew attack and aims to be more efficient and require greater 
awareness of the target system. 
2.6.4 Social Engineering  
One of the most difficult weaknesses to counteract from a technical standpoint is the use of 
social engineering methodologies which rather than launching an attack against the 
hardware or software of the infrastructure targets the human controllers. Social engineering 
aims to breech security protocols through convincing operators that access is needed or 
through manipulating the user to unknowingly divulge access credentials or rights to a 
potential attacker. In itself social engineering is unlikely make up the destructive element 
of an attack and serves more as an intermediary step on the path to perpetrating the attack. 
Using the example of the attack on the Ukrainian power network as referenced in [30] a 
social engineering mechanism called spear-phishing was employed to steal access 
credentials to the system which in turn would have made the installation of remote access 
tools easier and hand control of the system over to the adversary. 
 CONCLUSIONS 
The examination of the literature and network deployments there general consensus is that 
a hierarchical approach to the design of the control and communication architecture 
structures is the most effective method. However the research is not unified on the structure 
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beyond the hierarchical concept, citing differing levels numbers of data aggregation levels, 
and distribution of controllers within the architecture. The concept of self-organisation was 
barely recognised within the source literature and indicating that the architecture considered 
within the research are intended to remain static, likely with additional reinforcement to 
ensure they can withstand a wider range of communication traffic. Therefore there is 
definite scope to explore a range of architecture designs using the information extracted 
from existing literature and determine whether there are performance gains to be exploited 
from the design of the communication architecture. Furthermore there is additional scope 
to consider if the absence of a thorough discussion of self-organisation within the presented 
examples is an oversight or whether a well-designed static configuration is capable of 
producing all of the relevant performance characteristics.  
Additionally the communication structures present in the deployment examples are not 
necessarily aiming to solely deliver control signals to components within the network, the 
ENW-LVNS example mainly oriented around the provision of data collection and 
information management. Both these factors will have to be integrated into the agent 
architecture in order to evaluate their effectiveness. The structure of the networks examined 
will serve as a basis for the underlying model in terms of feeder length, customer population 
distribution and architecture configurations. Although the SoLa Bristol project presents a 
situation whereby only 32 customers can be effectively connected to a local controller, 
predicted advances in communication technology and computational power would suggest 
that this upper boundary could be exceeded in the future. Therefore these limits will be 
removed when considering the architectures presented in the following chapter, certain 
configurations will consist of smaller customer clusters than others but there will be a 
higher threshold. If the investigation determines that self-organisation is a viable method 
of defining the control and communication architecture, these limits will be useful in 
determining how many connection requests a controller or aggregator will accept. 
Additionally the deployment scenarios present cases with a relatively low sampling rate or 
degree of observability. For example the ENW-LVNS case includes three points of voltage 
sampling per feeder, at the top, tail and centre of the line, with data transmitted from sensors 
at up to 10 minute intervals. The planned investigation intends to increase the 
communication rate and coverage within the agent population, partly to be in line with 
potential future technologies but also to test the architectures more thoroughly with a more 
intense communication demand. 
45 The Cyber-Physical Power System 
 
From a development stand point multi-agent systems are commonplace within power 
system and specifically microgrid research and therefore demonstrating that such an 
approach is an appropriate base for the investigation into architecture designs. The 
investigation into the differing agent platforms has concluded that using JADE the 
development tool is an appropriate technique for exploring the different architectures and 
for implementing a series of agents which can represent the technologies involved in a 
sample network model. 
Finally research considering the impact and potential vulnerabilities arising from cyber-
threats indicates that these network events should be considered when developing smart 
grid architecture. This is because a cyber-attack may be directed at the control and 
communication technologies with a goal of disrupting and interfering with the delivery of 
control signals.  
Overall the research has indicated that there is a case for developing multi-agent 
architectures while individual scenarios and configurations prefer variations on a 
hierarchical theme. Therefore the following investigation will consider a series of 
architecture configurations in isolation to evaluate their relative performance, this will 
determine the potential plausibility of introducing self-organisation as a method of 
accessing ensuring continued system operation in the event that the network requirements 
change, or an attack event is present. 
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Chapter 3: Multi-Agent Architectures 
for Voltage Control  
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 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter two outlined the structural concepts used within the smart grid research domain 
featuring levels of decentralised control and hierarchical communication structures. From 
this information a series of architecture configurations were subsequently developed 
drawing inspiration from existing research. A total of 16 control and communication 
architectures were constructed within the JADE agent platform, each of which was then 
examined in the presence of a voltage deviation event present on each feeder, such that as 
additional agents were added to the scenario, the scale of the control requirements also 
increased. Therefore raising not only the amount of data recovered through customer 
demand, DG generation and voltage monitoring data streams but also through the number 
of requests for control and the resulting control signals. 
This investigation considered the performance of the individual architectures in isolation, 
to establish whether there was a notable difference between the capabilities of the selected 
configurations. Each of the architectures was assessed for its performance in respect to 
conventional operation in the form of performing the voltage control objective and 
maintaining data flow between the tiers of the architecture, and under the influence of an 
attack event. In addition to performing the control objective the architectures were also 
assessed under the presence of cyber-threat which was designed to be a result of 
compromised smart-meters failing to respond to control signals. 
This chapter outlines the selected electrical network upon which will be under the 
jurisdiction of the agent population and documents the control process embedded within 
the set of agents with respect to calculating voltage magnitude and providing voltage 
control. The chapter also contains the structures of the four core communication 
architectures developed, and the nature of the agents involved within those architecture 
detailing the roles and responsibilities of each component. Finally a series of test criteria 
are considered for evaluating the performance of the differing architectures and the series 
of results generated in response to those criteria. 
 TEST NETWORK 
The selected network model used for the testing process was based on a series of radial LV 
feeders; a section of LV network was selected due to the distribution network being subject 
to the introduction of smart-metering. Furthermore it is a part of the electrical system which 
is presently under-observed and therefore was an appropriate tier in the power systems 
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hierarchy to install agents. Additionally the literature surrounding control and 
communication architectures mostly involved the distribution network and smart-metering 
infrastructures. This network model is outlined in the following diagram in Fig. 3.. 
 
Fig. 3.1 – Network Diagram 
The network existed as a series of embedded variables stored as agent knowledge within 
the agent population. Each agent was supplied with information describing impedances to 
its neighbours, using data extracted from [97] and presented in Table 3.. The variables and 
calculation processes were then verified against a Simulink model of the same network 
configuration to ensure that the agent community modelled an electrical network. The 
network was composed of several radial feeders, each serving 90 customers, the number of 
customers, length of cable and customer density parameters were in line with feeder 
represented within the LV Network Solutions Project as documented by the authors of [73]. 
Population increases were achieved through appending additional branches to the network 
spine up to a total of 18 feeders serving 1620 domestic customers.   
Table 3.1 – Network Parameters 
Parameter Value 11kV Conductor 
Generation 63kW per DG Resistance  0.164Ω/km 
Customer Demand External demand profile Reactance 0.08Ω/km 
Branch Separation 500m 400V Conductor 
Customer Separation 10m Resistance 0.32Ω/km 
Feeder Population 90 Customers Reactance 0.075Ω/km 
Number of Feeders 6-18 (on branch pairings)   
Customer Population 540-1620   
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Each of the customers was supplied with a demand profile which was extracted from 
Customer-Led Network Revolution (CLNR) data files available online [98]. The number 
of customers per feeder and the selected load profiles were configured such that a voltage 
deviation would be present on each feeder, affecting customers towards the end of the 
feeder. 
3.2.1 Voltage Calculation 
The voltage calculation process was triggered by the observer agent at three second 
intervals – the calculation propagates through the network. Each active agent in the 
hierarchy was informed of the voltage at the preceding bus a value for transmitted power; 
the agent knows the impedance of the connecting conductor. Using this information the 
agent was then able to calculate the voltage drop between itself and the preceding agent as 
a means of calculating the voltage at the bus the agent represented. The voltage drop 
calculation is presented in the following equation (1). 
(1) (𝑉𝑟 − 𝑉𝑠) =
𝑅𝑃
𝑉𝑟
⁄ +
𝑋𝑄
𝑉𝑟
⁄  
Where Vs and Vr are sending and receiving voltages respectively. All values were converted 
into per-unit under the following base values (2-4). 
(2) 𝑆𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 = 100𝑀𝑉𝐴 
(3) 
𝑍𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒11𝑘𝑉 =  
(1.1𝑥104)2
1𝑥108
= 1.21Ω 
(4) 
𝑍𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒400𝑉 =  
4002
1𝑥108
= 0.0016Ω 
The voltage calculation is then completed iteratively for each pair of electrically connected 
nodes throughout the overall agent network. This allows each of the customer agents to be 
aware of the voltage at their corresponding bus and thus determine if any control actions 
need to be taken. 
3.2.2 Recognising and Tracking a Developing Excursion Event 
In order to prevent the controller from intervening too quickly, events were tracked before 
being responded to. When responding to a voltage violation a controller would instruct 
customers to shed load, reducing demand in order to raise the voltage level. It was important 
to ensure that the voltage deviation event was a persistent event rather than a transient one 
before shedding customer load. 
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Therefore a stand-off period of time was introduced, initiated at the when the excursion 
event is first detected. If the event persists to the point that it lasts longer than the stand-off 
period – then intervention action is taken. The stand-off time was set to five minutes, such 
that transient voltage excursions do not trigger a control response. The length of this period 
is shorter than the voltage regulations as per the UK grid code – continuous operation up 
to 15 minutes [99] -  but it exceeds length of the longest voltage sag definition (events 
between 0.5 cycles and 60s) as defined in IEEE standard 1159 [100] outlined in the 
following table - Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 – Voltage Sag Classification Table  
Voltage Sag/Dip Classification Timeframe 
Instantaneous 1
2⁄  cycle – 30 cycles (10-600ms at 50Hz) 
Momentary 30 cycles – 3seconds (600ms -3s at 50Hz) 
Temporary 3 – 60s 
 
Each customer was responsible for the monitoring the length of any voltage deviation it 
observed, this responsibility was not passed onto the control layer for two reasons. Firstly 
this reduced the communication overhead as each deviation did not have to be reported to 
a controller, and only those events which exceeded the stand-off time were communicated 
to a controller. Secondly it removed the necessity of the controller to maintain a series of 
timers devoted to each incident, as each customer contained its own event timer which is 
triggered as soon as the calculated voltage drops below 0.94 per unit.  
3.2.3 Performing Control Actions 
Once a voltage issue had been detected and determined to be a persistent problem the 
customer detecting the event then began an interaction with the controller. This interaction 
involved sending a control request to the controller and waiting for the controller to issue 
commands to customers on the same feeder as the deviation. If the architecture was 
operating with the highest level of decentralisation – i.e. customer led control – the first 
stage would be bypassed by the fact that the control functions and the source of the 
deviation were the same agent. Control was achieved through demand side response – 
modifying customer demand rather than modifying generation output. In the network 
model, 50% of the customer population were deemed to be controllable and would accept 
control commands to reduce demand by 700W. Once a controller received a request it 
would then select an initial set of customers and send query messages to those customers 
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to check if they were controllable. If any of the selected targets indicates that they were a 
controllable customer, the controller would send the instruction to shed load in order to 
reduce the under-voltage situation. This interaction is presented in the following diagram. 
 
Fig. 3.2 – Communication flow between agents during control 
The load shedding restrictions were left in place until the voltage recovers past a safe value 
whereby the controller would then issue a set of commands to lift all restrictions. This safe 
value was set at 0.96 P.U. and would only be accepted when received from the agent at the 
end of the feeder, using data from customers closer to the 11kV-400V transformer at the 
head of the feeder would result in the restrictions being lifted too soon and thus reducing 
the effectiveness of the process on reducing the voltage deviation.  
 ARCHITECTURE DESIGNS 
Four initial organisational structures were implemented for testing purposes based on the 
core concept of a hierarchical design which was prominent in literature. Within these 
architectures the location of the control functions could be varied for differing levels of 
decentralisation. For example a fully centralised control mechanism would involve 
customer agents transmitting control requests to the central observer agent. Whereas a 
 
Controllability Check  (“IS_CONTROLLABLE”) 
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Asks for controllability check  (“IS_CONTROLLABLE”) 
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52 Multi-Agent Architectures for Voltage Control 
 
highly decentralised control approach involved customer agents transmitting control 
signals to neighbouring customers without involving any other tier in the hierarchy. As 
previously indicated the issue of increasing network scale and agent population numbers 
was performed through adding further feeders to the end of the main network spine. The 
four architecture designs implemented are presented as follows. 
3.3.1 Base Architecture 
The first of the architectures which was developed was a base architecture, in this 
configuration a single aggregate agent is allocated per feeder. This aggregate agent was 
responsible for the collection of demand and generation information from its feeder and 
triggering the sequence of voltage calculations which would then iterate down the length 
of the feeder. If the aggregate was not responsible for customers on feeders connected to 
the furthest end of the central network spine – the aggregate would also trigger voltage 
connections to the corresponding aggregate in the subsequent network branch. 
The control mechanisms involved are dependent on the level of decentralisation – 
customers would contact the controller directly without following the communication route 
involved with transmitting customer data. For example if centralised control was in place, 
a customer would send a control request to the observer agent instead of that message being 
routed to the observer via the aggregation tier. This architecture is presented in the 
following figure Fig. 3.3. 
 
Fig. 3.3 – Base Architecture Diagram 
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3.3.2 Clustered Architecture 
The clustered architecture increased the number of aggregation agents per feeder, and 
therefore reduced the communicative load at each of the aggregation agents. To perform 
the voltage calculation sequence one of the aggregates on each of the feeders was selected 
to act as a cluster-head agent, which meant it was responsible for starting the set of 
sequential equations which were then passed between customers along the length of the 
feeder. The cluster head agent was supplied with the demand information collected from 
the rest of the aggregates on the feeder such that it could perform an initial calculation. 
Each cluster head agent would then supply demand and voltage information any cluster 
head agents electrically downstream. 
The cluster head agent was on the same hierarchical tier as the other aggregates, but was 
the only aggregate associated with a feeder which would report to the observer agent. The 
overall objective of the architecture was to reduce the congestion at the aggregation layer 
as this was a key bottleneck area within the structure. The topology and communication 
structure is presented in the following figure: Fig. 3.4. 
 
Fig. 3.4 – Clustered Architecture Diagram 
3.3.3 Tiered Architecture 
The third of the core architectures was built to accommodate the role of a cluster head agent 
as a separate tier within the hierarchy. Its secondary function was to place a buffer stage 
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between the main aggregation layer and the central observer agent, such that any congestion 
issues were shielded from the central agent by an addition aggregation layer.  
With the exception of handling upstream power values for individual customers the upper 
tier aggregate performs the same core duties as it did in the other configurations. It received 
demand information from the set of aggregates on the feeder and relays that onto the 
observer to gain a total picture of the network. The generation agent on the feeder also 
reports directly to the upper tier agent, as in the clustered architecture it would communicate 
with the cluster-head agent. The following figure in Fig. 3.5 presents the structure of the 
architecure. 
 
Fig. 3.5 – Tiered Architecture Diagram 
3.3.4 Disaggregated Architecture 
The final developed conversion was the disaggregated architecture, which involves 
removing all of the dedicated aggregation agents from the architecture. Instead the 
generation agent assumed the responsibility of the sole aggregation point for each of the 
feeders. This means that fewer total agents are active on the platform in comparison to the 
other designs, but increases the potential for congestion. There were no dedicated aggregate 
agents present within the architecture and therefore fewer potential layers at which the 
control process could be installed. The topology for this architecture is presented in the 
following figure in Fig. 3.6.  
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Fig. 3.6 – Disaggregated Architecture 
3.3.5 Control Levels 
Within each of the previously mentioned architectures, multiple levels of control 
decentralisation, whereby each of the agent classifications present has the capability of 
receiving control requests and disseminating commands. A completely centralised 
approach uses the Observer agent as a controller and therefore all customer agents report 
any detected voltage deviations to the central point. At the opposite end of the scale the 
customer agents themselves request control actions from their neighbours in response to a 
deviation event.  
Taking the four architectures and the control levels in account a total of 16 permutations of 
control and communication architecture combination were investigated and these 
architectures were then examined under three escalating population scales. Each scale 
extended the electrical network through adding additional feeders to the central network 
spine, the agent architecture would be applied to the extra feeders as per the structure of 
each of the architectures previously introduced. The additional feeders are identical to the 
previous ones such that the distribution of loads remained balanced between scales and 
such that the absolute volume of agents and messaging became the dominant variable. 
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3.3.6 Security Considerations 
The four presented architectures are subject to a series differing performances advantages 
and disadvantages with respect to being resilient to a cyber-attack event, additionally the 
alternate control approaches would also create a differing set of properties. The nature of 
the impact of an attack event is related to the objective of the attacker and the attack 
methodology employed. One objective may be to disrupt the control ability of the 
controller, and therefore control requests from the customer layer are either ignored or 
responded to incorrectly. Alternatively the target of the attack could be to gain access to 
information stored within an agent, such as demand profiles and customer details.  
Any architecture which was running under a centralised control mechanism contained a 
central point of failure at the observer, which if compromised by an adversary would have 
significant consequences for the controllability of all of the controllable customers. 
However it is also reasonable to assume that a central control room would have the most 
sophisticated defences in order to reduce the chances of an intrusion. However if the 
architecture was under the control of a set of aggregation agents, the impact of the attack 
would be influenced more by the topology of the agent architecture. The Base Architecture 
contained one aggregate per feeder and therefore a compromised aggregate would only 
impact the feeder with which the aggregate was associated. Whereas a clustered 
architecture required more aggregate controllers to be compromised before the entire feeder 
would lose controllability, therefore in addition to enabling a reduction in communicative 
load the clustered architecture also offered greater robustness.  
If the control was located at the customer tier, it would take several customers to be 
compromised before a degree of control loss could be achieved. This is because multiple 
customers are required to perform a control action and therefore if a small number of 
customers had their controllability disabled or manipulated overall controllability will not 
be affected. However in the presence of smart-meters as customer agents, it is these agents 
would be considered the most accessible to a potential adversary, unlike the majority of the 
agent types within the architecture it is the smart-meters which provide the easiest physical 
access and therefore could be tampered with by an attacker. 
57 Multi-Agent Architectures for Voltage Control 
 
 AGENT SPECIFICATION 
In the development of the architectures presented in the previous section test configuration 
a core agent population needed to be established representing a generic distribution network 
composed of several different agent types. These agent types are presented below. 
3.4.1 Customer Agents 
The customer agents formed the core population of any of the implemented Multi-Agent 
architectures and were designed to represent customer smart-meters. The function of the 
customer agents was to maintain local load profiles and relay periodic updates to the 
aggregation layer such that a global picture of demand could be drawn. In addition, the 
customer agent was also responsible for handling information pertinent to voltage 
calculations and passing that information onto neighbouring agents. The final function of 
the customer agent was to perform local voltage monitoring, once the customer has 
performed a voltage calculation as discussed in section 0, the agent assessed the result. If 
this result was outside of the recommended +10%/-6% voltage limits, the customer agent 
would start the event timer. In the event that the deviation event proved to be persistent – 
the customer would then be responsible for contacting a controller to alert it to the 
developing problem. If the architecture was operating with the highest level of control 
decentralisation, the issue would be processed internally; otherwise the customer would 
receive control signals from other tiers within the hierarchy. A percentage of the customer 
population was configured to perform demand side response as a control mechanism; the 
customer agent was responsible for receiving those control signals and applying the 
relevant action to the local load profile. 
3.4.2 Generation Agents 
The generator agent class operated in much the same way that customer agents did, it had 
an internal profile which defined the output of the generator. This information was then 
passed up the agent hierarchy to the aggregation layer, in the event that a configuration 
without a dedicated aggregate population is in place, the generation agents assumed the 
responsibility of becoming the aggregation points. All updates were passed directly to the 
observer agent, after the generator agent would receive information from the customer layer. 
Another potential role for the generator agent was as a controller. If a persistent deviation 
was detected, control requests would be received by the generation agent on the same feeder 
as the deviation event.  The concept of generation control within the context of the 
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presented research referred to the fact that the generation agents would transmit control 
signals to controllable customers, rather than being able to influence the generator output.  
3.4.3 Aggregation Agents 
The Aggregation agents are placed in a tier above the customer layer, this tier was 
predominantly used for the purposes of data collection from customer and generation 
agents. Depending on the architecture in use the aggregates would either forward 
aggregated data onto the observer if no other aggregates were present on a feeder. 
Otherwise, the aggregate agent would forward updates from the generation and customer 
population to the cluster-head aggregate instead of the observer. The aggregation agent 
could also be used as a local controller, only responding to the control requests of the 
customer population within its catchment area.  This catchment area was dependant on the 
number of aggregates in operation per feeder; this may span the length of one feeder or a 
subset of agents on that feeder. 
3.4.4 Cluster Head Agents 
A cluster head agent acted as an enhanced aggregation agent, whereby it contained all the 
core functionality of the other aggregation agents within architecture it also performed 
further duties. Cluster-heads were used when multiple aggregates were assigned to a single 
feeder, all demand and generation information collected by the other aggregates on the 
feeder were passed to the cluster head. This was because the cluster-head agent needed to 
know the overall demand of the feeder such that it could perform the first voltage 
calculation, before reiterating the information to the first customer. In addition to triggering 
voltage calculations along a feeder the cluster head would also pass voltage information to 
the next cluster head agent downstream. All demand and generation information collated 
by the cluster head agent was passed up to the observer agent. 
3.4.5 Observer Agent 
The observer agent was the central entirety in each of the architecture designs; it 
represented a central control room or server which is supplied with the global data from the 
network. All demand and generation updates were transmitted to the observer which built 
an overall picture of the network. The observer agent could also act as a central controller, 
if used as a controller all control requests from the customer population would be received 
by the observer and it would be responsible for disseminating the control signals. This 
approach creates the potential for the observer to make decisions on a global level – and 
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may have wider control applications but it also created the risk of a control request 
bottleneck at the top of the architecture. Furthermore it also represented a single point of 
failure; therefore if the observer was no longer able to perform the control responsibility as 
a result of an attack event or failure, controllability would be completely lost throughout 
the architecture. 
3.4.6 Error Generator Agent 
The final agent that was included within the population was the error generation agent; this 
agent was not part of the core architectures from a communication and configuration 
perspective. The role of the agent was to deliver the signals required to simulate failure or 
attack events within the architecture when instructed to do so. The error generator would 
transmit an instruction to a controller to begin performing anomalously in the form of 
rejecting control requests or responding with incorrect commands. When there were not 
attack or failure events taking place, the error generation agent served no function and did 
not interfere with the general running of any architecture design. 
 PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 
To assess the performance of the different configurations presented in the previous section 
of this chapter a series of comparative metrics were introduced to extract information from 
the agent population. These metrics illustrated the impact of architectural design choices 
on the core control objective of solving a voltage deviation in addition to the impact on the 
levels of computational load the system experienced. A further purpose of using multiple 
metrics was to determine if the competing architectures favoured certain properties or had 
side effects from increasing control performance. These metrics are as follows: 
3.5.1 Congestion 
The congestion metric focused on the number of messages which were trapped in the 
message queues maintained by each of the agents. When an agent within the Jade platform 
received a message from another agent it was temporarily stored in the message queue, 
once it had been read by behaviour within that agent it was then removed from the queue. 
If the agent was subject to a large number of incoming messages, for example in the case 
of the aggregation layer receiving periodic updates from an agent population, it reached the 
point where more messages were being received than being read. As a result the message 
queue began to build and this caused data congestion, by measuring the amount of messages 
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waiting in this queue it was possible to gauge the level of congestion that particular agent 
was facing. As previously noted the issue of congestion was largely a problem of the 
aggregation layer due to the nature of the responsibilities it faced.  
3.5.2 Reactivity 
Reactivity referred to the ability of the architecture to respond to events taking place within 
the architecture, it acted as a measure of the speed of detection and response to certain 
messages transmitted by the customer layer of the architecture. To evaluate the reactivity, 
each of the customers was instructed to transmit a message to its controller which contained 
information about a fault condition. Two stages of reactivity were then considered, the first 
was the time difference between the initial fault message being transmitted, and it being 
detected by the control layer. In the eventuality that the architecture was operated with 
customer level control then detection times were not recorded, this was because the source 
of the message and the detector were the same agent. The second reactivity consideration 
focussed on the controller responding to the fault message and transmitting a command 
signal back to the customer agent. This test evaluated the distance between controller and 
customer and its impact on reactivity, but also the degree with which message congestion 
compromised the ability to detect and reply to key messages. 
3.5.3 Message Efficiency 
Message Efficiency dealt with the matching the number of messages transmitted in total 
with the number of messages received - to determine the percentage of messages that 
reached the ideal destination. Messages are only counted if they are processed by the 
recipient agent rather than being captured by the message queue – therefore messages 
which were trapped in a queue were not counted as they were not processed. As congestion 
and data flow increased the likelihood that a message would not be processed increased 
and therefore lowered the message efficiency of the overall system. For many messages 
such as demand and generation updates, the issue of message efficiency was not necessarily 
a significant problem – it played a far greater role in the transmission of critical messages. 
Control requests reporting voltage deviations required action from the recipient and 
therefore in a system with lower message efficiency it became less likely that those 
messages would be acted upon and therefore reduced the controllability of the system.  
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3.5.4 Control Performance 
Control performance related to the ability of the controllers to solve the voltage deviation 
– each simulation was provided with a set of profiles which contained an under-voltage 
incident which required solving. A customer would report an under-voltage incident once 
it lasted for more than 5 minutes, confirming it as a persistent issue. This report was made 
to the controller for the corresponding section of the network who in turn will issue control 
commands to resolve the issue. An architecture configuration performing strongly would 
be able to complete this interaction faster than one under the strain of communication 
problems and therefore solve the voltage deviation in a shorter period of time. As the 
voltage performance is a key indicator of the electrical performance of the system it was 
important document the impact the cyber layer had on the physical network properties. 
3.5.5 Robustness 
Further research considered examining the set of architectures from the perspective of 
robustness and the ability to perform the control actions under the pressure of component 
failure or cyber-attack.  
During the investigation the selected method of failure focussed on the control action, 
enacting a potential avenue for a cyber-attack. Those customers who were designated as 
‘infected’ would still perform monitoring, and detection of voltage deviations –they would 
also still also accept control signals from a controller. The influence of the infection was 
that it changed how the customer agent responded to an incoming control signal – instead 
of performing the load shedding action requested, the agent increased the demand. This 
could be through activating a heat-pump, electric vehicle charging station or other smart-
loads within the premises – an infected agent increases demand by 1500W – which risks 
intensifying the voltage deviation and nullifying any control attempts. The infection only 
targeted controllable customers, which amounted to a maximum 50% of the total customer 
population. To examine the survivability of this form of attack, different quantities of 
infected agents were activated per feeder.  
Even through the selection of a single attack strategy there is an immense quantity of 
potential permutations of attack location, strength, spread pattern, duration, and scope. An 
attack could be limited to a single feeder, or be network wide – each feeder population 
could be affected differently depending on the differing vulnerabilities of the installed 
smart-meters or monitoring devices. This list of attack vectors is then further expanded 
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through variations in the customer population – a network with 1620 customers has 
considerably more avenues of attack than one with 540 customers for example. Therefore 
it was important to narrow the scope of the investigation an effective worst case attack 
scenario was selected – wherein the infection affected each feeder symmetrically and one 
agent population size was selected of 540 customer agents. Adding further feeders to the 
investigation would not change the nature of the problem as each feeder would respond to 
the attack in an identical manner. The only difference would be in the magnitude of the 
voltage deviations further from the grid connection, as more customers experienced the 
load increase, the voltage drop in the network spine would be greater and therefore feeders 
at the far end of the network would experience lower voltages at the start of the feeder.  
Each of the sixteen control and communication architecture combinations was supplied 
with the same customer profile calibrated to create a single voltage deviation event, and the 
first 1000 seconds of the voltage profile was analysed. This section of runtime would 
comfortably cover a period of pre-deviation operation plus the event and recovery time, 
under normal circumstances. As the number of infected agents per feeder was increased up 
to the maximum 45 (50% of a feeder’s population) the length of time taken to correct a 
voltage deviation should increase. The upper limit of 1000 seconds was used to compare 
levels of infection in which the deviation cannot be corrected to prevent the length of the 
deviation being defined by the simulation runtime. The voltage profile for each customer 
was processed to extract the duration and magnitude of any deviation event experienced. 
The total number of deviation events and excursions was also recorded; where an event 
refers to any period of time the voltage drops below 0.94pu whereas excursions only 
consider events lasting more than 300 seconds.  Eight levels of infection were tested per 
configuration – starting with control tests of 0 infected agents, and no control and increasing 
the number of infected agents to 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, and full infection of 45 customer agents 
per feeder. 
Several metrics were recorded for each of the customers within the overall architecture, as 
each customer agent regularly updates a CSV output file containing data documenting time-
stamped voltages to reconstruct an individual profile per user. These profiles were then 
dissected via a Matlab script to isolate the periods of under-voltage, counting the number 
of occurrences in addition to retrieving the duration and magnitude of each event. From 
each profile the following information was recorded: 
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 Max Voltage  
 Min Voltage  
 Mean Voltage 
 Number of Deviation Events 
 Number of Events Exceeding the 300s waiting period 
 Max Deviation Event Length – Timed from the first instance of voltage dropping 
below 0.94, until recovering above limits 
 Total Under-Voltage Time – Total time spent below 0.94pu 
 Average Deviation Length – Taken using all deviation events, not just those 
exceeding the 300s stand off period. 
 RESULTS 
Two series of investigations were conducted into the performance of the range of control 
and communication architectures. The first of which considered the operational variables 
of the network considering control performance, alongside communication metrics. The 
second investigation was focussed on operating the set of architectures in the presence of 
an external attack which compromised agents at the customer layer.  
3.6.1 Operational Performance Results 
Each of the 16 configurations was examined against four criteria as published in by the 
author of this thesis in [101]. The results demonstrated that the 16 different architecture 
combinations displayed variances in performances that indicated that no single 
configuration out-performed the others across the range of agent population scales and 
differing performance metrics as presented in the following figure in Fig. 3.7 from the paper. 
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Fig. 3.7 – Performance Summary Table 
The figure presents the relative rankings for each of the different architectures for four of 
the performance indicators previously introduced. Illustrating that some common design 
trends delivered preferential performance but did not deliver the strongest performance 
across all categories – for example configurations with increased aggregation capacity are 
able to respond faster to changes in the network and operated with lower message 
congestion. However the same configurations scored worse in the context of message 
efficiency as a result of a larger number of aggregation points in the communication 
architecture increasing the chances that messages were not be received. Based on the results 
it was determined that the architecture would benefit from not being fixed to a single 
configuration; this is due to the fact that differing architecture designs exhibited differing 
properties. Therefore the data indicated that the presence of a self-organising architecture 
with the capability to transition between states would be beneficial in terms of accessing 
specific performance advantages. 
3.6.2 Robustness results 
The second result set documents the series of robustness tests which demonstrated the 
network performance under the pressure of an attack event within which customer agents 
were compromised. The attack targeted the smart-meters represented by the customer layer 
of the architecture an affected how those customers responded to control commands. The 
profiles presented in Fig. 3.8 illustrate the control process in the absence of an attack event. 
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Base + Aggregation 10 14 14 8 6 13 16 16 13 4 3 2 2nd
Base + Generation 7 11 11 15 15 12 8 11 10 15 14 15 3rd
Base + Customer 5 10 9 13 16 2 11 9 12 13 13 16 4th
Clustered + Central 15 6 7 16 2 10 7 14 15 1 5 4 5th
Clustered + Aggregation 2 4 4 5 5 7 5 4 3 8 9 5 6th
Clustered + Generation 1 2 1 4 9 9 3 5 9 10 10 9 7th
Clustered + Customer 3 1 3 12 13 3 2 2 4 16 11 12 8th
Tiered + Central 8 9 8 14 10 8 4 3 2 2 12 11 9th
Tiered + Upper Aggregation 14 7 10 2 4 6 15 12 11 9 15 8 10th
Tiered + Lower Aggregation 4 3 2 1 1 5 1 1 1 12 2 10 11th
Tiered + Generation 12 8 13 7 12 11 6 6 5 11 16 13 12th
Tiered + Customer 9 13 12 10 11 4 10 8 8 14 7 1 13th
Disaggregated + Central 16 12 6 11 3 16 14 15 16 3 1 3 14th
Disaggregated + Generation 11 15 15 3 7 15 13 13 14 5 4 6 15th
Disaggregated + Customer 13 16 16 6 14 1 12 10 7 7 6 14 16th
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Fig. 3.8 – Voltage Profiles Without Infected agents 
 The profiles presented in the figure were taken from the customer at the farthest point of 
the network from the grid connection point at the tail of the 6th feeder – customer number 
540. As the infection was distributed symmetrically and the demand/generation data was 
identical for each customer the selection of the final customer for the purposes of 
constructing the figures does not impact on the validity of the results and presents the feeder 
at the greater risk of a voltage deviation. 
The figure illustrates that in each case the control solution was able to respond to the voltage 
problem and raise the voltage levels above the minimum threshold. The performance 
difference in the control processes between architectures does confirm the information 
posted in the previous table as the configurations based on the disaggregated 
communication architecture struggle in terms of control performance than the other formats. 
The following figure in Fig. 3.9 presents the same voltage profiles where 45 customer 
agents per feeder were infected with the malware and all control commands were reversed.  
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Fig. 3.9 – Voltage Profiles with 45 Infected Customers per Feeder 
The figure illustrates that the different architectures responded to the presence of an 
infection differently, those architectures featuring a larger aggregation population were 
able to weather the attack event better than those with at most one aggregate per feeder. 
Furthermore the centralised control approaches also performed favourably against the more 
decentralised options due to the increased distance between the point of decision making 
and the component under control. In the context of achieving control without the presence 
of an infection this distance can be considered detrimental as the increase in the number of 
communication hops increases the risk of a delay. However while the attack or infection is 
in place, that control distance acts as insulation and defers some of the impacts of the attack.  
To evaluate the comparative performances between the architectures in the presence of 
increasing attack intensity each configuration was ranked – as in the research conducted on 
an attack free scenario in the published paper [101]. The following figures illustrate how 
those rankings fluctuated with respect to different performance metrics extracted from the 
voltage profiles.  
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Fig. 3.10 – Average Minimum Voltage Ranking Table 
The first figure presented in Fig. 3.10 demonstrates the variance in relative performance 
across the different architecture combinations and the different levels of infection with 
respect to the average minimum voltage per feeder. The results indicated that different 
levels of attack intensity are better served by alternate architectures – for example a 
clustered communication structure operating with generation agents providing control 
signals is the lowest ranked architecture when no customer agents are infected. However 
the same configuration is ranked 5th when faced with the most severe level of infection as 
50% of the customer population are ineffectively responding to control signals.  
The second of the assessment metrics considered the average duration of all under-voltage 
events recorded across the entire customer population, the rankings for this metric are 
presented in the following figure in Fig. 3.11. In contrast to the data on minimum voltage 
the manner in which specific architectures either climbed up or descended down the 
rankings was more progressive and exhibited fewer sharp changes in relative performance. 
This indicated a state which presented with a degree of graceful degradation, not all 
configurations followed this pattern – the disaggregated architectures in particular observed 
significant performance loss when processing the more severe attack formats. These results 
also indicated that a single configuration was not advantageous when under pressure from 
the different attack severities. Disaggregated architectures performed strongly when the 
attack severity was low, but the clustered architecture became more prominent when the 
attack was stronger. 
NC 0 5 10 20 30 40 45
Base + Centralised 2 6 7 1 15 15 7 11
Base + Aggregation 5 5 1 9 3 3 6 12
Base + Generation 3 9 10 15 10 1 16 16
Base + Customer 4 10 5 7 16 16 11 15
Clustered + Centralised 8 3 8 3 7 7 2 1
Clustered + Aggregation 1 11 6 2 8 12 9 8
Clustered + Generation 6 16 11 8 11 6 15 5
Clustered + Customer 7 14 15 16 9 2 13 14
Tiered + Centralised 9 2 2 5 12 13 3 2
Tiered + Upper Aggregation 11 7 13 12 13 9 5 9
Tiered + Lower Aggregation 15 15 14 11 1 8 10 13
Tiered + Generation 10 13 12 14 5 4 8 4
Tiered + Customer 14 12 16 13 14 14 12 6
Disaggregated + Centralised 12 1 4 6 2 11 1 3
Disaggregated + Generation 13 4 3 4 4 5 4 7
Disaggregated + Customer 16 8 9 10 6 10 14 10
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Fig. 3.11 – Average Total Under-Voltage Time per Affected Customer 
Finally the data illustrated in Fig. 3.12 presents the comparative rankings for the number 
of affected customers – a customer was considered to be affected if it encounters a voltage 
deviation which lasts for more than five minutes during the simulation. Higher ranked 
performers contained the smallest number of affected customers, in the smaller attack 
configurations several configurations had the same number of affected customers and were 
therefore ranked equally.  
 
Fig. 3.12 – Number of Affected Customers Ranking Chart 
The results echo the information presented in the earlier voltage profiles as configurations 
with a more decentralised control approach were ranked highly when faced with a low 
volume of infected customers. Whereas when exposed to a larger infected population the 
NC 0 5 10 20 30 40 45
Base + Centralised 14 9 11 10 11 8 13 13
Base + Aggregation 10 2 1 5 8 14 16 16
Base + Generation 9 15 16 16 16 13 5 2
Base + Customer 8 11 12 11 10 6 8 10
Clustered + Centralised 6 12 10 13 12 12 10 6
Clustered + Aggregation 2 13 13 9 14 15 9 5
Clustered + Generation 16 16 14 15 13 16 3 4
Clustered + Customer 7 10 15 14 15 5 2 1
Tiered + Centralised 15 5 7 7 2 4 12 14
Tiered + Upper Aggregation 1 8 6 3 5 7 15 8
Tiered + Lower Aggregation 5 14 9 12 4 3 6 3
Tiered + Generation 11 7 4 8 9 10 7 7
Tiered + Customer 3 6 5 4 6 1 1 9
Disaggregated + Centralised 12 3 8 6 1 9 11 11
Disaggregated + Generation 13 1 2 1 3 11 14 15
Disaggregated + Customer 4 4 3 2 7 2 4 12
NC 0 5 10 20 30 40 45
Base + Centralised 6 4 4 4 6 9 13 9
Base + Aggregation 2 2 2 2 3 13 15 14
Base + Generation 6 15 4 4 2 16 10 12
Base + Customer 6 4 4 4 6 11 9 14
Clustered + Centralised 6 4 4 4 6 1 6 1
Clustered + Aggregation 1 1 1 1 1 6 12 6
Clustered + Generation 6 16 4 4 6 12 11 3
Clustered + Customer 6 4 4 4 6 8 5 9
Tiered + Centralised 6 4 4 4 6 1 8 1
Tiered + Upper Aggregation 6 4 4 4 6 15 15 13
Tiered + Lower Aggregation 4 4 4 4 6 5 4 7
Tiered + Generation 4 3 3 3 5 14 7 5
Tiered + Customer 6 4 4 4 6 7 1 9
Disaggregated + Centralised 6 4 4 4 6 1 2 4
Disaggregated + Generation 6 4 4 4 3 4 14 8
Disaggregated + Customer 2 4 4 4 6 9 3 16
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centralised control architectures were ranked higher – demonstrating that the control 
distance between component and controller reduced the impact of the attack. It should be 
noted that under the larger scale attack formats, all feeders experienced a voltage deviation 
which could not be corrected as the number of infected agents outnumbered those providing 
correct control and therefore counteracted any valid control decisions.  
 CONCLUSION 
Across the set of results in both the case of conventional operation and the presence of a 
cyber threat there is no dominant architecture configuration than can be universally 
described as being the strongest performer and the most resilient. This is more relevant in 
terms of dealing with an attack event where the impact of the same attack varies across the 
set of architectures and as that attack intensifies those architectures which initially ranked 
higher start to record a lower placing. The amount of factors influencing performance 
within the agent structure itself indicates that a static structure is not completely fit for 
purpose as the vision for future networks aims to incorporate greater flexibility and 
controllability. As a result it would be valuable to devise a system whereby the architecture 
in use would be able to change and adapt itself in response to the state of system health – 
either in the form of communication issues or in the form of an attack. These changes would 
allow the architecture restructure to deliver more effective performance or becomes more 
resilient to an ongoing attack event. A self-organising architecture would be able to deliver 
the greater resistance to an ongoing threat as it will have the capacity to isolate members 
of the agent population or replace agents under attack and increase the number of available 
controllers or data collection points to improve the performance if necessary.  
Therefore on the basis of this result set the following course of action was to investigate 
the usage and approaches of self-organising architectures in a variety of applications where 
a large number of individual components are required to interact. The investigation aimed 
to examine tools and techniques involved with developing self-organising systems such 
that the implemented architecture could be informed by proven examples.  
In addition to the development of the self-organising architecture it was also relevant to 
introduce a flexible test environment within which the voltage calculations can be 
conducted outside of the agent population. This was considered to avoid architectural 
transitions from disturbing the voltage calculation process within the agent population, the 
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connections within the architecture were restructured as a result of a transition event – 
access to the required variables to perform voltage calculations would be compromised. 
For example if a transition involved removing an aggregate – one which was performing a 
cluster head role – an additional overhead would have been required to reconnect the 
iterative voltage calculations with its replacement. Therefore separating the load flow 
mechanism from the self-organising architecture prevented similar situations from 
developing. This requires the addition of an external load flow engine operating over a 
network model of the test system and supplied with the most recent demand and generation 
data from the agent population.  
Furthermore the data attained through the investigation demonstrated that suitable focus 
for the self-organising architecture was the presence of a cyber threat. This focus was based 
on the impacts of the attack event being more severe than those experienced in those 
architectures which were ranked poorly for the other performance metrics. Failing to 
intervene in the event of a cyber threat would be more costly than improving individual 
metrics when the architecture is not under attack. It was still important to consider 
monitoring these performance metrics in the eventuality that a severe disturbance took 
place which would compromise the control objective, but in terms of trigger events an 
attack based scenario was more relevant. 
 SUMMARY 
This chapter documented a series of investigations on static architectures which considered 
differing performance metrics and the stability of the control system under an attack event. 
Initially the core architecture designs were described and the components of the test system 
were discussed including the method for voltage magnitude calculation. The results 
illustrated that there was a clear need for the introduction of a self-organising architecture 
with the ability to perform suitable transition events which aimed to improve performance. 
This was deduced by the variance in performance of the individual static architectures with 
and without the presence of an attack event taking place. In conclusion it was determined 
that the threat of a cyber-attack was a more relevant trigger factor for the implementation 
of self-organisation. 
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Chapter 4: Self-Organising Systems 
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 INTRODUCTION 
After conducting preliminary investigations concerning the comparative performances of 
different static architecture designs both in terms of withstanding a cyber-attack event and 
performing voltage control, the results indicated that there was scope for the development 
of a self-organising architecture. The self-organising architecture needed to fulfil the 
control and monitoring requirements contained within the static configurations but also the 
ability to recognise that a transitional event was needed. Therefore performance monitoring 
techniques were also an important consideration when examining mechanisms for 
implementing the system. Both communication level and electrical information was needed 
in terms of building the self-monitoring aspect of the self-organising architecture, 
information which then informed a decision making element before a transition would be 
made. 
To develop the relevant functions and abilities additional literature needed to be 
interrogated for the purposes of examining tools, techniques and applications of existing 
research in the field of self-organisation. The investigation aimed to discover methods 
which could be adapted for an implementation in the smart grid domain, and to establish 
the requirements for a self-organising architecture. A range of different research areas were 
explored including wireless communications, sensor and vehicle networks because self-
organisation architectures within power systems is not a field which had been documented 
extensively in the literature. Therefore it was relevant to consider alternative domains 
wherein communication and monitoring are conducted over wider geographical areas or 
involving multiple agents.   
This chapter considers the core concepts involved within self-organisation and the desirable 
deliverables for implementing such a system. Following this the chapter continues on to 
consider differing applications of self-organisation across different research domains with 
a view of exploring the different approaches and considerations made for providing self-
organisation. Furthermore the chapter introduces examples whereby self-organisation has 
been investigated for certain functions within the power system research domain. Finally 
conclusions are drawn on the basis of the material examined, and gaps in the research are 
identified where the implementation of a self-organising architecture may be of value, 
supporting the research presented in this thesis. 
.  
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 SELF-ORGANISING CONCEPTS 
Over-arching research in self-organisation defines it as “the mechanism or the process 
enabling a system to change its organization without explicit external command during its 
execution time” [38]. Therefore all processes involved with data collection, performance 
monitoring and ultimately decision making are to take place within the agents involved in 
the system. Therefore no external influences or commands are involved in changing the 
organisational structure. Secondly the definition states that the system must remain in 
operation during a transition and cannot be offline until such time that the re-organisation 
process has been completed. As a result self-organising systems also need to be agile, as 
documented by the authors of [37]. The authors of [38] go on to outline differentiations 
between strong and weak self-organisation which is based around the location and method 
of decision making with respect to performing an architecture transition. A strong self-
organised system is defined as one that is composed purely of decentralised decision 
making and architecture transitions – at no point is a central entity or agent involved in 
dictating to the network which structure to transition into. A weak system on the other hand, 
conducts self-organisation through a central entity which is present within the host 
architecture; hybrid systems perform different self-organising tasks at differing locations 
in the structure of the system.  
Several properties and characteristics are described within the paper, included in the list are 
the following notable properties: 
Endogenous global order – This states that the system requires the capability to organise 
itself into a stable state from start-up without external assistance. Therefore agents within 
the system form their own connections and interactions with other agents in the population 
depending on their roles and responsibilities.  
Simple Local Rules – This involves simplifying the rule base on the local scale and the 
decisions involved with determining whether or not a transition is required. Therefore 
introducing local decision making in the case of assessing performance metrics – those 
which are within limits are not pursued further while those which exceed thresholds are 
subject to further analysis. This characteristic maps directly with the requirement for 
simplicity discussed in [37], wherein reducing the complexity of the individual components 
within the self-organised system increases the potential for that system to withstand the 
impacts of scale and improve agility.  
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Dissipation – A requirement for dissipation refers to the ability for the system to achieve 
a state of equilibrium, therefore following a transition event or an initial start-up stage the 
system does not form an unstable state, or one which is unable to perform the functions of 
the system. This prevents a necessity for continual re-organisation and restructuring as a 
result of developing unstable system states. This is also reflected in the requirement for 
stability as presented in [37] – whereby following initial configuration or a transition event 
the structure of the network settles and remains stable.  
Self-Maintenance – A final property refers to a need for self-healing and the ability to 
remain functional in the event of failure – from a purely software perspective this would 
include repairing agents and agent mobility. But in a system where hardware failures could 
also be the cause of faults in the network, self-maintenance could be implemented through 
redundancy in both hardware and software.  
An alternative focus on self-organisation is presented by the authors of [102], who present 
a scenario based around a fully centralised approach, which sits outside of the system under 
control. This approach does not contain a decentralised method of performing self-
organisation and therefore would be considered to be a weak configuration by the authors 
of [38]. It is indicated that the system under control (SuOC) exhibits decentralised 
properties for the purposes of its own operation, but the processes involved in self-
organisation would be handled by a pair of components as illustrated in Fig. 4.Error! 
Reference source not found..  
 
Fig. 4.1 – Observer/Controller Architecture 
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The idea that both the observer and the controller sit outside of the SuOC is in contradiction 
to the principle that the SuOC is to conduct self-organisation without external influences 
or control. The observer component of the self-organising mechanism is tasked with 
aggregation of data retrieved from the SuOC; this data includes performance indicators 
from individual components and global indicators. This data is then processed and 
aggregated before being passed to the controller. After receiving an aggregated set of data 
detailing the system state, the controller has the ability to make a series of potential 
decisions based on three potential objectives:  
1. to influence the system such that a desired emergent behaviour appears, 
2. to disrupt an undesired emergent behaviour as quickly and efficiently as possible 
3. Construct the system in a way such that no undesired emergent behaviour can 
develop. 
To achieve one or more of these objectives, the controller can apply one or more of the 
following control processes. 
Influencing Local Rules: This is a command to a particular agent within the SuOC, where 
the controller instructs it to modify its internal behaviour. This could entail a variety of 
different commands such as modifying thresholds on monitored performance metrics or 
changing how the targeted agent interacts with other members of the community.  
Influencing Structure: This is a more widespread action, changing the global behaviour 
of the network, which may involve introducing behaviour changes to all of the individuals 
within the global system or the topology of the network through modifying the number of 
individuals within the population. Alternatively this could entail restructuring the 
connections between entities within the SuOC. 
Influencing the Environment: Influencing the environment requires the agents to have 
the ability to modify the physical nature of the system those agents are responsible for. For 
example, a smart grid self-organising architecture could restructure the topology of the 
electrical network in response to a fault condition. Not all applications have the potential 
to influence the host environment to a significant degree, but control decisions and actions 
taken by the agents involved can have impact on elements of the host system. Therefore 
influencing the environment may be a consequence of actions taken in fulfilment of the 
other control process or a standalone decision. 
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Selecting one of these approaches is based on a set of monitored parameters within the 
system under control – if these parameters exceed their defined threshold values, or the 
observer detects anomalous behaviour a decision is triggered. Each set of parameter states 
is mapped to a desired action such that the controller is aware which decision to make given 
the overall state of the system. However this mapping is not an exhaustive set of potential 
system states and behaviours and therefore, the controller needs to be able to perform 
decision making in the absence of a pre-selected control process. If the outcome of the 
control process is beneficial, the decision would then be recorded and used for future 
reference.  
 APPLICATIONS 
Current research regarding the application of self-organising architectures within the power 
systems and smart grid domain is not extensive, and therefore to build a wider picture of 
the tools and techniques used it was relevant to examine literature from a range of research 
domains. Multiple domains have considered the concept of self-organisation and the 
specific use of self-organising architectures; these include communication networks, sensor 
networks and vehicle network management systems. Some applications consider the use of 
self-organising processes for the purposes of solving a particular control problem, others 
are focussed on the structure of the communication architecture and restructure for data 
handling. A range of research domains was examined for the purposes of interrogating the 
tools and techniques implemented, the aim was to explore a collection of methods which 
could be adapted and combined to develop the novel self-organising architecture.  
4.3.1 Communication Networks 
One of the areas of investigation examined was communication networks, where signal 
strength and failures can force the network to reconfigure in order to maintain connectivity 
between nodes. Communication networks were considered a suitable source of self-
organising literature due to the parallels between the requirements and properties of a 
communication network and the static architectures examined in the previous chapter. A 
node in the context of a communication network exhibited similar properties to an agent 
within the smart grid architecture because they shared common roles and responsibilities. 
Both concepts consisted of a network of connected entities which were involved in the 
sharing of information and communicating between one another. While a communication 
network operated in the presence of differing challenges, including node mobility and 
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dynamic communication loads the overall structures and self-organising mechanisms were 
transferrable. Several communication networks employ self-organising principles as a 
method for handling node mobility, particularly in wireless networks [103] and mobile 
phone networks [104]. 
One example of a communication network exhibiting self-organising properties considers 
the data collection issues surrounding the deployment of smart-meters as described by the 
authors of [105]. In this example the work considers the smart-meter nodes as data 
producers alone and doesn’t consider the implications surrounding control decisions, and 
the transmission of control signals, because the research is focussed on the communications 
element. From a self-organising architecture perspective the work examines an initial 
configuration stage whereby smart-meters form connections with data collection points or 
concentrators on a higher tier within the communication hierarchy. The use of concentrators 
can be considered to be analogous to aggregation agents, although the data collection points 
do not contain the capacity for performing control actions and are solely used to retrieve 
information transmitted by the smart-meters. 
To form the connection between the smart-meter and the collection point, a two stage 
process is required. The first stage involves each smart-meter ranking the connectivity 
between itself and each of the available concentrators; the ranking is a comparison of the 
communicative distance between the two entities, and the available connection capacity of 
the concentrator.  This process allows each smart-meter to build a list of concentrators 
ordered by connection preference, and to form a connection between to the most favourable 
concentrator. The second stage takes the form of monitoring the newly formed connection, 
in this stage the smart-meter listens for elongated silences from the concentrator. A long 
silence suggests the concentrator is no longer available and the smart-meter reverts back to 
stage one to select a new connection. This process indicated that two key properties needed 
to be integrated into the self-organising architecture, firstly the necessity to be able to 
analyse the potential connection options between the customer and aggregation layer before 
forming a connection, and secondly the ability to monitor the stability of that connection. 
A second example examines the differing perspectives for a hierarchically structured radio 
communication network [106] based upon the 3GPP management reference model [107]. 
The authors base the research on the SEMAFOUR project vision as presented in [108]. The 
core 3GPP model is a hierarchical model featuring management nodes or agents at each 
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level of the structure as illustrated in Fig. 4.2 taken from [107]. The network reference 
model contains three categories of node/agent – the Network Managers, Domain Managers, 
Element Managers and Network Elements forming the base layer of the structure. Each of 
which describe in general terms different stages in a communication network. 
 
Fig. 4.2 – Management Reference Model 
The authors of [106] use this structure to define four levels of Self-organisation 
management with respect to the placement of decision making. The approaches are as 
follows: 
NM-Centralised Self-Organising Network (SON) – Performance data is supplied from 
the network elements (NE) to the Network Manager entity (NM), the NM then processes 
this information before determining is an architectural change is warranted. 
DM-Centralised SON – Similar to the NM-Centralised approach with the exception that 
the sphere of influence of the SO controller is limited to the NE’s under the jurisdiction of 
the relevant DM. Several DM entities may make restructuring decisions independently of 
neighbouring DM entities – as each one is responding to a set of local conditions. 
Distributed SON – The network elements themselves make self-organising decisions 
based on reports from user equipment (UE). Updates from the UE devices are quicker and 
network elements can communicate with one another, however this approach is more 
localised and each decision does not have access to global information.  
Hybrid SON – A combination of distributed and centralised approaches operating within 
the same scenario, combining the faster update times of the distributed version with the 
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wider scope of the centralised approach. Some elements of local reconfiguration are 
handled by distributed approaches while global decisions are handled centrally. 
Each of the different levels of self-organisation relies on data retrieved from the 
communication network itself as a method of determining its current performance through 
continuous monitoring. A further implementation of the SEMAFOUR approach [109] to 
self-organisation and applying the 3GPP [110] standard involves the monitoring of Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs). The KPIs monitor certain parameters such as network 
capacity, network coverage, call drop rate, handover success rate, or cell load.  The KPIs 
are then used to define a set of targets which may result in a potential architectural change 
an example of such targets are presented in Fig. 4.3 
 
Fig. 4.3 – Example KPI Targets within a Mobile Communication Network 
The use of KPIs reinforced the need for integrating continuous performance monitoring 
within a self-organising architecture, and the performance monitoring data is then 
transmitted to a location within the architecture responsible for performing the decision 
making. The KPIs formed the trigger factors for initiating an architectural transition event, 
when one or more of the performance metrics exceeded a designated threshold the KPI was 
considered to be violated and therefore indicating that a transition may be required. This 
research also indicated that there is scope for a hybrid self-organising architecture in terms 
of the smart grid implementation. Threshold comparisons and performance monitoring 
would be handled by the individual agents themselves whereas transition events would be 
initiated by an entity further up the hierarchy.  
4.3.2 Sensor Networks 
A second source of literature on self-organising architectures was found in sensor networks, 
due to the natural similarities between the field and the objective of developing self-
organising smart grid architecture. Customer level agents and sensor entities within a sensor 
network exhibited similar properties because some of the core functions were shared 
 Dropped call rate < 2.5% (indicates the percentage of dropped voice calls due to, e.g., failed 
handovers or bad radio conditions) 
 Cell load < 90% (indicates the used radio resources per cell or sector) 
 Handover success rate> 99.5% (indicates the percentage of successful handovers between 
cells or sectors) 
 Energy consumption < 80% (indicates the average consumed energy by the base station 
compared to the maximum energy consumption) 
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between the two research domains. Both architectures involved low level entities 
responsible for taking measurements, which were then passed to data collection nodes and 
eventually to a central data store. As with the research presented on communication 
networks, the entities involved in a sensor network were subject to different challenges as 
result of their environment, challenges which were not necessarily present in a smart grid 
environment. These included agent mobility, nodes with limited battery life and therefore 
greater agent turnover. 
The first example is presented by the authors of [111], which focuses research on 
communication pathfinding between members of an underwater sensor network. The 
sensors aim to transmit information to a data collection point in the form of a sink node on 
the surface by passing data to neighbouring sensors. The authors describe a process wherein 
the sensor nodes send discovery – “REQ” – messages to nodes in its vicinity. The objective 
of neighbour discovery is to build a path from the sensor to the sink node on the surface, 
so only nodes closer to the surface respond to the “REQ” messages with a “RPLY” message.  
The source sensor node then assesses the time delay between the “REQ” and “RPLY” 
messages to determine which node is the best node to connect to. A stand-off period is 
imposed before selecting the desired neighbour to ensure that “RPLY” messages have been 
received. This communication sequence is documented in Fig. 4.4. Each sensor aims to 
connect to the neighbour with the shortest response time, and one which will remain in 
communication range for the longest time before being swept out of range by underwater 
currents. 
 
Fig. 4.4 – Neighbour Discover Packet Format 
The process is similar to the connection finding method as applied in [105] as each sensor 
ranks the connections before selecting which node to form a link with. An alternative 
approach to sensor organisation is by clustering sensor nodes into partitions centred on an 
effective aggregation node. The authors of [112] suggest a method for structuring the sensor 
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network in response to placement of mobile cluster-nodes for the purposes of data 
collection.  In contrast to the research presented in [111] this process is primarily centrally 
driven. An initial phase determines the number of clusters within the area covered by the 
sensor network; these clusters are then sub-divided such that the delay between the nodes 
within the cluster and the mobile actor data collection node is below a certain threshold. 
These examples indicated that the need for an initial configuration stage is important for 
the development of a self-organising architecture, to allow the customer agents to form 
their own connections with the aggregation layer. Several implementations employed a 
ranking system to evaluate which data collection nodes would be the most applicable 
depending on properties endemic to the environment the nodes are active in. 
A configuration stage would be supported by the ability to put nodes partially to sleep if 
certain functions are not needed by the authors of [113] regarding a set of mobile sensors 
in a wide area network. The sensors have two sets of internal behaviours each operated by 
an independent power supply. The first behaviour handles navigation and GPS 
communication whereas the secondary behaviour deals with inter-sensor communication. 
When the GPS elements are not required, that aspect of the system enters a dormant state 
while the listening behaviour remains active. Therefore if an aggregate did not receive any 
connection requests it would enter a dormant state, but any communication and listening 
behaviours would remain active in the event that it was to receive a signal to become an 
active participant in the architecture. 
A repeated Self-organising solution within general sensor networks is Energy-efficient 
aDaptive hiErarchical and robusT Architecture (EDETA) which is the subject of several 
papers discussing self-organisation in the context of sensor networks, is initially proposed 
in [114] and applied in [115] and [116]. The EDETA approach describes a two part 
initialisation stage before the sensor network enters an operational stage. As per the original 
definition in [114], part one of the initialisation stage involves the election of a data 
collection node which acts as a cluster head node for a group of connected sensors. This 
process assumes a population of identical components, and within that population certain 
nodes are promoted to form a higher tier of sensors in the hierarchy whilst still performing 
core sensing responsibilities. Part two of the initialisation stage is to connect sensor nodes 
to the elected cluster-head nodes, a cluster-head has a limited capacity for incoming 
connections – therefore will reject requests once that capacity is reached. There are two 
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limits on the number of connections, a soft limit defines the number of sensors the cluster-
head node will allow connection requests from, but the node will still accept connections if 
the request is for a ‘last resort’ connection. However the hard limit represents the absolute 
capacity of the cluster-head and no requests will be accepted if this limit has been reached. 
Once the initialisation process has been completed, another function of the EDETA 
approach is the provision of substitute agents, which would replace a cluster-head node in 
the event of failure. The substitute continually monitors the connectivity of the cluster-head 
node so that it can detect if the node has failed, and if a failure is detected it assumes the 
role of the cluster head and informs the other sensors of the role change. This action aims 
to ensure that data is not lost and communication is not interrupted in the event of node 
failure. 
The processes outlined in EDETA are very similar to those used in HARP [117], which 
promotes self-organisation through two phases – a set-up phase and a steady state phase. 
In HARP’s initialisation phase, base sensor nodes transmit “JOINRQ” messages to the 
previously selected cluster head nodes. A JOINRQ message contains information about the 
sensor node including remaining energy and transmission power. After the “JOINREQ 
messages have been sent, the cluster head nodes broadcast “ASSOCCH” messages which 
contain a list nodes which have been approved connection. If a sensor node receives 
multiple ASSOCCH messages – it communicates to the cluster head with the lowest 
communication delay. The HARP approach also includes provision for a substitute node, 
to allow a cluster head to be immediately replaced in the event of failure. As in EDETA, 
the substitute node is pre-selected during the initialisation phase of the process – once 
selected the ID of the substitute node is transmitted to the sensor population.  To take 
advantage of this process the self-organising architecture would require an initialisation 
phase, combining the communication structure of the EDETA approach supported by the 
connection ranking processes outlined earlier under mobile communication approaches. 
One of the proposed applications of the EDETA solution is in fire detection as presented in 
[115], whereby 30 smoke detectors were placed over an ever increasing target area – to test 
coverage capabilities. However the authors of [115] don’t pay too much attention of how 
the protocol interacts with the set of sensors – outlining the structure of the protocol as 
copied from the overview publication of [114] followed by a discussion on available sensor 
technologies. A later paper featuring an underwater sensor network proved to be more 
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illustrative of the practical applications of the EDETA method [116]. The underwater 
sensor network operated with two population scales of 100 and 200 sensor nodes and three 
coverage area scales, with a single centrals sink node, performing the role of the observer 
agent. The communication interval between updates from the sensor nodes to the cluster-
head is every 250s – which is notably longer than the interval presently used in the current 
MAS simulation and several smart-meter projects.  
From this investigation it was clear that an initialisation stage and that such a stage would 
be driven by the ability of the customer layer to rank potential connections to members of 
the aggregation tier. Furthermore aggregation agents were to play a more involved role in 
the process than initially outlined in the examples derived from communication network 
literature; these agents would have the ability to reject incoming connection requests based 
on connection capacity. Additionally the aggregation agents would have the responsibility 
of selecting a substitute agent which was a customer agent promoted to take on aggregation 
duties in the event of failure. 
4.3.3 Vehicle Networks 
A further research domain where self-organising properties and techniques are present was 
within smart-vehicle and transportation networks. Like wireless communication structures, 
one of the core driving factors is agent mobility. A road network would be under the 
supervision of a coordinating controller or management system and occupy a static 
geographic area but the number of entries operating within that network is subject to 
continuous change. Therefore research in this area was considered  
The first example examined traffic management from a higher-level perspective as an 
implied multi-agent system detects and analyses congestion across the road network as 
discussed by the authors of [118]. The research outlines a method for allowing smart-
vehicles alternative routes based on traffic congestion data, in contrast to the previous 
examples the network management is primarily delivered through simulation rather than 
interaction between physical entities. A control centre maintains a model of the road 
network and the vehicles using it, the network itself is dissected into road segments – 
referring to unbroken stretches of road between junctions. Smart-vehicles communicate 
their position to the control centre and receive a representation of the model so each vehicle 
is aware of the decomposition of road segments. 
84 Self-Organising Systems 
 
The objective of the system is to calculate how long a vehicle spends travelling along each 
road segment – much in the same way that message transmission times are calculated. The 
vehicle announces to the nearest server when it has entered a segment, and when it has 
exited it - along with a unique vehicle identifier to distinguish between vehicles entering 
and exiting the area. These times are logged and compared to a pre-calculated time 
representing clear passage through the area. The pre-calculated time is a function of the 
length of the road segment, its speed limit and number of traffic signals along its length. If 
none of the recorded transit times exceed the pre-calculated estimate, then the road is 
declared clear. Otherwise if transit times are recorded above the threshold, it becomes 
indicative of potential congestion within the road segment. In the paper the local-server in 
charge of the road segment extracts the two/three longest transit times as a measure of 
network congestion rather than an overall average.  
Upon calculation of the level of congestion on a given road segment, incoming vehicles 
need to be informed such that they can make organisational decisions about which road 
segment to take to complete the journey. The authors recognise that decisions can be 
influenced by human behaviour depending on mood, journey purpose, visual information 
or local knowledge – each of which would influence their decision in response of 
recommendations delivered by the monitoring system.  Two potential choices are given to 
the vehicles subscribing to the management system:  
 Stay on track Strategy - Under this strategy, vehicles will continue to travel along the 
congested route up until the delay caused by the congestion issue exceeds the length of the 
offered alternative route. This operates under the logic that changing route to avoid 
congestion may not be the best solution for the vehicle. Therefore until such time that the 
alternative route actually offers a quicker journey time – avoid using it.  
Immediate Evasion Strategy – this approach involves the vehicle opting for the non-
congested route without considering the time-delays involved in the detour.  
In some respects the first option could be considered customer centric –where the needs of 
the customer are put first, while the other is network centric as further congestion on the 
initial route is limited through re-routing traffic before it becomes a more significant 
problem.  
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This research centred on the use of performance monitoring data used to inform 
reconfiguration actions, but also demonstrated that a reconfiguration action had the 
potential to be over-ridden by expert knowledge. Furthermore it also discussed that the act 
of taking no action in response to performance metrics exceeding thresholds is a valid 
course of action in the event that the transition event itself would prove to be more 
disruptive than the current congestion issue. Therefore it was important to consider if it was 
ultimate necessary to perform a transition in the event that even if thresholds have been 
exceeded, the effective impact on the network is relatively small. An immediate evasion 
strategy would involve the self-organising architecture performing a transition event for 
each metric threshold violation. 
An alternative traffic management and congestion avoidance mechanism is outlined in 
[119], the solution uses an approach similar to the ‘stay on track strategy’ implemented in 
the previous example. The difference being that the vehicles themselves are not necessarily 
involved in the process, potential expansions suggest the introduction of car-to-
infrastructure communication. Instead the junctions within the road network form the base 
layer of agents, and the vehicles are more analogous to data packets within the network. 
Therefore the scenario becomes a load balancing problem – minimising the amount of cars 
trapped at each of the junctions by routing the vehicles more efficiently. Each junction has 
an observer/controller agent which assesses the average waiting time for vehicles due to 
red light conditions – which can be compared to a message queue assessment. The junction 
then informs drivers of the least congested route via display boards if it knows that the 
suggested route would offer a time saving. To make these assessments there is no central 
server as proposed in [118], instead junction controllers communicate with each other, in 
what is effectively a flat architecture such that the junctions can update their internal routing 
tables with an estimated journey time between nodes – an estimation which is composed 
of road speed limits and waiting times as collected by the observer/controller agents. 
Therefore in this case the provision of self-organisation is performed through redirecting 
traffic between nodes in the road network based on performance monitoring information. 
The results of this implementation indicated that under normal conditions the improvement 
in traffic flow was limited, as illustrated in Fig. 4.5(a). However under a scenario when 
connections within the network were blocked, the system delivered more effective results 
as presented in Fig. 4.5(b). 
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Fig. 4.5 – Adaptive Traffic Control Results, with and without Incident 
It was not able to eliminate congestion building due blocked roads, but it was able to 
prevent vehicles from attempting to use the severed connections. This enforces the use of 
self-organisation for the purposes of resilience – detecting a fault within the communication 
architecture and modifying the recipient addresses of the transmitting agents to prevent 
messages being transmitted to a failed node. The increase in overall congestion is expected 
in these circumstances, as the volume of vehicles (of communication messages) then has 
to be passed onto the remaining active nodes and ultimately increasing the communication 
load.  
Further examples don’t necessarily implement self-organisation from the perspective of 
congestion and traffic management – instead considering the vehicle network in the context 
of a mobile sensor network and improving data collection as presented in: [36], [120], 
[121]. However these solutions are predominantly aimed to counter the condition of node 
mobility, which depending on the road network under surveillance can involve nodes 
travelling at significant speeds, which is not a situation encountered in the smart grid 
monitoring system.  
This research indicates that beyond an initialisation stage, the use of self-organisation was 
more effective when the system under observation encounters a condition outside of normal 
operating parameters. A failure of an aggregation agent would correspond with a blocked 
road and represent an event whereby triggering a reconfiguration event would deliver a 
performance improvement. A sudden rise in congestion would also be created if a cyber-
87 Self-Organising Systems 
 
attack event created a stream of attack traffic aimed at interrupting the flow of legitimate 
data. 
4.3.4 Multi-Agent Systems 
Multi-agent systems was another key research domain in which self-organising properties 
are exhibited and therefore could be investigated for the purposes for integrating techniques 
into a self-organising architecture. Unlike a sensor or communication network a multi-
agent system often required a greater degree of interaction between entities in terms of 
retrieving monitoring data, processing that information and responding with control actions. 
Therefore the control objectives of the system also had to be factored into the self-
organisation process. 
The first example considers reconfiguration on the basis of partial agent failure as 
documented by the authors of [122] whereby an agent community consisting of robots on 
an industrial production line is examined. The case study presents a scenario where one of 
the robots loses partial functionality, and thus the agent population is restructured in order 
to prevent the failure halting the production line. The authors suggest the idea of 
behavioural redundancy such that in the event of failures, the defective robot switches roles 
with another functional agent such that the defective agent operates in a position where the 
defects will not influence performance. For this process to work the agents need to be 
equipped with multiple behaviours for multiple roles within the network – allowing 
adapting to a new position within the community. To perform this role swap, the 
robot/agent needs to be aware of its own performance metrics and capabilities to decide 
whether or not it is able to continue performing the role it is currently allocated to. Once a 
defect has been detected, the affected agent contacts its neighbours to ask for a position 
change – explaining which failure has taken place, and what functionality has been affected. 
After making the help request, and agent which possesses the ability the defective agent 
has lost responds to the defective agent and the others in the system as an acknowledgement 
of being willing to help. Once the transition has taken place the defective agent concludes 
that it doesn’t possess the complete behaviour set required for its new position in the system. 
Therefore triggering a second transitional phase – the sequence of events is represented in 
Fig. 4.6 
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Fig. 4.6 – Role Swapping in a Self-Organising Multi-Agent System 
This research demonstrated that building behaviours into agents associated with other roles 
within the architecture improves the flexibility of the system. Such that agents can be 
transplanted into alternative roles within the system in the event that either the original 
agent had failed or additional support is required. Therefore agents could be designed to 
accept differing responsibilities if they are promoted or demoted. For example under the 
system described in the EDETA strategy the substitute agents were identical to the cluster-
head agents they were designed to replace, however it became evident that it would be more 
applicable to source substitutes from the a different agent group. This was because the 
customer layer had a larger accessible population, and therefore in the event of aggregate 
failure it was more appropriate to source a replacement from a tier with sufficient resources.  
Additional work in self-organising multi-agent systems considered applications within the 
smart grid domain where the focus is directed towards self-healing as documented in the 
following papers: [123], [124], [125]. Those papers separate the self-healing concept from 
the self-organising whole and apply is specifically to the control problem while the MAS 
remains static throughout.  
A further paper details a process for forming the core components of a self-healing process 
as described by the authors of [126]. These core components form a three layer approach 
which governs a self-healing process; these three layers are as follows. 
4. Fault Detection Layer 
5. Fault Diagnosis Layer 
6. Corrective Action Layer  
The corrective actions discussed by the authors are focussed towards changes made to the 
electrical network rather than the communication layer, but the core principals can be 
adapted to the management of agent interactions. The initial layer – fault identification – 
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takes place at the sensor level, which would equate to the customer agent level – assuming 
that these sensors which have some degree of awareness to notice that a particular variable 
is no longer within limits. Phase two is the diagnosis layer, which determines what has 
failed and if so propose a temporary solution if possible, while the final layer instigates the 
architectural change to prevent further damage to the system and restore service. This 
reinforces the idea that in the aim of developing a self-organising system it is important to 
monitor agent performance and variables which are not involved in the actual provision of 
control and general operation of the network.  
Aside from the smart grid domain the concept of self-healing through changes in 
architecture has been considered for web services [127], [128], [129] whereby multi-agent 
systems are applied. In [127], a two stage process is employed in the event of a failure 
within the agent community. Before an action is conducted a diagnosis agent analyses faults, 
a fault is defined as an instance where a performance metric exceeds specified thresholds 
usually in the form of various timers. If a number of faults are detected over a period of 
time – this is deemed to be a failure and as such is referred to the repair agent. This repair 
agent has the choice of two courses or action – attempt to re-establish the connection 
between customer and supplier or find a replacement agent which can carry out the tasks 
the customer is requesting. The replacement concept is a reflection of the substitute node 
concept presented in [114]. Except that in the case of the web-service scenario not all agents 
will be involved at any given time, so an inactive but functional agent can be used to 
substitute for the agent who has triggered the fault condition. The performance monitoring 
element of the process introduces a series of performance metrics measuring 
communication and agent effectiveness through a series of timers. These metrics are 
presented in greater depth in [129], illustrated in Fig. 4.7. 
 
Fig. 4.7 – Communication Performance metrics 
The figure presents several differing time intervals which provide five sets of performance 
measurement these times are described as follows: 
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 The Response Time: defined as the time elapsed between sending a request and 
receiving its response; Tresp = t4 − t1  
 The Execution Time: defined as the time elapsed for processing a request; Texec 
= t3 − t2,  
 The Communication Time: defined as the round trip time of a request and its 
response; Tcomm = Tresp − Texec  
 The Throughput: defined as the amount of requests that can be processed in a 
specified period of time; Throughput = Number of requests/period of time, 
 The Accuracy: defined as the success rate produced by the service; Accuracy = 
Number of successful responses/Total number of requests. 
Each of the parameters would be associated with a threshold governing the anticipated 
communication performance between agent pairs. If these measurements increased 
significantly this could be an indication of other events taking place within the architecture, 
either in the form of poor local node performance or the influence of a cyber-attack. 
4.3.5 Smart Grids 
While other research domains have alluded to applications related to smart grids, such as 
the smart-meter communication networks presented in [105] and self-healing multi-agent 
systems. It was also important to consider research conducted within the power systems 
domain because while the exploration of self-organisation in power systems is not presently 
extensive the development of advanced and increasingly intelligent monitoring and control 
methodologies increases its applicability. This is driven by the need for decentralised 
control and increasing quantities of sensors and monitoring technologies applied at the LV 
end of the network. Due to the high number of potential control scenarios involved with 
smart grid management the idea of self-organisation can be applied to a considerable 
variety of contexts.  
On example is concerned with organising charging priorities for electric vehicles with the 
aim of reducing the impact on the network through staggering charging patterns [130]. 
Because of the introduction of a control element the requirements of a self-organising 
system become notably more diverse, moving beyond topological changes to the 
architecture. The authors of [130] integrate the concept of self-organisation through 
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interactions on the lowest layer of the smart grid architecture, whereby the needs of the 
connected EVs dictate the control priorities. It could be argued that the self-organised EV 
charging concept is more of a decentralised control approach as no network configuration 
or control changes are made to the network – only the order and duration of which an EV 
is charged. 
A second example examines the smart grid as a cluster of interacting sensors within the 
context of voltage quality monitoring, in [131], the authors present a system wherein the 
sensors behave both like network nodes in a communication network or sensor grid and 
like agents in multi-agent system. The core component of the self-organisation is delivered 
through the communication network and routing paths between measurement and data 
storage. The roles and number of data aggregation points is not varied within the proposed 
solution, instead variations in the monitoring process are predominantly aimed at 
calculating a voltage quality index within the cluster of sensors observing a section of the 
electrical network. An architecture is proposed for the purposes of voltage monitoring 
which is based around node coupling is composed from the connection matrix of the 
underlying electrical network topology, again with the primary objective of determining 
voltage quality. Specific consideration with respect to drivers for variations in the 
architecture or decisions that may influence a topological change is not present within the 
research. 
A third example of self-organisation within smart grids illustrates the benefits of 
implementing the hierarchical structure using agents rather than a conventional client-
server architecture [132]. A specific focus is placed on reliability and robustness as a 
predominant driver for implementing self-organised monitoring systems. The authors 
introduce agent based technologies and an alternative to the strictly centralised traditional 
monitoring approach in system monitoring, two agent classifications are involved 
Intelligent Distribution Agent (IDA) and Power Quality Agent (PQA). These to agents form 
a hierarchical structure where the PQAs form the base layer, performing the monitoring 
responsibilities and processing the collected data. Processed results are then communicated 
to the IDA, acting as a local controller for the area served by the collection of PQAs. It 
analyses the incoming updates from the PQA population and compares the results with a 
series of thresholds. Each PQA can only communicate with its immediate neighbours and 
the IDA – thus lowering the bandwidth requirements to accommodate the system. Unlike 
a mobile communication network or an un-tethered underwater sensor network – the nodes 
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forming the majority of the population are static, positioned according to measurement 
availability or network points containing sensitive equipment. But self-organisational 
concepts are applied through modifying the virtual topology rather than the physical one – 
through changing agent responsibilities and communication routes. In this instance the 
driver for re-configuration is agent failure, with a view of improving robustness. As the 
architecture diagram in Fig. 4.8 illustrates, each monitoring cluster contains a single, central 
IDA – which is a single point of failure thus making the agent community just as fragile as 
the centralised client-server paradigm is it intended to replace.  
 
Fig. 4.8 – MAS Topology for Power Quality Monitoring 
Therefore in the event of failure the authors suggest that it would be replaced by a PQA, 
promoted to assume the responsibilities of an IDA as illustrated in Fig. 4.8. The process for 
selecting promoting one of the existent PQAs involves ranking the set of potential PQAs 
available for promotion with respect to a series of criteria – based upon expert assessments. 
 
Fig. 4.9 – IDA Promotion - Post Agent Failure 
The key criteria involved are: Computational ability, Computational burden, Adjacency to 
other PQAs and Adjacency to other IDAs; therefore assessing the nearby PQAs for their 
ability to host the IDA behaviours and their location within the network.  
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This research furthers the concept of using substitution as a method of replacing failed 
agents within a system, and that those substitutes do not necessarily have to be of the same 
agent type as the agent that has failed. As a result additional behaviours need to be 
embedded within the agent population such that they can assume new responsibilities. The 
research also indicates a system of determining which agent should be selected as a 
substitute in the event of failure, the EDETA approach pre-selects substitutes but a selection 
process could still be applied such that the pre-selected agent is the most accessible 
replacement when it is needed. 
Another driver for self-organisation within the smart grid domain is the influence of 
potential cyber-attacks compromising certain sectors of the network. The authors of [133] 
present the concept of controller switching in the event of a communication jamming attack 
affecting the connectivity between smart-meters and the local controller node. In a similar 
concept to the previous example the non-mobility of the smart-meter nodes means that the 
re-configuration is conducted by re-routing communications away from the affected area. 
The process involves using channel hopping to counteract the influence of the jamming 
signal; at this point a self-organised approach isn’t in play as the communication remains 
between the same pair of nodes, the customer and the local controller. However if the 
solution cannot avert the issues created by the jamming signal then the smart-meter needs 
to look elsewhere –and therefore becomes the architect of the self-organisation process. 
The system then retains the channel hopping approach, but widens the range by including 
the open channels on nearby controllers. To do this the smart-meter node contacts the 
neighbouring controllers and requests it’s channels hopping sequence – which defines 
which channels are in use for a given timeslot. From this information the smart-meter builds 
a controller switching matrix which defines which controller will be contacted on each 
timeslot, based on channel availability from the sequence data. While channel hopping 
processes are not simulated in the present model, as it focusses on the beginning and end 
points involved in a communication pairing rather than the communication technology 
itself, this example is another application of self-organisation for the purposes of self-
healing and robustness. 
Self-configuration can also take place at the transmission level where the voltage levels are 
much higher. In this case the smallest nodes are the sensor nodes instead of customers 
which communicate with regional aggregators. The authors of [134] propose a self-
configuring architecture focussed on connecting transmission line sensors with gateway 
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nodes which connect the sensor network with the remainder of the communication 
infrastructure. However this approach is presented as a solution to automated gateway 
detection for new sensor installations, while it is important to develop approaches for new 
nodes to integrate with the system the paper contains no indication of repeated architectural 
transitions and triggers for more wide spread action.  
 RESEARCH GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
The majority of the papers presented self-organisation based solutions to specific problems 
within the target domain and these solutions were primarily centred on either load balancing 
or recovery from failure. For example, the authors of [132] presented a self-organising 
network for the purposes of recovering from a fault at one of the nodes – responding 
through re-allocating the responsibilities of the failed node to an active alternative. In this 
example the concept of self-organisation is solely applied to resolving the issue of agent 
failure, whereas [105] documents an approach for allocating new nodes a connection to an 
aggregation point in a system with a dynamic population.  
In [114] an initialisation phase was described and in [109] a method for deciding how to 
modify the network is presented. In a smart grid environment under the control of a self-
organised MAS, a more complete approach was required, one that exhibited several of the 
aforementioned qualities and techniques, plus others from across the self-organising 
community. This variety of solutions is a product of the widespread applicability of self-
organisation and the multitude of potential interpretations and implementations, but even 
after narrowing the subject domain to networks and architectures – different research 
streams have their own specificities.  
One limitation of the present set of research examined is that there appears to be little 
consideration for the time-scales involved in any of the phases of a self-organised system. 
In terms of determining how long it takes to perform customer-aggregate allocations for 
various customer populations. Whether differing techniques would achieve convergence 
faster, or achieve a more even distribution of the number of connections per aggregate. The 
consideration for differing time scales could also be applied to responding to node failure, 
replacing a failed node is not an instant process and therefore there will be consequences 
for an elongated transition time. Furthermore the documented literature does consider the 
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implications for control actions during the node replacement stage and whether some 
control objectives would be more severely affected than others. 
Different solutions also focus on different performance metrics for ranking the potential 
connection options to the data collection points. The authors of [111] use a combination of 
communication delay, and predicted availability. Because nodes in the smart grid context 
are of a fixed position the issue of agent mobility affecting availability is removed, thus 
leaving decision making to be based on communication delay. On the other hand [132] uses 
physical proximity as one of the comparison criteria alongside computational burden and 
available resources to determine the most applicable agent. The latter may incur a larger 
communication overhead to transmit the additional metrics but prove more accurate in 
terms of fairly distributing connections.  
One notable omission from the set of sources referenced is an investigation into the 
overhead produced by the additional monitoring and diagnostic messages required in the 
context of a self-organised system on top of the base-level communication for a given 
scenario. For example, hard-coded MAS will have all of the connections pre-loaded and 
therefore wouldn’t need to undergo an initialisation phase which involves the transmission 
of various discovery messages. In order to make rational decisions about performing 
architectural changes, knowledge of the current system state needs to be collected and then 
transmitted to an agent with the powers to act upon it if necessary. This will ultimately 
increase the volume of data that the agents will have to process, and it raises the question: 
would this additional communication load and processing demand interfere with control 
processes.  
In terms of opportunities, there is certainly a case for implementing self-organisation within 
the context of smart grid management. To achieve self-organised status the agents need to 
be able to perform network discovery themselves, make their own connections – a concept 
which is noted in communication architectures and referenced with respect to smart-meters 
[105] and sensor networks [114]. The case for self-organisation due to agent mobility isn’t 
necessarily applicable to the smart grid domain, as the agents in this case are of a fixed 
location – domestic properties, generators etc. which accounts for the limited research 
output on self-organising communication/control architectures for smart grids. Yet the 
emergence of electric vehicle ownership would present a differing self-organisational 
challenge. 
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However a strong case is present for self-organisation in response to failure – whereby the 
agent network has to replace a failed agent in order to maintain a chain of communication 
or replace a lost controller. Failures could also reduce the maximum incoming or outgoing 
data capacity from a particular agent, therefore forcing the network to modify the 
distribution of communication load by either using up capacity on neighbouring agents, or 
introducing formerly dormant agents into the equation to take on the additional load. This 
scenario invokes the second rationale for a self-organising approach, which involves load 
balancing specifically of the communication load – identifying aggregates with higher than 
average congestion or reactivity times and instructing them to lay off connections to 
neighbours if possible. Self-organisation is relevant to the current research and in terms of 
managing the control and communication architectures in a smart grid concept, but the 
discrete transitions from the Disaggregated to Base to Cluster to Tiered communication 
structures may not be as applicable as greater flexibility would be beneficial. 
A further trigger for self-organisation is the presence of a cyber-attack event, whereby 
members of the agent population are compromised and therefore experience a reduction in 
functionality. The presence of cyber threats is an emerging topic within the smart grid and 
power systems domain and therefore requires as much attention and consideration as 
hardware or software failure related triggers. Failures within the network could easily be 
the result of an attack event aiming to damage control functions or compromise security 
measures. 
Also it could be considered an opportunity to amalgamate several different approaches to 
individual objectives into the same system – from an initialisation phase, conventional 
operation, performance monitoring, response to failure, load balancing, and architectural 
change decision making – all with respect to ensuring that control performance goals are 
maintained. Several techniques and approaches can be adapted and integrated to form a 
more complete self-organising architecture. 
 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Given that the current set of research examined in this chapter was spread across several 
subject areas, tackling several problems there was no single standout implementation which 
could then be translated into the smart grid domain. Furthermore it was important that in 
the objective of developing a self-organised MAS system the properties of the system 
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adhered to the properties as outlined in definitions provided by conceptual papers [37] [38] 
[102]. The system benefited from adapting multiple approaches from across the literature 
to solve the differing problems involved. Overall there was a reasonable degree of 
applicability for the principles and concepts of self-organisation within smart grid solutions. 
The most applicable of these was the response to failure either due to a technical 
malfunction or under the influence of a cyber-threat. A failure of a controller or data 
collection agent would interrupt the observability or controllability of the smart grid 
network, and therefore placing a great deal of importance in fault recovery with view 
towards continuous operation. The following papers [130], [131] and [132], illustrated that 
existing research considers the importance and relevance of self-organisation within the 
smart grid domain, and the examples cite differing aspects of smart grid applications which 
would benefit from these techniques. In [132], the authors use self-organisation for the 
purpose of recovering from agent failure through installing redundant behaviours and agent 
promotion. The other examples focus on a version of the load-balancing problem whereby 
EV charging patterns are organised to reduce impact on the grid and ensure that vehicles 
are still charged. These don’t take into consideration the architecture of a given system, or 
make topological changes to the structure of the network – but support the idea of the agents 
in the lowest layer of the hierarchy taking a leading role in determining which agents/nodes 
to connect with.  
As per the processes outlined in, [114] [115] [116] regarding the EDETA method – a self-
organised structure needed to go through an initialisation phase at start-up. This phase 
involved customers selecting their own aggregation agent to make a connection to; these 
connections were selected on the basis of agent availability and capacity.  The rationale for 
including this phase is with respect to the characteristics presented in [38], whereby the 
authors indicate a property entitled “Endogenous global order” which essentially suggests 
that the set of agents involved within a self-organised system are required settle into a stable 
operating state. This entailed customers finding a connection and thus establishing a link 
along which demand data and control alerts can be transmitted. In the context of the 
EDETA sensor network concept, the connections are formed based on proximity to the 
node requesting a connection and whether or not the target node has enough capacity to 
accept another connection. When establishing data and control connections between 
customers it was important that the customer was able to build a set of information such 
that it could make an informed decision as to which aggregate/controller to communicate 
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with. This required a series of messages similar to the REQ/RPLY messages used as part 
of the neighbour discovery process described in [111], where the difference between a 
transmitted REQ message and a received RPLY message is used to measure the 
communication time between sender and target. Channels with quicker response times then 
represent a more applicable connection.  
Outside the initial connection phase, examples in the literature both application specific 
and general principle pointed to a necessity for continual measurement which in turn 
reflects the objective of future power systems to maintain an increased level of 
observability. The authors of [102] introduce an observer element of which the sole 
responsibility is to retrieve performance metrics from the set of agents operating in the 
system. This is a centralised approach, where a single element is in charge of providing a 
controller with information on the system state, the controller then decides what actions 
need to be taken. An alternative approach to performance monitoring, with respect to agent 
failure detection is presented in [127], which follows a similar approach to that introduced 
in [102] – instead an observer, a diagnosis agent examines the performance data to look for 
instances where measured parameters exceed the designated limits. As the goal of the 
system is detect failure or sub-optimal performance the parameters are centred on message 
response times. The diagnosis agent flags each instance of an overly long response time as 
evidence of a potential failure; multiple instances are then flagged up to the next agent as a 
call for repair or replacement. A third example of performance monitoring is taken from 
[118], where updates are again published to a central server to be processed. However in 
the interests of improving scalability, it may be more appropriate to disseminate the 
monitoring process at a more local level.  
Each agent being able to assess its own communication times, congestion and control 
performance where applicable avoided the necessity for large numbers of messages in a 
highly populated system being transmitted to a central agent. There was still a case for the 
existence of a specific agent responsible for handling architectural changes – as in [127] – 
an architect agent would not receive all performance data, but would need to establish a 
view of key agents and their connections. As individual agents detect an anomaly in the 
performance metrics – alerts were sent to the architect agent, to limit the amount of traffic 
that the architect needed to process. Instead of creating a separate controller entity as in 
[102], the architect analysed the set of alert messages to determine a common link. For 
example this could mean that several customers noted slower response times to the same 
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aggregate, therefore corrective action is then applied to the aggregate in question. There is 
the concern that the overhead presented by diagnostic messages – especially in relation to 
failure detection will contribute a number of messages to the total data traffic. Some of the 
metrics were embedded within agent messages, through adding fields to the message 
content: time sent, time received, processing time, congestion data etc. As managing data 
collection is recognised as a source of self-organising interest as noted in [36], [120], [121], 
[112] 
As previously noted two objectives are common within self-organising literature – response 
to failure and load balancing. Because a smart grid system is highly dependent on the IT 
infrastructure and the communication links between components in that system, the load 
balancing issue would influence the handling of agent messages and control signals. A 
system with concentrations of message congestion is likely then to experience issues in 
terms of disseminating control signals and receiving the appropriate acknowledgement. 
Therefore it was important to include a process for monitoring communication load across 
the key bottleneck areas within the MAS. Some of this was handled during the initialisation 
phase through distributing connections, but as the system operates – agents may experience 
changes in communication intensity and therefore may request some of the load be re-
allocated elsewhere.  
The second objective is responding to failure, in [132] agents effectively bid to replace a 
failed agent – while in [114] key agents are assigned a substitute which is invoked at the 
point of failure. For the prospective MAS, a fusion of these techniques was more applicable 
to avoid delays when performing a bidding process post-failure. From the perspective of 
an aggregation agent it needed to select the most appropriate substitute – data extracted 
from the sequence of messages involved in making a customer connection was used as bid 
information. The customer agent with the lowest bid – in the form of round-trip message 
delay – was then selected as the substitute. This process is conducted during the 
initialisation phase, at such point that the aggregate had either reached maximum 
connection capacity or hadn’t received a connection request within a timeout period. This 
pre-selected the replacement in the event of failure, the ID of which is passed to the 
architect agent for the purposes of knowing where to re-route communications post-failure. 
The architect also needed to know which agents had made connections with the failed 
aggregate, such that they could be contacted and informed of the identity of the substitute.  
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Finally the decision making process for selecting which architecture to transition into is a 
key aspect of a self-organising system, and in the context of the smart grid domain, this 
decision would need result in a stable configuration. It is not feasible to introduce several 
trial and error based stages before settling on a the next architecture structure as enduring 
multiple transition phases in a short period of time may lead to incomplete transitions and 
interfere with underlying control processes. A series of rules is suggested in [109] and [135], 
based on performance indicators. Combinations of performance indicators are mapped to 
actions or reconfiguration options – translating the concept into current project in 
conjunction with the performance monitoring flags can be used to form a table of actions 
based on events.  
For example, if several customers contacted the architect with an alert message stating that 
they have received no contact from an aggregate agent – a rule will map that condition to 
the action of invoking the substitute to replace the failed agent. A second example might 
entail multiple messages from aggregation agents indicating that they are receiving 
connection requests after reaching maximum capacity. This would be mapped to an 
instruction to increase the aggregation capacity, to accommodate the additional customers. 
While some of the self-organising functions are completed in a decentralised manner 
through distribution across the overall agent population – the rule mappings would be 
hosted by the architect agent. This is reflective of the network management approach 
presented in [135] – where a network objective manager hosts the responsibility comparing 
performance indicators and their respective actions.  
Overall there is no single approach that could be immediately translated into the context of 
the self-organising architecture documented in this thesis. In accordance with the 
conceptual research presented in [37], [38], [102] the system needed to adopt more 
functionality in addition to transitioning from one configuration to the next. Therefore an 
initialisation phase composed of elements from [111], [114] was introduced to establish 
connections between customers and aggregates/controllers based on communication delays 
and aggregator/controller capacity. During this phase agent substitutes are pre-selected. 
After the completion of an initialisation stage performance monitoring techniques were 
used to maintain observability. These techniques were based on the concepts presented in 
[105], [118], [127]  and [129] with the exception that only instances of performance 
indicators exceeding threshold values are communicated to the architect agent. Finally in 
response to the alerts a hybrid approach to self-organised management will be introduced 
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as per [107] where different actions are completed by different tiers within the overall MAS 
architecture. Some load balancing actions can be handled in a decentralised manner through 
connection handovers from one aggregate to the next. Wider architectural changes, 
including transitioning from one core design to another through activating dormant 
aggregates or promoting/demoting agents will be handled by the architect agent. This agent 
should maintain a list of conditions and actions similar to those implemented in [109] and 
[135]. These actions could involve controlling whether an agent is dormant or not for the 
purposes of balancing communication load [106] or replacing a failed agent [132], [114]. 
For some changes, a ‘stay on track’ strategy [118] can be employed – mostly in the case of 
connection transfers – to check if transferring the connection would result in a performance 
improvement, to avoid unnecessary modifications to the system. 
Overall considering the set of existing literature and the self-organising architecture 
required for the set of agents performing voltage control and data collection duties a three 
stage process shall be introduced. Stage one of the process consists of an initialisation phase 
where the agents can locate a set of potential aggregates and request a connection. 
Connections will be prioritised on the response time of the aggregate, and whether the 
aggregate has reached capacity. Once the architecture is fully connected the second stage 
begins, this stage consists of a conventional operation state and is focussed around 
performance monitoring, and the communication metrics retained by the individual agents 
will be given appropriate thresholds. Violation of those thresholds would constitute an error 
report. 
 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a range of different research topics in which concepts pertaining to 
self-organised systems were presented, in addition to exploring application specific 
techniques and approaches, underlying requirements were also examined. In addition to 
interrogating relevant literature in domain of self-organising systems the chapter also 
explored the gaps in the documented research. From these gaps suggestions for strategies 
which would then implemented in the development of a self-organising agent architecture 
were inferred. Finally conclusions were drawn with regards to elements of the reviewed 
literature which could be adapted and integrated into the developed architecture.  
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Chapter 5: Developing a Self-
Organising Architecture  
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 SYSTEM OUTLINE 
Research into the concepts and mechanisms involved with self-organisation conducted in 
the previous chapter outlined that thee core stages were required to develop a system which 
could be considered self-organising. The processes involved needed to be adapted for 
implementation within the context of a smart grid architecture solution.   
The first stage of operation was focussed on the connection of customer layer agents to the 
aggregation tier for the purposes of data transmission; this stage also included connecting 
customers to controllers. The second stage accounted for the majority of the runtime, where 
the agent population conducted performance monitoring, comparing individual variables 
against a set of thresholds. This performance monitoring stage was triggered once 
initialisation was completed, after each transition event the architecture reverted to the 
performance monitoring stage. Finally the third stage was responsible for the process of 
performing architecture transitions on the back of a decision making engine, and 
determined which of the available transition mechanisms needed to be invoked based on 
the data recovered during performance monitoring. 
This chapter will discuss the development of each of the different stages involved within 
the self-organising architecture covering the communication requirements and the 
processes necessary for the stages. The chapter will examine the architecture transition 
functions and method for triggering and simulating attack mechanisms within the 
architecture. 
 INITIALISATION STAGE 
The initialisation stage defined the initial start-up procedure in terms of how the agents 
form a communication and control architecture through contacting controllers and data 
collection points in the form of aggregation agents. The initialisation stage was adapted 
from mechanisms employed by the EDETA [114], HARP [117] approaches for sensor 
networks in addition to the ‘Tic tac toe’ [111] architecture also used for sensor 
communications.  
The EDETA solution assumed a set of homogenous nodes and aimed to build a hierarchical 
structure for data transmission. Of this population a proportion were elected as ‘cluster head’ 
nodes and therefore formed the upper tier of the hierarchy. The EDETA and HARP 
approaches presented an initialisation stage whereby the nodes which were not selected to 
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be elected into cluster-head positions seek out cluster-head nodes for the purposes of 
forming a connection. The Tic-tac-toe-arch also presents an initialisation stage and 
introduces a communication protocol for selecting the relevant data collection point and for 
sending connection requests. Rather than using proximity, the approach uses the interaction 
between a sensor node and a cluster head node as a metric for selecting the most appropriate 
option. This interaction involves the base tier sensor nodes, sending REQ messages and 
receiving RPLY messages from the sink nodes. A similar approach has been applied in the 
current implementation through ‘DISCOVER’ and ‘HELLO’ message pairs.  
An additional component of the initialisation stage is the selection of substitution agents 
for the aggregation layer agents. Substitutes are proposed as part of the EDETA approach. 
The cluster heads are allocated a substitute node in the event of failure, which may be a 
result of power loss in the context of the sensor networks involved. Therefore a substitute 
is selected to replace the missing cluster head and maintain the data link from the sensors 
to the surface node. This adds a degree of fault tolerance to the network.  
Overall the present initialisation stage has been put into place on the influence of the 
EDETA/HARP approaches which present a multi-stage method of applying a self-
organising architecture to sensor networks. Secondly the internal methodology for pairing 
customer/generation agents with an aggregator was informed by the Tic-Tac-Toe-Arch 
method. The time delay between the transmission of a ‘DISCOVER’ message and the 
reception of a ‘HELLO’ was used as a metric for selecting aggregate agents to connect to, 
this metric bears a similarity to the process applied by [105] when addressing the issue of 
smart-meter networks. 
5.2.1 Establishing a control and communication connection 
The first part of the initialisation phase was to establish a connection to a data collection 
point within the architecture, and to select a controller. A communication connection 
focussed on building a route from the customer to the observer so that demand information 
could be extracted and filtered to the top of the hierarchy. Generation agents are seen as 
customers from the perspective of searching for a communication connection, as 
transmitting generation output data was considered to be identical from a messaging 
viewpoint as transmitting demand. Whereas a control connection determined which tier of 
the hierarchy a customer will transmit control requests in the event of a voltage deviation.  
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The following diagram in Fig. 5. illustrates the initial negotiation process between a 
customer agent and an aggregate, each communication interaction was stored as a series of 
variables recorded as a ConnectionObject. A ConnectionObjeect was a java class written 
to manage the initialisation process from the perspective of the customer/generator agent – 
determining whether or not the relevant discovery messages had been sent and responded 
to. The class also calculated the response time, it is this response time that was used by the 
agent to decide which of the aggregates active on the network it wished to connect to as its 
first priority.  
 
Fig. 5.1 – Initialisation Handshaking 
If the first connection request was denied due to the aggregate having already accepted the 
maximum number of connections, the customer moved onto the aggregate with the second 
shortest response time until a connection is made. If no aggregates accepted the connection, 
the customer was then deemed to be isolated and communicates that to the Architect so that 
a place can be found, or additional aggregation resource is created. The same process was 
used to apply for a connection to a controller, if the aggregate layer was also performing 
the control processes, one connection request will apply to both data sharing and control. 
Furthermore if the level of control decentralisation is set to the customer layer, no control 
connection requests will be made as control will be handled locally.  
Architect Customer Aggregate
Request for Aggregate list and control 
information
Returned Information
DISCOVER Message
HELLO Message
For each Aggregate in the list returned 
by the Architect
CONNECTION_REQ Message
Response Time
Selecting shortest 
response time
CONNECTION_ACCEPT Message
CONNECTED Message
Update internal 
database
If the aggregate 
has available 
capacity
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5.2.1 Defining Substitute Agents 
After both the data and control connections have been made – the final phase of the 
initialisation stage was the nomination of substitute agents. These agents are members of 
the customer/generation layer and were pre-selected to replace an aggregate in the event 
that the aggregate becomes unresponsive. Substitution was also one of the architecture 
transitions that could be selected by the Architect in the event of dealing with an error state 
which was having a large impact on a single aggregate within the network. An aggregate 
only selects a substitute once it had reached the maximum number of connections or, if no 
more connection requests were received indicating that agent population had been fully 
initialised.  
To select a substitute the aggregate a data collection message was sent to each of the 
customers which had established communication connections, those customers then replied 
with a set of performance data including current input and output data flow rates, message 
congestion, and response times. From this information the aggregate could select the most 
appropriate agent to use at its substitute, in the event that the aggregate needs to be replaced 
for any reason the replacement had been preselected through the substitution process.  
Once all customers and generation agents have secured their connections to the aggregate 
layer and a relevant controller and once substitution process had been completed for each 
of the aggregates the network can then be described as fully initialised. 
 PERFORMANCE MONITORING 
The second stage of the process was the performance monitoring phase as the system 
needed to be monitored to ensure that it operated within a given set of parameters; the 
performance monitoring process was informed and adapted from work presented in [127] 
and [136]. In addition to recording data regarding differing communication and processing 
times, additional monitoring was performed through a range of key performance indicators 
(KPIs) documented in the following subsection. 
In [127], the authors use the performance monitoring information to determine whether or 
not a fault has occurred, by applying threshold values to the performance monitoring 
metrics. If a metric exceeds a threshold a fault event is recorded, several fault events 
requires the intervention of a corrective mechanism. This approach was adopted into the 
107 Developing a Self-Organising Architecture 
 
monitoring phase of the developed self-organising architecture, whereby a single metric 
exceeding a threshold is would not trigger an architecture transition.  
A performance monitoring mechanism is considered to be one of the core functions of a 
self-organised system as presented by [37]. Furthermore the authors of [102] present a 
configuration whereby a specific agent or component is allocated for the purposes of 
collecting and processing of performance monitoring. Within the developed self-organising 
architecture individual agents perform local performance monitoring through comparing 
recorded data with a set of threshold values, however the overall processing of any 
performance data that did exceed one or more thresholds would be completed by a central 
agent. This was one of the responsibilities of the Architect agent which maintained a record 
of all performance exceptions and determined the overall system health. 
Another contributor to the performance monitoring process was adapted from [118], where 
error reports have a limited lifespan – and once expire therefore the re-organisation 
mechanism would not be triggered by historic data. Furthermore the authors of [118] also 
presented a scenario whereby monitoring would be conducted locally and reported back to 
a central entity for processing. The use of the Architect has previously been stated but time 
limits on performance exceptions were also implemented such that the Architect did not 
attempt to respond to error conditions which had expired. 
5.3.1 Threshold Decisions 
One of the core methods behind the performance monitoring process was determining when 
each of the performance metrics was considered to outside of a recommended set of limits. 
Each agent was responsible for monitoring a series of performance metrics and reporting 
instances when those metrics exceeded performance limits. Therefore a set of thresholds 
needed to be instantiated to make the required comparisons; some thresholds were informed 
by practical limitations while others were informed through performing communication 
load tests to gauge effective difference between normal and abnormal data production and 
consumption. The following table presents the metrics examined and the thresholds applied 
Table 5.1 – Threshold Settings Table 
Metric Threshold Comment 
Control 
Performance 
400 
Seconds 
A 200 second waiting period was imposed before 
processing an excursion – if the event was not cleared 
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with a 200 seconds of control being initiated a control 
error is triggered. The threshold of 200 seconds (plus 
the 200s standoff stage) is based on the voltage 
recovery times presented in [137] of 40-70s 
additional time is allowed for a non-optimal control 
approach.  
Data Flow Maximum 
Rate: 
120kbps 
(15kB/s) 
As per the Smart-meter Specification – smart-meters 
will use ZigBee standard transmitters and adhering to 
the ZigBee Smart Energy Profile (SEP) v1.2 [138]. 
The ZigBee devices have maximum potential 
transmission rate of 250kbps (31.25KB/s). Actual 
transmission speeds will be slower due overheads 
and delays. The selected threshold of 120kbps was in 
line with research conducted by the authors of [139] 
and [140]. The former identifying an effective 
maximum data rate of between 110kbps and 
120kbps, while the latter observed performance loss 
after 118kbps. Therefore transmission would be 
possible after 118kbps, but with a performance loss. 
 
Additionally each ACL message within the MAS had 
its calculated size in bytes increased by 48 bytes to 
emulate the presence of a security certificate 
presented by the standard in [138].  
Reactivity 
Response Time 
500ms The reactivity metric was set at 500ms as on the basis 
of testing the architecture without the presence of 
additional load to determine a baseline value. Lower 
thresholds were more likely to trigger false positives. 
Congestion 50 
messages 
The congestion threshold was a measurement of the 
amount of messages that are waiting to be processed 
by the agent in question. Like the data flow threshold 
this primarily concerns the aggregation tier as these 
agents filter the bulk of the data and therefore form 
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the effective data bottlenecks. Congestion was 
measured as a moving average over the course of a 
minute and therefore the threshold was taken from 
the average rather than congestion spikes. As with 
reactivity a set of base tests were performed to 
determine the nominal performance level given the 
agent population size, values that notably exceed that 
nominal level of congestion were the considered to 
be erroneous.  
Unresponsiveness No reply in 
10 seconds. 
 
10 missed 
messages 
The unresponsiveness threshold was a limit by which 
transmitting agent assumes that the receiving agent is 
no longer responding to messages. If an agent did not 
receive a reply within 10 seconds sending the initial 
message, that message was declared missing. After 
10 messages are declared missing the agent assumes 
that the desired recipient is offline or unresponsive 
Under-usage 3kB/s Research presented by the authors of [106] suggests 
that as part of Capacity and Coverage Optimisation 
in mobile communication networks, nodes which are 
under-utilised can be placed into a dormant state. 
This value is set at 20% of the maximum throughput 
rate – at 24kbps (3kB/s) 
 
This minimum utilisation of an agent, only applies to 
agents performing aggregation functions as they can 
be demoted or made dormant in response. 
Additionally customer or generation agents 
performing aggregation duties will monitor 
utilisation in the event that they need to relinquish 
aggregation responsibilities  
Control 
Unresponsiveness 
3 seconds The control responsiveness metric was not used for 
performance monitoring purposes but the same 
techniques were applied. If a customer agent queried 
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the controller to ask whether or not DSR restrictions 
are still required and receives no response within 3 
seconds, the customer would terminate all control 
actions under the assumption that they are no longer 
needed. 
Each of the performance metrics listed was stored as a performance monitor object, where 
samples were periodically taken so that a moving average could be computed. The 
performance monitor object also calculated the rate of change of a given metric so that if a 
threshold is exceeded, the object estimated the length of time the performance metric will 
remain outside the recommended limits and if it showed any sign of declining. Any metric 
that exceeds its threshold is considered to have entered an error state and thus the agent 
observing the error state would generate an error report and transmit that report to the 
Architect agent. The role of the Architect agent was to store the error with any other 
received reports and process the list with a view of determining the need for a transition 
event.  
5.3.1 Error Collection and Processing 
Processing and then acting upon an error state within the agent population was a three stage 
process. The first step involved handling the incoming error reports and storing them 
effectively – and thus required a suitable data structure to record all of the relevant error 
report fields. Step two required scanning through the error list and converting the data into 
a series of comparable metrics, error severities, totals, and scope. The final stage used the 
results of the error processing stage to determine if a self-organised action is warranted and 
if so which action to take.  
The Architect agent would perform an analysis function whenever a new error was received 
from the agent population. At the point the message was received, the Architect determines 
whether or not an instance of the same error has been previously recorded. If it was the first 
instance of a given error then the agent will create a new error object and store the object 
in the list of active errors for that particular error type, however if the error has been 
received previously, the Architect would scan through the list of errors and update the 
relevant object with the new timestamp and magnitude of the most recent occurrence of the 
error. The list of active errors for each type is contained within a wrapper object; the 
wrapper object contains functions for processing the list of errors and returning information 
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necessary for performing decision making – I.E. prominent error locations or causes. For 
example if a customer observed a slow reaction time between itself its associated aggregate 
then it would send an error report. Each error report contains the following fields as 
illustrated in the following table in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2 – Composition of an example error alert message 
Header Error Type Cause Magnitude Timestamp Threshold 
ERROR_ALERT reactivity AG1 750 1452790402508 500 
Complete Message ERROR_ALERT,reactivity,AG1,2000, 1452790402508,1500 
The Architect would receive this error and locate the wrapper object for the ‘reactivity’ 
error type, and extract the list of errors currently recorded for the error type. If it has been 
found that the same customer had previously reported a reactivity problem and cited agent 
“AG1” as the cause of the problem – the error report will be updated with the new 
magnitude and timestamp. If this was the first instance as previously indicated the Architect 
will create a new error report object. The following diagram outlines this process of 
handling incoming messages for any given error type. 
 
Fig. 5.2 – Receiving Error Messages 
As part of the error management and performance monitoring stage it was also important 
for the list of errors retained by each of the wrapper objects to be processed – one of the 
most important parts of this process was to calculate error severities and rates of change. 
Error severity was determined as being the percentage by which the magnitude of each 
error exceeded the threshold value. The rate of change component would be extracted from 
error types with multiple error reports, as multiple data points were required to determine 
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if an error was decreasing or increasing in severity. Comparing the error magnitudes across 
several error reports were useful in determining how that error was developing – whether 
it was becoming more severe or whether it was declining. This information was then used 
as an input into the decision making process such that it could decide which errors were the 
most severe and which course of action was required.  
Other factors are involved in the error processing stage, as it was important to filter out 
error reports which hadn’t been updated in a significant period of time, if no further reports 
were made for an error condition it was then assumed that the error condition is no longer 
present. Therefore these errors were eliminated from the list of active errors as they were 
no longer active, errors are deemed to be inactive after 30 seconds of inactivity, and this 
prevented any expired errors from contributing to the average severity of the error type. 
This was also done to prevent error states carrying over from one transition event to another 
if they were solved in the first instance and avoid unnecessary transitions based around 
false positives.  
At the end of the processing stage the Architect would then be aware if it needed to enact 
a transitional event through triggering the decision making element of the self-organising 
system. The elements of the decision making system will be documented in the following 
chapter, but the result of any decision was in the form of one of the following architectural 
transition options.  
 ARCHITECTURE TRANSISIONS  
Four stages of architectural transition were available to the Architect agent in terms of 
adjusting the communication network in response to data retrieved from the performance 
monitoring stage. This data may indicate that the initialisation phase had created an uneven 
connection distribution across the aggregation tier, poor agent performance as a result of 
failure or the presence of an attack event within the architecture. Each stage represented an 
escalation in the severity of the response by the Architect agent and the severity of the 
performance issues across the agent population. 
5.4.1 Stage 1 - System Rebalancing 
A rebalancing operation was the smallest and least intrusive of the transition events and 
was based on systems used in mobile communication networks when redistributing 
connections between nodes. Rebalancing was most effective when redressing the actions 
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of the initialisation phase, where one aggregate may have been configured with a larger 
number of connected customer agents than any of other agents in the aggregation 
population. Therefore it was immediately at greater risk of congestion or reaction time 
errors, and as a result a rebalancing operation would transfer some of the connections from 
the heavily loaded aggregate to a less heavily loaded equivalent. A second format of the 
rebalancing stage took place when a small number of agents are affected by connectivity 
issues between themselves and the aggregation layer in this case those agents were 
transferred to a new location. 
Process 
If the Architect agent determined that a rebalancing process was required it would trigger 
the transferConnections function – the pseudocode to which is presented in Fig. 5.3. The 
function was supplied with an error type this error type represented the dominant issue 
detected during performance monitoring, if the dominant error referred to connectivity 
problem, either in the form of slow response times or unresponsiveness – a targeted 
rebalancing is triggered. Other error formats such as congestion or execution timing errors 
are responded to with a general rebalancing.  
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Fig. 5.3 – Pseudocode Regarding Connection Rebalancing 
The pseudocode also demonstrates that the Architect has the power to over-ride the 
suggestion of a rebalancing action if the location of the problem determined that such an 
action would prove to be ineffective. If the error was located at an agent which had the 
FUNCTION CALL with dominant error type 
INITIALIASE list of connections to transfer 
IF error type = “reactivity” or error type = “unresponsive” 
 RETRIEVE list of agents reporting the error 
 FOR agent list 
  RETREIVE the aggregate the agent currently reports to 
  FOR each of the potential aggregates 
   IF aggregate has a remaining connection space 
    BUILD transfer message 
    SET content = “NEW_TARGET” 
    SET recipient as agent to be relocated 
    SEND transfer message 
     
    BUILD transfer out message 
    SET content = “TRANSFER_OUT” 
SET recipient as former aggregate 
    SEND transfer out message 
    RECORD all message sizes in bytes 
    END FOR 
   ELSE 
    MOVE to next aggregate 
   END IF 
  END FOR 
 END FOR 
ELSE 
 IF aggregate reporting the error has the fewest connections 
  PRINT “Rebalancing would be ineffective, replacing agent 
  FUNCTION CALL to substitution function 
 ELSE IF multiple aggregates reporting errors 
  FUNCTION CALL activate a single dormant agent 
 ELSE 
CALCUATE difference in connections between error reporting aggregate and least 
heavily loaded aggregate 
TRANSFER half the difference in connections to the least heavily loaded 
aggregate 
 END IF 
END IF 
 
115 Developing a Self-Organising Architecture 
 
fewest connections, it indicated another issue with the agent itself rather than one derived 
from communication volume and therefore would trigger a stage 2 substitution action 
instead. Alternatively the Architect may discover that the issue was widespread across a 
number of locations and therefore rather than redistributing the connections via a 
rebalancing action – it would be more advantageous to increase the aggregation capacity 
by activating a dormant agent.  
Communication Summary 
During a rebalancing operation the following messages would be transmitted between the 
Architect, aggregation and customer layers of the architecture. Each of the rebalancing 
formats utilised the following three messages presented in Table 5.3 to orchestrate 
transferring a connection from one aggregate to another.  
Table 5.3 – Communication Summary during Rebalancing.  
Header Sender  Receiver Payload Comments 
NEW_TARGET Architect 
Agent 
Customer 
or 
Generator 
Agent 
Agent name of 
the new 
aggregate to 
connect to 
Message informing the 
customer or generator it is 
being transferred and to 
modify its communication 
targets. 
TRANSFER_IN Customer 
or 
Generator 
Agent 
New 
destination 
aggregate 
Header only Message to introduce the 
customer/generator to the 
new aggregate agent 
TRANSFER_OUT Architect 
Agent 
Former 
data 
aggregate 
Header only Message to the aggregate 
formerly connected to the 
customer agent to 
removed it from its 
connection list 
5.4.1 Stage 2 - Agent Substitution 
Aggregation level substitutes were pre-selected during the initialisation stage, as adapted 
from the fault tolerant aspects of the EDETA [114] method. The role of a substitution event 
was to replace an existing aggregate with an immediate substitute agent. Substitution was 
also presented in [132] whereby local controllers which fail are replaced by an agent from 
a lower tier in the hierarchy. This process would not add to the total aggregation capacity 
available in the agent population, it replaces a poorly performing or failed agent with 
another functioning one. Because the replacement agent was from a lower tier, it 
maintained its existing responsibilities (monitoring local voltage, publishing demand 
profiles, enacting any control commands etc.) while also adopting those of the failed agent. 
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The substitution process used some of the same functions as used by the promotion process, 
but without adding aggregation capacity or modifying network tiers 
Process 
When a substitution was called for as part of an agent failure the process will remain the 
same, only the trigger condition changes. So the first stage was to identify which of the 
connected customer/generator agents was the designated substitute for the aggregate in 
question. This designated substitute was then sent an “ACTIVATE_SUB” command, and 
supplied with a list of agent names which the substitute would assume the responsibility of 
interacting with. As the substitute agent received the message, it began informing the agents 
who were formerly connected to the failed aggregate who to redirect their messages to. As 
outlined in the pseudocode listed below in Fig. 5.4 : 
 
Fig. 5.4 – Pseudocode for Activating a Substitute 
The substitute would then break down the list of affected customers from the message into 
an array structure so that it can iterate through the list and transmit the command to each 
agent to inform it of the change in source of aggregation services. The substitute performed 
this through transmitting a “SUB_ACTIVE” message to each member of the agent list. On 
reception of this message, other agents previously associated with the failed aggregate reset 
their data_target which defined the outgoing location of agent updates. The substitute itself 
would modify its own data_target to point to the Observer agent if anything other than the 
tiered architecture is in use. If a tiered architecture was in place, the substitute would 
connect with an upper tier aggregate instead. Once all the agents involved in the process 
have reset their communication targets the broken link will have been repaired as the failed 
or inaccessible aggregate is phased out of the communication loop as the substitute assumed 
responsibility.  
RECEIVE “ACTIVATE_SUB” Message and customer list 
SET aggregate status = true; 
BUILD agent message declaring aggregate status 
FOR each customer in customer list 
 ADD customer id to list of message recipients 
END FOR 
SEND message 
RECORD size of outgoing message in bytes 
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Because the substitute did not participate in the original initialisation phase as a substitute 
agent it will not have built internal knowledge base containing information about those 
connections. Therefore to accumulate that information, the agent identifiers extracted from 
incoming demand and generation updates were used to build the relevant internal 
knowledge of connected agents. When a new the first update from a connected customer is 
received, sender information was retrieved from the message, such that it could be added 
to the list of customers which relied on the aggregation services provided by the 
replacement aggregate. The following pseudocode in Fig. 5.5 outlines the function which 
handled adding connection objects and determining the object type based on the first letter 
of the agent name – where “C” refers to a customer agent and “G” refers to a generator 
agent.  
 
Fig. 5.5 – Pseudocode for Checking and Adding Connection Objects 
Both agent types were represented by the same java object as they both contain the 
following variables: agent name, type, real power (load or output) and reactive power (load 
or output). The role of the agent type distinction was to determine how the information was 
aggregated – to separate P and Q for load and generation entities. 
Communication Summary 
The following table presented in Table 5.4 documents the series of messages involved in 
delivering a substitution process as the architect activated the substitute and ensured that 
FUNCTION CALLED with new connection name 
FOR each customer in connection list 
 RETREIVE customer name 
 IF new customer name matches current customer name 
  RETRIEVE customer object 
 END IF 
END FOR 
IF no matches 
EXTRACT name prefix (“C” or “G”) from new connection name 
BUILD new customer object 
IF prefix = “C” 
 SET object type to “CUSTOMER” 
ELSE IF 
 SET object type to “GENERATOR” 
END IF 
ADD customer object to connection list 
RETURN customer object 
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data from the outgoing aggregates isn’t used in overall calculations to avoid data 
duplication. 
Table 5.4 – Communication summary for Agent Substitution 
Header Sender  Receiver Payload Comments 
ACTIATE_ 
SUB 
Architect 
Agent 
Substitute 
Agent 
Substitution 
type, 
Communication 
architecture 
type, 
List of agents 
to transfer 
Message from the 
architect to a 
substitute agent 
instructing it to 
activate and which 
customers to connect 
to 
DROP_ 
AGGREGATE 
Architect 
Agent 
Observer 
Agent 
Name of 
aggregate being 
replaced 
Message to the 
observers agent to 
inform it that one of 
the aggregates 
previously connected 
was being replaced 
SLEEP Architect 
Agent 
Aggregate 
being 
replaced 
Reason for 
being made 
dormant 
“SUBBED” 
Message to the 
aggregate being 
replaced by the 
substitution 
instructing it to enter 
a dormant state  
SUB_ACTIVE Substitute 
Agent 
Customers 
being 
reconnected 
Reason for 
transfer  
“SUBBED 
CUSTOMER” 
Message to each 
customer formerly 
connected to the 
replaced aggregate 
informing them that 
the substitute is the 
new aggregate 
SUB_ 
COMPLETE 
Customers 
being 
reconnected 
Substitute 
Agent 
Header only Response from the 
customers being 
transferred that they 
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have accepted the 
substitution and 
changed internal 
parameters 
accordingly. 
IS_ 
AGGREGATE 
Substitute 
Agent 
Observer 
Agent 
Header only Message to inform 
the observer that the 
substitute agent will 
now be acting as an 
aggregate 
Results 
To illustrate the system in effect Fig. 5.6 presents the change in incoming and outgoing 
data before and after a substitution event. The solid lines represent the data flow of the 
original aggregate before it is taken out of the loop, while the dashed lines represent the 
data flow of the substitute agent. In the pictured example the substitution event was hard 
coded into the architect agent and triggered using a timer rather than a response to network 
conditions. This process was applied to examine the effectiveness of the transition event 
and demonstrate that the processes and communication structure previously presented 
would have the desired impact. These hard coded triggers were then replaced when 
installing the decision making engine into the architect agent, once the individual 
transitions were validated in isolation of the error recording processes. 
 
Fig. 5.6 – Data Transfer during Substitution 
Twelve minutes into the simulation the changeover procedure was triggered and at 13 
minutes the dataflow recorded by the substitute matches that of the former aggregate. The 
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minute delay between the two samples was due to the performance monitoring process 
collecting data flow information which is sampled over a minute period. So a full minute 
after the transfer the array containing performance monitoring data was updated with the 
results of taking over the aggregation role. 
5.4.2 Stage 3 - Activating Dormant Agents 
The second mechanism involved the activation of dormant agents, a set dormant 
aggregation layer agents existed to provide additional aggregation capacity in the event that 
performance monitoring detected a wider issue. This would indicate that the aggregation 
layer had become over-loaded and further aggregation resources are needed to be 
dispatched to distribute the connections. In contrast to the substitution process, all existing 
agents retain their original responsibilities and the architecture remains largely consistent, 
no further tiers would be added and no roles modified. The dormant agents are activated 
and assigned to the lower or only aggregation tier and communicated with the existing 
aggregates. Likewise if the congestion/data flow information indicates that the agents are 
being under-utilised then they can be placed into a dormant state and the connections re-
allocated to the remainder of the aggregation population.  
The use of dormant agents in self-organisation was documented by the authors [106] – 
whereby nodes with little or no connection usage are placed into a dormant state and are 
called upon when needed. Additionally several sensor network solutions place agents into 
a dormant state through for the purposes of conserving energy, however as it is not 
anticipated that the agents will have a limited power supply – a dormant agent remains 
partially active in the sense that it can listen and respond to messages. Such that if it 
received errant communications while being registered as dormant, an appropriate message 
can be send in response, also to allow the agent to listen for signals to awaken. Nodes which 
were not used as data collection points were also made dormant in the case of the Tic-Tac-
Toe-Arch [111], as part of the initialisation phase. In addition to a series of aggregation 
agents which were instantiated as dormant agents, any active aggregates which did not 
receive any connections during initialisation would themselves enter a dormant state.  
Process 
If the Architect agent determined that the appropriate course of action was to activate 
members of the dormant agent population the first step was to trigger the activateDormants() 
function within the Architect agent. This function checks the number of dormant agents, 
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and then checks the number of active aggregates. Fig. 5.7 presents the pseudocode for the 
function responsible for activating the dormant agents an integrating them with the rest of 
the network.  
The first act of the function is to determine how many connections will the newly awakened 
aggregate be responsible for, and which member of the active aggregate population those 
connections would be transferred from. To calculate the number of customer connections 
to relocate, the architect needs to be aware of the ratio between active aggregates and 
dormant agents scheduled to be awakened. For example if a structure with 4 active 
aggregates is to be joined by 2 dormant agents – the first dormant agent would receive 33% 
of the connections from both the first two active aggregate. The second dormant agent 
would also receive the same proportion of customers but from the second pair of aggregates 
– therefore all of the active dormant agents would adopt a similar number of connections 
and communication load at all aggregates was reduced. 
 
Fig. 5.7 – Pseudocode for Activating All Dormant Agents 
Once the new distribution of customer connections was calculated the 
“ACTIVATE_DORMANTS_ALL” message would be transmitted to each of the dormant 
FUNCTION CALL 
RETRIEVE list of active aggregates 
RETRIEVE list of dormant aggregates 
SET limit = ratio of active to dormant aggregates 
 
SET counter = 0 
IF dormant aggregates are available 
FOR each dormant aggregate 
  IF (number of active aggregates – counter) < limit 
   SET remaining active aggregates = number of active aggregates – counter 
  END IF 
  FOR each of the remaining set of active aggregates 
   ADD aggregate name to transfer list 
   Increment counter 
  END FOR 
  BUILD activation message 
  SET recipient as current dormant aggregate 
SET content as: List of agents to take connections from, number of connections 
to take 
 END FOR 
END IF 
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agents. This message included a list of original aggregates to request connection transfers 
from, and the proportion of agents to request. The pseudocode presented in Fig. 5.8 presents 
the reaction by a dormant aggregate to the command to activate and participate in the 
network. The receiving agent would initially check that is it in a dormant state, to ensure 
that the selected dormant agent had not previously been activated by a different transition 
event. Once passing this check the dormant agent compiled two messages – the first of 
which was sent one back to the Architect as a confirmation that the agent is now active, 
this allowed the Architect to amend the number of dormant and active agents it is aware of 
for future reference. The second message was sent to the set of aggregates whose names 
were supplied as part of the activation call, this message informed the selected aggregates 
that the dormant agent is now active and will accept connection transfers. 
 
Fig. 5.8 – Dormant Agent Receiving the Call to Awaken 
The message also indicated what proportion of current connections should be transferred 
to the new aggregate. Fig. 5.9 describes how an active aggregate agent responds to the 
announcement of an awoken dormant agent.  
RECEIVE activation message, and list of targets to transfer customer connections from 
BUILD reply message 
IF aggregate is dormant 
 SET dormant = false 
 SET reply content = “NOW_ACTIVE” 
  
BUILD transfer message 
SET transfer message content = “DORMANT_ACTIVE” 
 FOR each transfer target 
  ADD transfer target name to transfer message 
 END FOR 
 SEND transfer message  
 RECORD message size in bytes 
ELSE IF aggregate is not dormant 
 SET reply content = “ALREADY_ACTIVE” 
END IF 
SEND reply message 
RECORD message size in bytes 
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Fig. 5.9 – Active Aggregate Becoming Aware of an Awoken Dormant 
Upon receiving a “DORMANT_ACTIVE” message the aggregate agent the extracts the 
parameter containing the proportion of agents to transfer. It would iterate through the 
connection list and send a “NEW_TARGET” message to a correct proportion of the 
connected customers/generators. This “NEW_TARGET” message contained an identifier 
for the newly activated dormant agent which was accepting transferred connections. Fig. 
5.10 outlines the process that a customer or generator agent goes through when in reception 
of a transfer notification.  
 
Fig. 5.10 – Receiving a Transfer Notification 
Before a customer/generator can transfer to another aggregate agent would have to conduct 
two checks which determine how it relates to the aggregate agent it was being transferred 
RECEIVE dormant activation message, number of connections to transfer 
BUILD transfer message 
SORT connection list 
FOR number of connections to transfer 
 RETRIEVE connection from list 
 SET connection name to transfer message recipients 
 REMOVE connection from list 
 REDUCE connection total by one 
END FOR 
SET transfer message content to “NEW_TARGET” 
SEND transfer message 
RECORD message size in bytes 
 
RECEIVE new target message and id of new aggregate agent 
IF aggregation control in place 
 SET controller id to data target id 
END IF 
IF is designated substitute agent 
 BUILD replace substitute message as reply 
 SET content “NEW_SUB” 
 SEND reply message 
 RECORD message size in bytes 
END IF 
SET data target = new aggregate id 
BUILD transfer complete message 
SET receiver as new aggregate id 
SET content as “TRANSFER_IN” 
SEND transfer complete message 
RECORD message size in bytes  
 
124 Developing a Self-Organising Architecture 
 
from. The first check was to determine which control format the architecture was operating 
under – if the aggregation tier was performing control then the data target and the control 
target point to the same agent. If a customer was being relocated to another aggregate, it 
also needed modify its control target such that control alerts are also redirected to the former 
dormant agent which assumed control responsibilities. 
The second check was to determine if the customer agent was selected to be a substitute for 
the aggregate it is being disconnected from, if that is the case the aggregate needed to be 
informed such that it can select a new substitute to replace it. This is done through sending 
a “NEW_SUB” message back to the original aggregate which triggers a new substitute 
selection process. Finally the customer/generator sends a “TRANSFER_IN” message to 
the new aggregate so that it can be added to its connection list. 
Communication Summary 
The following is a list of the messages involved in the process of activating a dormant agent 
and transferring a set of connections from existing aggregates to the newly awakened 
dormant aggregate. Each message used the ACL message protocol – and was composed of 
two sections. The first section was the header which was used by the listening behaviour, 
which acted as a function switchboard for the agent. The second was the payload and 
contained any variables and information that the receiving function needed to perform the 
required action. 
Table 5.5 – Communication Summary 
Header Sender  Receiver Payload Comments 
NET_INFO Gateway 
agent 
(DMA) 
Architect Number of 
customers 
Number of 
Generators 
List of Generator 
names 
Number of 
Dormant 
aggregates 
List of Dormant 
Aggregates 
Informs Architect 
about the contents of 
the components 
CSV file including 
aggregate agents 
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Number of Active 
Aggregates 
List of Active 
Aggregates 
ACTIVATE_ 
DORMANTS_ 
ALL 
Architect Dormant 
Aggregate 
List of active 
aggregates to 
contact 
Proportion of 
connections to 
transfer 
The command is 
sent to all dormant 
agents in this case 
rather than 
activating a single 
agent in one part of 
the network 
NOW_ACTIVE Dormant 
Aggregate 
Architect  Header only Confirmation 
message that the 
activation has taken 
place 
ALREADY_ 
ACTIVE 
Dormant 
Aggregate 
Architect Header only Message to inform 
the Architect that 
this agent has 
already been 
activated 
DORMANT_ 
ACTIVE 
Dormant 
Aggregate 
Active 
Aggregate 
Proportion of 
connections to 
transfer 
This initiates the 
connection transfer 
process 
 
NEW_TARGET Active 
Aggregate 
Customer 
or 
Generator 
Agent 
Agent name of the 
new aggregate to 
connect to 
Message informing 
the customer or 
generator it is being 
transferred and to 
modify its 
communication 
targets. 
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NEW_SUB Customer 
or 
Generator 
Agent 
Active 
Aggregate 
Header only Message to inform 
the aggregate that its 
substitute is being 
transferred and to 
search for a 
replacement 
 
TRANSFER_IN Customer 
or 
Generator 
Agent 
Former 
Dormant 
Aggregate 
Header only Message to 
introduce the 
customer/generator 
to the new aggregate 
agent 
Results  
The dormant activation process was tested with 340 customers 4 generators initially 
connecting to four aggregation agents these agents did not make symmetrical connections 
in the sense that each aggregate did not receive an equal number of connections. During a 
test simulation two additional aggregates which previously existed in a dormant state only, 
were activated and instructed to initiate the transfer of customer data connections from the 
original set of aggregation agents. The following graph in Fig. 5.11 traces the number of 
connections per aggregate throughout the simulation runtime.  
 
Fig. 5.11 – Changes in Number of Connections per Aggregate 
The graph shows that aggregates 2-4 reached their soft connection limit reasonably quickly 
and therefore the remaining customers discovered and connected to AG1 explains the delay 
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in accumulating connections. When the dormant agents (AG5 and AG6) were activated, 
they took connections away from the original set of aggregates. Those aggregates which 
were up against the soft limit shed more connections than AG1 which was initially 
configured with fewer connections. It can also be seen that the two newer aggregates did 
not accumulate the same number of transferred connections because of the respective 
population sizes of the aggregates they are transferring connections from. For example AG5 
received 1/3 of the connections of AG1 and 1/3 of the connections from AG2 – as AG1 had 
fewer connections AG5 gains fewer connections. Whereas AG6 retrieved connections from 
two of the highly populated aggregates and therefore is handed a larger population itself.  
5.4.3 Stage 4 - Promoting and Demoting Agents 
The promotion mechanism operated in a similar manner to the substitution process, with 
the exception that customer/generation agents were promoted for the purposes of increasing 
the aggregation capacity rather than to replace an existing agent. Also aggregates could be 
promoted to create an additional aggregation tier to reduce the load on the observer agent. 
When creating an additional tier, each of the promoted aggregates is replaced by a promoted 
customer or generator agent. Selecting agents to replace the promoted aggregates take 
advantage of the substitution process.  
The concept of promoting agents was connected to the EDETA approach in the sense that 
cluster-head agents are promoted from the overall agent population, as all sensors are 
considered to be homogenous and it was their physical location which forms the network. 
A select number of standard sensor nodes are elected to take up the role of cluster-heads, 
and in the event that the population of cluster head nodes doesn’t provided sufficient 
coverage, additional sensors are promoted to assume the role. Another example of 
promotion and demotion of agents from a lower tier into a higher one is presented in [141]. 
In this example matchmaking nodes pair producer and consumer nodes together, if the 
matchmaking process becomes too heavily loaded additional resource is created through 
promoting producers or consumers to become matchmaking nodes. This process was 
similar to the current promotion process adopted by the self-organising architecture – 
customers/generators are promoted to assist in the aggregation layer if required.  
Two forms of agent promotion have been developed as latter stage architecture transition 
option, the first of which was to promote an aggregate agent up to a higher tier to move 
from a base or clustered architecture to a tiered alternative. The second was to create 
128 Developing a Self-Organising Architecture 
 
additional aggregation resource in the lower aggregation tier – in the event that no dormant 
agents are available or if previous activation of dormant agents has not been enough. The 
second approach was not necessarily considered to be a stage four transition, but one that 
was introduced as an alternative mechanism when the selected transition stage could not be 
executed.  
Promotion for a tiered architecture  
To trigger a promotion event for the purposes of creating an upper tier, a function within 
the Architect agent would be called – as in the same manner which other transitional 
procedures will be triggered. When applying the tiered architecture across the network/zone 
under control the Architect had to initially select which of the current aggregate population 
was going to be promoted into an upper tier. This decision was based on the data collection 
process that the Architect agent periodically carries out of the aggregate population – 
therefore recent information on congestion was collected, data flow and reactivity to the 
observer. Such a transition would be triggered in the event that the observer noted an 
increased quantity of information being passed to it by the aggregation layer or that reaction 
times between the top two tiers of the architecture are starting to rise.  
The first stage was for the Architect to query the aggregate population and retrieve a list of 
those aggregates identified as being in the lower aggregation tier as per the extended 
getList() function. The Architect agent would choose one or more aggregates to promote 
into the upper tier. From the total aggregation population, those agents with the highest 
congestion figure were selected, a higher congestion value were used because this reflects 
the aggregates which are experiencing the highest load in their current role and therefore 
would benefit from promotion into a less highly loaded tier. The selected aggregates are 
then contacted with a “PROMOTE_SELF” message. This function is presented in the 
following pseudocode in Fig. 5.12, which also includes the Architect informing the 
substitutes for the promoted aggregates to activate and replace the aggregate within the 
lower aggregation tier.  
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Fig. 5.12 – Triggering Aggregate Promotion 
Upon receiving a “PROMOTE_SELF” message from the Architect, each of the promoted 
aggregates sets their data target to communicate with the observer, in the event that a 
previous promotion phase had changed the data target variable. Additionally it sets the 
current communication architecture to “tiered” and responds with a 
“PROMOTE_CONFIRM” message to inform the Architect that it received and acted upon 
the command. Once the Architect had received confirmation messages from each of the 
promoted aggregates, it then informs the lower level aggregates that a tiered architecture 
has been created and that they are now members of a lower tier. As illustrated in Fig. 5.13 
FUNCTION call with number of agents to promote (n) 
RETREIVE list of lower tier aggregates 
FOR each lower tier aggregate 
 IF promotion list size < number of agents to promote  
RETREIVE current aggregate queue size 
COMPARE value to maximum queue size 
IF found largest queue size 
 ADD aggregate to promotion list 
END IF 
 END IF 
END FOR 
IF promotion list not empty 
 BUILD promotion message 
 SET content = “PROMOTE_SELF” 
 FOR each promotion candidate in list 
  ADD candidate to recipient list 
 END FOR 
 SEND promotion message 
 RECORD message size in bytes 
ELSE IF 
 PRINT no promotion candidates found 
 RETURN transition incomplete 
END IF 
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Fig. 5.13 – Informing the Lower Tier 
Because the lower tier aggregates do not have direct access to the observer as they 
previously did, these aggregates then need to select a connection from the upper tier. This 
process mirrored the initialisation phase for customer/generation agents – whereby the 
aggregate is given the names of all upper tier connections and contacts them all to retrieve 
round trip time information. The lower level aggregate is also required to contact the 
observer to inform it that it will no longer be directly publishing updates, so that it can be 
removed from the observer’s data collection structure to prevent information duplication. 
Once the lower level aggregates were connected to the upper tier – all agents will once 
more be connected and the process is complete. The promoted aggregate was then replaced 
by its own substitute and, the remainder of the set of aggregates seek out upper tier 
connections. 
Promotion for additional aggregation resource 
The second avenue of agent promotion related to increasing the amount of aggregates 
within the single lower aggregation tier. This was similar to the process involved with 
activating dormant agents, to back-up the current set of aggregates. However if no dormant 
agent population was present or those dormant agents had already previously been 
contacted and activated, an alternative solution is to use members of the 
customer/generation layer as aggregation agents.  
Initially this process was triggered by the Architect agent, whereby 
“PROMOTE_CUSTOMER” message was transmitted to each of the currently active 
aggregation agents. This effectively doubled the aggregation resource by assigning each of 
RECEIVE Promotion confirmation message 
INCREMENT promotion count tally 
SET sender’s aggregation tier status 
IF promotion tally = number of intended promotions 
 SET communication Architecture = tiered 
 RETRIEVE list of lower tier aggregates 
 BUILD lower tier message 
 SET message content = “LOWER_TIER” 
 FOR each lower tier aggregate 
  ADD aggregate id to recipient list 
 END FOR 
 SEND lower tier message 
 RECORD message size in bytes 
END IF 
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the current aggregates a promoted back-up to share the connection load with. This function 
is presented in Fig. 5.14 – and was received within the listening behaviour of the target 
aggregate, as presented in Fig. 5.15. Once the aggregate agent received the command to 
promote one of its customer agents up to aggregate status – it uses the same process that 
the Architect uses to select aggregates for promotion up to an upper tier. It uses the data 
collected for each of the agents and selects the agent with the longest round-trip time, as 
this agent could be seen as the least well connected and would be reasonable to be selected 
as a new aggregate. 
 
Fig. 5.14 – Promotion into the Lower Tier 
 
Fig. 5.15 – Receiving a "PROMOTE_CUSTOMER" Message 
The least well connected aggregate was selected as it represented an agent which may be 
more geographically distant from the current aggregate. Therefore the process involved 
promoting a customer agent into an aggregation potion where little aggregation was present.   
The selected customer receives the “PROMTOTE_SELF” message from the Architect, and 
checks whether or not it is a substitute agent – if that is the case it won’t accept the 
promotion request. Otherwise the agent will transmit the promotion confirm message to the 
aggregate, as well as contacting the Architect and observer agent to inform them of the role 
change so that their data structures can be modified to recognise the change. The response 
from the perspective of the promoted customer is presented in the pseudocode extract in 
Fig. 5.16 
FUNCTION CALL 
RETRIVE list of active aggregates 
BUILD promotion message 
SET content = “PROMOTE_CUSTOMER” 
FOR each active aggregate 
 ADD aggregate id to recipient list 
END FOR 
SEND promotion message 
RECORD message size in bytes 
RECEIVE promotion message 
RETRIEVE connection information for customer with longest communication round trip time 
BUILD promotion message 
SET content = “PROMOTE_SELF” 
ADD customer id to recipient field 
SEND promotion message 
RECORD message size in bytes  
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Fig. 5.16 – Response to Receiving a “PROMOTE_SELF” Message 
Once the promotion was complete and each aggregate has been informed of the successful 
promotion event, it was then responsible for transferring a series of connections from its 
own connection list to the promoted customer. Each aggregate agent transfers 50% of its 
connections to the promoted customer. This is illustrated in Fig. 5.17, whereby a series of 
“NEW_TARGET” messages to agents which were to be transferred.  
 
Fig. 5.17 – Transferring Connections 
RECEIVE promotion message 
IF is not a designated substitute 
 SET aggregate status = true 
 BULD reply message 
 SET content = “PROMOTE_CONFIRM” 
 SEND message 
 RECORD message size in bytes 
 BUILD aggregate status message 
 SET content = “IS_AGGREGATE” 
 ADD Architect and observer agents to recipient list 
 SEND message 
 RECORD message size in bytes 
 IF communication architecture is not tiered 
  SET data target to observer agent 
END IF 
ELSE IF designated substitute agent 
 BUILD reply message 
 SET content = “PROMOTE_DENY” 
 SEND message  
 RECORD message size in bytes 
END IF 
 
RECEIVE promotion confirm message 
SORT connection list 
BUILD connection transfer message 
SET content = “NEW_TARGET” 
FOR half of the connection list 
 ADD connection id to recipient list 
 REMOVE connection from connections list 
 DECREMENT connection total 
END FOR 
SEND transfer message 
RECORD message size in bytes 
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Once all the agents have been transferred, the process of adding a customer in the place of 
an additional aggregate is complete. The promoted customer will then aggregate incoming 
updates and pass the totals onto the observer agent in the presence of a single tier of 
aggregation agents. In a tiered architecture those updates are transmitted to the upper 
aggregation layer. 
Communication Summary 
The following series of messages presented in Table 5.6 were used in the process of 
promoting agents, both in terms of increasing the number of aggregates in the lower tier, 
but also in terms of adding a second aggregation tier to the network. 
Table 5.6 – Promoting Aggregates. 
Header Sender Receiver Payload Comments 
PROMOTE_ 
SELF 
Architect Selected 
Aggregates 
Header only Command for an 
aggregate agent 
to move to an 
upper tier 
PROMOTE_ 
CONFIRM 
Selected 
Aggregate 
Architect Header only Confirmation 
that the 
aggregate has 
been promoted 
ACTIVATE_ SUB Architect Designated 
Substitute 
Current time 
Substitution type 
(PROMOTE) 
Communication 
architecture 
Set of agents to 
transfer 
Instruction to the 
substitute of the 
promoted 
aggregate to take 
over the role 
SUB_ACTIVE Designated 
Substitute 
Architect Header only Confirmation 
that the 
substitution 
occurred 
SUB_ACTIVE Designated 
Substitute 
Customer 
Agents 
Header only Instructing the 
other customers 
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that the substitute 
is the new 
aggregate 
SUB_COMPLETE Customer 
Agents 
Designated 
Substitute 
Header only Confirmation 
that the customer 
has changed its 
data target 
IS_AGGREGATE Designated 
Substitute 
Promoted 
Aggregate 
Header only Informing the 
upper tier that the 
agent is 
performing as an 
aggregate 
LOWER_TIER Architect Lower tier 
Aggregates 
List of upper tier 
aggregates 
Information 
message to the 
lower aggregates 
informing them 
of a tiered 
structure 
LOWER_TIER Lower tier 
Aggregates 
Observer Header only Informing the 
observer that the 
lower aggregates 
will not be 
contacting it 
DISCOVER Lower Tier 
Aggregates 
Upper Tier 
Aggregates 
Time message 
sent 
Initial discovery 
message sent to 
upper tier 
aggregates 
 
HELLO Upper Tier 
Aggregates 
Lower Tier 
Aggregates 
Time original 
message sent 
Time message 
received 
Response to 
discovery 
messages 
135 Developing a Self-Organising Architecture 
 
Time reply sent 
JOIN_REQUEST Lower Tier 
Aggregates 
Upper Tier 
Aggregates 
Time message 
sent 
“AGGREGATE” 
flag 
Request for 
connection 
JOIN_CONFIRM Upper Tier 
Aggregates 
Lower Tier 
Aggregates 
Time original 
message sent 
Time message 
received 
Time reply sent 
Connection 
request approved 
 
Table 5.7 – Promoting Customers  
Header Sender  Receiver Payload Comments 
PROMOTE_ 
CUSTOMER 
Architect Lower Tier 
Aggregates 
Header only Instruction to start a 
promotion process 
PROMOTE_SELF Lower Tier 
Aggregates 
Selected 
Customers 
Header only Instruction from the 
aggregate to 
promote one of its 
connected 
customers 
IS_AGGREGATE Selected 
Customers 
Observer, 
Architect  
Header only Inform both the 
Architect and the 
observer that the 
customer is 
behaving as an 
aggregate 
PROMOTE_ 
CONFIRM 
Selected 
Customers 
Lower Tier 
Aggregate 
Header only Confirms to the 
aggregate that 
promotion is 
complete 
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NEW_TARGET Lower Tier 
Aggregates 
50% of 
connections 
Id of the 
promoted 
customer 
agent 
Instructs some of 
the connected 
customers to 
connect to the 
promoted agent 
NEW_SUB Transferred 
customers 
Lower Tier 
Aggregates 
Header only Informs the 
aggregate that it’s 
substitute has been 
transferred and to 
select a replacement 
TRANSFER_IN Transferred 
customers 
Promoted 
customer 
Agent type 
flag 
Transfers 
connection from the 
old aggregate to the 
promoted customer 
Results 
To demonstrate the impact of a promotion event the following figure presented in Fig. 5.18, 
where two agents are promoted in support of a pair of aggregates. The two promotion events 
were aimed at agents with differing communicative loads to illustrate the impact on both a 
high and low functioning aggregate. 
 
Fig. 5.18 – Data flow during a Promotion Event 
At the point where the first agent was promoted, the original aggregate observed a reduction 
in data flow; this was picked up by the promoted customer agent as it assumed a proportion 
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of the connections previously held by the aggregate. The same pattern was present with 
respect to the second of the promotion events as the losses experienced by the Architect 
agent were collected by the promoted customer, such that no connections are dropped 
during the process. This was further documented in the following figure, illustrating the 
number of customer connections managed by the agents involved in the process  
 
Fig. 5.19  - Number of Connections per Agent during a Promotion 
Both figures represented a promotion scenario where the additional aggregation resource 
in the form of customer agents was added to a single aggregation tier focussing on the 
process of converting conventional customer agents into aggregation roles. 
 SIMULATING ATTACK EVENTS 
The process of implementing the attacks was embedded in the development of the self-
organising architecture through the addition of the Error Generating Agent (EGA) the EGA 
contains a series of timers that issued commands to agents within the customer layer to 
trigger behaviours representing attack events. The EGA controlled when an attack event 
would begin and when it would conclude if the attack is not intended to endure for the 
length of the simulation.  
5.5.1 Selecting Targets 
Due to the nature of the initialisation phase, the EGA has no immediate knowledge of the 
communication structure of the agent population and therefore must be supplied with 
information from the Architect Agent. Once the initialisation stage is complete, the EGA 
would be supplied with lists of customer agents in contact with each of the aggregates – so 
that if the examined scenario required multiple customers to direct the attack towards a 
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particular target the EGA was able to determine which customers to select to initiate the 
attack.  
Those names of the selected agents are then stored in an internal data structure such that 
the EGA is able to communicate with the attack population to terminate the attack when 
necessary. This also prevents subsequent attack events with the same simulation attempting 
to use the same attack population, removing the chance for duplication. 
5.5.2 Performing Attacks 
To perform the attack the customer agents were constructed with embedded behaviours 
which were either activated or deactivated by Boolean flags, these flags dictate whether or 
not the customer was launching an attack against its target. While the inclusion of these 
attack behaviours in each agent resulted in a large amount of unused agent code throughout 
the agent population it provided more control in the form of orchestrating an attack and 
shaping the nature of the attack. If each customer was only supplied with the behaviour 
required for each attack scenario, there would be small differences in how the agent 
population behaves at runtime due to the amount of virtual machine memory occupied by 
running the agents. Taking out unused code for one simulation, and then inserting it for 
another effectively changes the dynamic of the agent population between scenarios and 
ultimately makes the results less comparable. The overhead of running the agent platform 
with the increased code content and therefore the increased computational footprint did 
have an impact on the scalability of the simulation. The following diagram in Fig. 5.20 
illustrates the interaction involved in launching an attack against a controller. 
 
Fig. 5.20 – Launching an Attack 
Error Generator Attacker Target
Start Spamming Event
End Spamming Event
Attack Traffic
Attack Traffic
Attack Traffic
Control Request
Control Response
Pre-Attack Timer
Attack Duration 
Timer
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To activate attack behaviour, messages are transmitted from the EGA to the targeted 
population; the number of attackers is determined by the intent of the scenario. The 
distribution of attackers can be defined within the EGA without interfering with any 
configurations for the other agents in the population.  
5.5.3 Timing Attacks 
Part of the role of the EGA is to schedule the attack events in relation to the actions taking 
place within the core simulation, as the previous figure illustrates the attacks would be more 
effective if designed to coincide with key operations. In the simulation there are two stages 
where critical commands are sent from the controller to the customer population, these 
commands oversee the initial control commands and the removal of any controls imposed 
on the customer layer. The specifics of the attack methodology will be described in chapter 
7, but the EGA is responsible for ensuring that the attack event is triggered during one of 
these key stages thus posing the risk of creating the largest disturbance. Multiple timers are 
employed by the EGA, the first of which determines the start of the first attack signal, other 
timers determine the length of the attack event and if necessary the start and end times of 
subsequent attack conditions.  
 SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined each of the components involved in the development of the self-
organising architecture. The system contained three stages of operation each informed by 
literature and described in the chapter in terms of the functions, communication 
requirements and their impact on the agent population. The initialisation stage is the first 
of those three stages, and involved forming connections between members of the customer 
layer – which included smart-meter based agents and small scale DG entities – and the 
aggregation layer. The second stage considered the use of performance monitoring 
techniques and examined the individual thresholds applied to the metrics embedded within 
the self-organising architecture. The performance monitoring stage involved the collection 
of error reports from members of the agent population along with the appropriate storage 
and processing approaches. A final stage considered the different architectural transition 
events the Architect agent had the ability to invoke in the event of a performance violation, 
each transition is described in terms of the functions required to perform the transition and 
the sequence of messages between entities.  
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In addition to the set of transitional mechanics, the processes for emulating attack events 
and the role of the Error Generation agent in the architecture. Attack behaviours were 
instantiated within each of the main agents involved with the self-organising architecture, 
and were activated by the error generation agent. The following chapter is focussed on the 
decision making engine which was responsible for converting the set of error information 
retrieved in during the performance monitoring stage into a transition event. This chapter 
discusses the different approaches to decision making and the mechanisms for evaluating 
the set of errors received by the architect agent. 
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Chapter 6: Decision Making Engine 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The decision making engine at the heart of the self-organising architecture was responsible 
for converting performance monitoring data retrieved from the agent population into 
transition events. Instead of a predetermined set of system reconfigurations the role of the 
decision making engine was to assess the conditions of the agent architecture through the 
provision of error reports such that an appropriate restructuring process could be applied.  
Two implementations of the decision making engine were introduced initially centring on 
a decision tree mechanism breaking down the set of error responses into their individual 
sources. Each source equated a branch in the decision tree, where specific error context and 
location information resulted in a final decision on which of the architecture transition 
events to pursue. The second and favoured implementation replaced the decision making 
engine with a more sophisticated fuzzy based system – this alternate system involved 
computing a single variable for computational burden which accumulated data from each 
of the error formats involved with the communication aspect of the overall system. This 
decision making engine would then produce a recommendation as to the scale of the 
transition event, a recommendation which could either be accepted and implanted by the 
architect or over-ruled in the event of contradictory information.  
The remainder of the chapter discusses the formulation of the fuzzy decision making system 
including the integration of the fuzzy membership functions into the java platform. Finally 
the chapter considers the processes involved in triggering a transition from the result of the 
decision making engine. 
 ERROR FILTRATION  
Before a call to the decision making engine was triggered, a series of checks were 
performed on the list of error reports received from the agent population. These checks 
were a preventative measure to avoid transitional events being initiated on the basis of 
reports which may be out of date or that represented transient occurrences of a given error 
type and therefore prevented the overall decision process from being too sensitive. 
As indicated in the previous chapter, all error reports for each of the performance metrics 
are transmitted to the architect agent, and are then stored in an overall error list data 
structure. The architect agent was responsible for processing this list of errors and sculpting 
the call to the decision making engine. In the presence of the initial decision tree approach, 
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this call took the form of determining the dominant error type in terms of its severity value. 
The list processing stage involved error filtration where each of the reports received by the 
architect agent was examined against a series of criteria before it was considered for use in 
calculating the overall error state of the architecture. In each case the error reports only 
existed for a finite length of time, and as discussed by the authors of [118] will expire and 
thus be no longer valid for consideration in terms of error analysis. A list of the set of 
filtration limits is presented in the following table  
Table 6.1 – Performance Monitoring Thresholds 
Metric Threshold Comment 
Lifespan 30 seconds The lifespan of an error determined the time after which 
the error is deemed to have expired. This was not the 
overall duration of the error state, but the time since the 
last occurrence of the error was reported. Therefore if no 
new reports of an error were received by the Architect, the 
record of the error was removed once the lifespan period 
had elapsed. 
Severity  
Buffer 
10% A severity buffer prevented the decision making process 
from acting upon each event – so that excessive changes 
were not made.  
Waiting  
Period 
20s Under the decision tree approach, a waiting period was 
instantiated to prevent the architect performing a transition 
on a transient event. 
This waiting period was then applied to the estimated 
duration of an event under the second decision iteration of 
the decision making engine after error rate of change was 
calculated 
Standoff 
Period 
Small – 
120s 
Medium – 
180s 
Three standoff sizes were used for different magnitudes of 
self-organised response. A small change such as 
transferring customer connections had a smaller impact on 
the overall network and therefore brought with it a smaller 
waiting time. Larger reconfiguration events, such as 
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Large – 
300s 
activating dormant agents or promoting an aggregation 
tier required a larger waiting period 
 DECISION TREE 
The process of defining which course of action to take as a result of performance 
monitoring data was initially the jurisdiction of a decision tree approach. An analysis stage, 
processing the error report list determined which of the errors present was the most severe. 
Each of the potential error formats was represented by a branch in the decision tree, and 
these decision branches are documented as follows: 
6.3.1 Control Errors: 
A control error was a consequence of a voltage excursion lasting longer than the prescribed 
threshold. Rather than waiting for the completion of the control action, any customer agent 
affected transmitted an error report as soon as the voltage had remained outside limits for 
a period of time longer than the threshold value. Depending on the current level of control 
in place the architect would take steps to replace or relocate the control responsibilities. If 
the control was placed at observer – i.e. centralised control architecture was in use, the 
Architect can only move the control functions further down the network. Likewise if the 
control was placed at the lowest tier – with the customer agents, the Architect could only 
move to less decentralised control architecture. The only control architecture with 
replaceable controllers, in the event that a single agent with the control functions failed to 
achieve the desired performance was the aggregation control architecture. This was because 
the other agents in the MAS represent physical components and therefore could not be 
disconnected without losing data and potential controllability. Raising control level in one 
agent without mirroring that action in another would result in hybrid control architecture 
where a proportion of the customer population may send control requests to the generation 
agents, while others communicate with the aggregate layer. A hybrid structure would create 
complications when performing further transitions within the architecture. The decision 
tree branch for processing this error format is presented in Fig. 6.  
 
Fig. 6.1 – Decision Branch for Control Events 
Central Control Lower Control Level
Customer Control Raise Control Level
Generation Control Lower Control Level
Single Aggregate Replace Controller
Multiple Aggregates Raise Control Level
Aggregation Control
Control Event
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6.3.2 Data Flow Errors 
In the same manner that control errors are declared, data flow errors were triggered when 
either incoming or outgoing data flow exceeded threshold values. Data flow errors were 
likely to be sourced from agents within the hierarchy responsible for handling larger 
volumes of information in the form of the aggregation layer agents and to a lesser extent 
the central observer. If the Observer was triggering data flow issues then it could be due to 
the number of aggregates transmitting customer data to it or if a member or members of the 
aggregation tier were launching an attack event. Therefore the solution was to add an 
aggregation tier to create a buffer between itself and the large quantities of information 
handled by the lower aggregation layer and potentially shielding itself from further attacks. 
As a secondary check the Architect also determines how many of the lower aggregates are 
producing data flow errors themselves, in order to decide which agents to promote to a new 
upper tier. Moving the aggregates with error reports places them in a less heavily loaded 
position within the hierarchy and therefore combats the data flow issues they are facing. 
Those with high outgoing data rates however were less likely to be considered for 
promotion, the decision tree branch processing data flow errors is presented in the 
following figure Fig. 6.2.  
 
Fig. 6.2 – Decision Branch for Data Events 
6.3.3 Congestion Errors 
The congestion error metric was concerned with the number of messages that an agent was 
storing in its message queue, a larger message queue indicated a greater congestion problem. 
As was the case with the data flow error type, the congestion issue was primarily restricted 
to those agents responsible for interacting with a larger population and handling larger 
volumes of data. Furthermore because the two metrics are often closely related the decision 
branch for the congestion error was very similar to that of the data flow branch as illustrated 
in the following figure in Fig. 6.3.  
1 or no aggregates reporting errors
Promote one upper tier 
aggregate
Multiple aggregates reporting 
errors
Promote mulitple upper 
aggregates
Also congested/ slow response 
time
Transferring Connections
Only showing Data Errors Replace Agent
Dormants Available Activate Dormants
No Dormants Available Promote Customer Agents
Observer Affected
Data Event
Single Aggregate
Multiple Aggected
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Fig. 6.3 – Decision Branch for Congestion Errors 
6.3.4 Reactivity Errors 
Reactivity errors were processed differently primarily because they are not observed and 
reported by the agent causing them Instead they were observed by agents that interact with 
the agent causing the problem. This allowed the architect to build a picture of the scope of 
the error by determining the percentage of customer agents reporting reactivity issues. 
Additionally the aggregation layer could report reactivity problems when communicating 
with the observer, and thus request a tiered architecture to alleviate some of the pressure on 
the observer agent. Therefore in terms of the decision branch as presented in Fig. 6.4, a 
check for impacts on the observer was preformed first before then assuming that the 
reactivity problem is occurring between the customer layer and the aggregation layer.  
 
Fig. 6.4 – Decision Branch for Reactivity Errors 
If only a small proportion of the customer population is affected then those customers could 
be relocated to alternative aggregates. If a larger population was experiencing difficulties 
then it became more relevant to examine the number of agents causing the reactivity 
problem. As an additional check, in the event of single aggregate causing problems, the 
magnitude of the severity is considered. If the severity was smaller than 150%, then it may 
be possible to solve the problem through rebalancing the communication load and 
transferring connections. If the severity was larger, then the aggregate agent could be 
moved to an upper tier where it would be exposed to less communication load. This would 
1 or no aggregates reporting errors
Promote one upper tier 
aggregate
Multiple aggregates reporting 
errors
Promote mulitple upper 
aggregates
Also Data or Reactivity Errors Transferring Connections
Only Congestion Issues Replace Agent
Dormants Available Activate Dormants
No Dormants Available Promote Customer Agents
Observer Affected
Congestion Event
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1 or no aggregates reporting errors
Promote one upper tier 
aggregate
Multiple aggregates reporting 
errors
Promote mulitple upper 
aggregates
Less than 10% of customers 
affected
Transfer Customers
Only Reactivity Errors
Dormants Available
No Dormants Available
More dormants available than 
active aggregates
Activate Dormant Agents
Fewer dormants available Promote Customers
Severity < 150% Transferring Connections
Severity > 150% Promote Agent
Replace Agent
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Also Data or Congestion 
ErrorsSingle Aggregate Responsible
Multiple Aggregates
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be applied if the aggregate in question was experiencing muliple error types in addition to 
reactivity, as the performance metrics are often linked. However if the aggregate was only 
experiencing a reactivity problem it may be assumed that the agent is not functioning 
correctly and therefore can be replaced by subsitution. 
6.3.5 Unresponsive Errors 
The unresponsive error type was an extension of the reactivity error type in the sense that 
it refers to the interaction between agent pairs and the requirement of a recipient agent to 
reply with a confirmation message that it received the updated information. In the event 
that the recipient did not transmit this confirmation message the customer logs the message 
as missed, if ten messages are missed then the agent sends an unresponsive error alert. This 
was similar to the reactivity error type as the architect could determine the scope of the 
impact through the number of customers reporting the problem. A smaller error scope can 
be processed through relocating some of the connections to an aggregate with a smaller 
number of active connections. Whereas a larger error event would be processed through 
substituting or promoting low performing aggregates. If several aggregates were involved, 
a more widespread reorganising strategy was required on the basis of the number of 
customers affected. At an intermediate level either dormant agents would be promoted or 
the aggregation tier would be widened through promotion. At the most severe level the 
architect will select the solution which creates the largest aggregate population. The 
decision tree branch is presented in the following figure Fig. 6.5 
 
Fig. 6.5 – Decision Branch for Unresponsive Errors 
6.3.6 Underused Errors 
The notion of monitoring agents for under usage was based on the ability to move specific 
agents into a dormant state if they running a small data flow measurement – as suggested 
by the authors of [106]. In the decision branch presented in Fig. 6.6, the response to each 
case of under-usage was dependent on the role of the agent submitting the error report. So 
each case for each of the agent types was handled in turn.   
Less than 10% customers Affected Transfer Connections
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Fig. 6.6 – Decision Branch for Under Used Errors 
An upper tier aggregate with low usage indicated that it would be better suited to being 
demoted to the lower aggregation layer as there wasn’t the need for an upper tier, or a less 
populated upper tier. Also a customer agent which has been promoted into an aggregation 
role or substituted to take over aggregation responsibilities would monitor usage to 
determine if those additional responsibilities were still required.  Finally an aggregate in 
the core aggregation tier reporting under usage may be made dormant and its connections 
distributed between the remainder of the aggregation tier.  
6.3.7 Isolated Errors 
The final error type is an isolated error, which is declared if a customer or generation agent 
cannot pair itself with an appropriate aggregation agent. This would occur during the 
initialisation phase if the customer had submitted requests to all available aggregates and 
been refused a connection slot. Isolated errors are also likely to occur if the network 
population changes over time, for example if an additional feeder was connected to the 
network and the customer population from the new feeder needed to interact with the MAS 
architecture the aggregate population may not have enough capacity to host the new 
connections. Therefore the architect may need to activate additional capacity to handle the 
connection demand. After first detecting the need for addition aggregates the architect can 
then forward subsequent messages to the new aggregate as it was unlikely that the new 
customers will have discovered the newly created aggregate and would still claim to be 
isolated. The decision branch responsible for processing isolated errors is presented in the 
following figure in Fig. 6.7 
 
Fig. 6.7 – Decision Branch for Isolated Errors 
 DECISION TREE PERFORMANCE 
The decision tree process needed to be evaluated once it had been installed within the 
architect agent to determine its effectiveness. A test configuration was devised consisting 
of 340 customer agents representing domestic smart-meters, 50% of the customer 
Upper Tier Aggregate Demote to lower tier
Lower Tier Aggregate Make dormant
Promoted Customer Remove Aggregate duties
Multiple Aggregates Responsible Process each case in turn
Single Aggregate Responsible
Under used Event
Dormants Available Single Dormant
No Dormants Available Promote Customer Agent
Aggregate Capacity Available
Point Agent at available 
aggregate
Dormants Available Single Dormant
No Dormants Available
Promote Customer 
Agent
First Event
Maximum Capacity Reached
Subsequent Events
Isolated Event
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population were declared controllable with a maximum reduction of 700W. Four active 
aggregates and two dormant aggregates formed the data collection tier; this tier was also 
responsible for performing control actions. The initialisation stage of the self-organising 
architecture defined that customers could select their own connection points, and therefore 
neighbouring customers could be connected to differing aggregation agents, this was true 
both in terms of controller and data collection connections. This process was developed to 
improve resilience within the architecture through control redundancy – agents tackling the 
same voltage problem could request assistance from alternate controllers. However those 
controllers could only request control responses from those agents affiliated with them 
during the initialisation stage. Each customer agent and generation agent was supplied with 
profile data which was compressed to cover the length of the simulation whilst presenting 
a voltage deviation which required a control response. Load flow calculations are 
completed on request from the gateway agent at the boundary of the JADE/Matlab interface 
(to be documented in chapter 7).  
These initial results considered both a static and self-organising version of the architecture, 
and did not contain any attack vectors, only the voltage deviation was present  
6.4.1 Static Architecture 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the self-organising architecture with the decision tree 
based decision making engine a base test was needed using a static version of the 
architecture. In the case of the static architecture, the initialisation phase locks connections 
between customers and the closest aggregate, performance monitoring components 
remained active but the decision making element of the process was disabled. Therefore 
the structure of the architecture remained the same throughout the simulation period, and 
any error conditions would not be mitigated by the actions of the architect agent. The 
following graph in Fig. 6.8 illustrates the errors received by the architect agent during 
conventional operation including a voltage excursion.  
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Fig. 6.8 – Error Severities Graph 
The most dominant error type was a reactivity error event with a maximum severity of 
138% - meaning that the largest reactibity event was 38% greater than the reactivity 
threshold. A second error event recorded was a data-flow error, however this error event 
did not exceed the 110% severity threshold value. In addition to recording the magnitudes 
of error severity, additional performance metrics were recorded during the course of a 
simulation, these performnce metrics included the length of the voltage devation, the 
amount of time customers were placed under demand restrictions the details of the voltage 
profiles taken from the end of the feeder. A further data point recorded was the demand 
losses as a result of customers being placed under restriction. To determine the amount of 
consumption lost through the control method, each customer recorded its raw demand as 
per its load profile in addition to the actual demand including control restrictions. These 
figures were compared for each sample in the output file to determine the consumption 
difference in kWh for each step as illustrated by the following equations (1-4) supported 
by the notation described in Table 6.2.  
(1)            𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  (𝑡(𝑛+1) − 𝑡𝑛) × 2.77778 × 10
−7 
(2)            𝑃𝑘𝑊ℎ =
(𝑃𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠 × 𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡)
1000
 
(3)           𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  ∑ 𝑃𝑘𝑊ℎ
𝑆1
𝑆𝑛
 
(4)          𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 =  𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 − 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 
Table 6.2 – Consumption calculations notation table 
Notation Description 
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𝒕 Timestamp of a given sample 
𝒕𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕 The time between two samples in hours 
𝑷𝑾 The real power recorded for a given sample 
𝑷𝒌𝑾𝒉 Real power consumption for the lifetime of a given sample 
𝑺𝒏 Sample number within the output file 
𝑷𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 Total consumption without restriction during a simulation 
𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 Total consumption with restriction during a simulation 
𝑷𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒔 Total consumption losses due to customer restrictions 
In the first equation the length of time each sample was valid for was calculated and the 
time between the current sample and the next one was converted from milliseconds to hours 
to complete the kWh conversion. The conversion presented in equation (2) was applied to 
each sample in the output file for the output field referring to raw unrestricted customer 
demand. Therefore a total consumption figure could be attained representing consumption 
if no restrictions were applied as documented in equation (3). This process was repeated 
for the output field referring to actual demand including control restrictions to give two 
consumption totals. From this information the losses could be determined as presented in 
equation (4). 
The results of the static architrecture test example containing the affoermenttioned metrics 
is illustrated in the following table in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 – Performance Results 
 
Error Performance Congestion Reactivity Control Data Unresponsive Under-Used Isolated
Maximum 0 138.57 0 110.4 0 0 0
Average 0 105.48 0 105.13 0 0 0
Voltage Performance Min Voltage Max Voltage Average 
Voltage
Total Time Single Event 
Maximum
Feeder 1 0.96073 0.92644 0.94445 371.42 328.69
Feeder 2 0.96069 0.92631 0.94438 383.8 331.93
Feeder 3 0.96033 0.92652 0.94412 384.01 329.69
Feeder 4 0.96004 0.92645 0.94417 405.06 330.04
Control Performance Actual Demand 
(kWh)
Without 
Restriction 
(kWh)
Total 
Restricted 
(kWh)
Average 
Restricted 
(kWh)
Total 
Restricted 
(%)
Max Total 
Restriction 
Time (s)
Max Single 
Restriction 
Event (s)
Feeder 1 31.459 35.69 4.232 0.101 11.86 706.79 706.79
Feeder 2 31.451 35.595 4.145 0.096 11.64 703.3 703.3
Feeder 3 31.303 35.601 4.297 0.102 12.07 704.13 704.13
Feeder 4 31.333 35.715 4.381 0.102 12.27 704.39 704.39
Overall 125.546 142.601 17.055 0.10025 11.96 704.6525 704.6525
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In the results derived from the example of operating under a static architecture customer 
agents were restricted for 704 seconds on average as a result of controls applied to correct 
the voltage deviation. This restriction period caused a total consumption loss of 17kWh, 
averaging at 0.1kWh per customer accounting for 12% of total demand during the 704 
second window. This information served as a further point of comparison between the static 
and self-organising architectures in determining where the performance gains could be 
achieved.  
6.4.2 Self-Organised Architecture  
In the second test case, the self-organised functions were activated, allowing the architect 
agent to respond to the error reports delivered by the agent population. Because there were 
no scheduled attack or failure events the level of restructuring required was reasonably 
small, and therefore only a single decision was made during the simulation window. The 
following graph in Fig. 6.9 presents the error severities received by the architect. The figure 
also illustrates that only a reactivity error exceeded the 110% buffer window and therefore 
triggered a transition event.  
 
Fig. 6.9 – Severities Graph 
The transition event was a rebalancing event, where a number of customer connections 
were transferred from one aggregate to another. In the example, customers from aggregates 
three and four are moved across to aggregate one – customers reporting the reactivity issue 
were targeted and relocated to an aggregate with available connection capacity. This helped 
distribute the connections more evenly in the event that the initialisation stage created an 
uneven distribution of communicative load between the different aggregation points.  The 
following figure presented in Fig. 6.10 illustrates the changes in data flow in at members 
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of the aggregation layer during the simulation and illustrates the impact of the rebalancing 
transition. 
 
Fig. 6.10 – Data Flow at the Aggregation Layer 
Aggregates three and four observed a rise in communicative load nine minutes into the 
simulation; this corresponded with the series of requests for control in correcting the 
voltage deviation, which suggested that they were not balanced correctly during 
initialisation. Therefore the architect elected to perform a rebalancing action and move a 
set of connections to the first aggregate; this is presented in the figure through a reduction 
in both incoming and outgoing data flow at aggregates three and four. Aggregate one 
however observed an increase in data flow, this did not translate into a reactivity issue in 
terms of overall error severity, furthermore the data flow increase remained within the 110% 
error severity threshold. 
The additional performance metrics retrieved from the simulation are presented in the 
following table in Table 6.4. The values in the table represent the difference in percentage 
terms between the tests performed on the static and self-organising architectures. A 
negative value determines that the self-organising architecture delivered improved 
performance, while a positive number presents a performance loss. 
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Table 6.4 – Comparative Performance Metrics 
 
The results demonstrate that there was a notable improvement in several metrics, 
considering the test was performed on a standard simulation without an attack or failure 
event in place. The maximum magnitude of a reactivity error event was reduced by 24%, 
which was corrected by performing a rebalancing action. From an electrical point of view, 
the deviation length was reduced by up to 12%, however this did result in longer restriction 
times as the controls were applied sooner as a result of the improve system reactivity. 
 LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The decision tree method had the capability to process the list of errors and ascertain which 
of the error reports was the most severe and therefore make a decision based on this 
information. Furthermore when executed the decision making process was able to select a 
transition event and execute it, which in turn was able to reduce the severity of the selected 
error condition and lead to improvements in the performance of the electrical network. 
However other tests and investigations indicated that the decision tree was subject to 
several limitations in terms of how it was implemented, its flexibility and the manner in 
which inputs were processed. 
The first of these limitations concerned the nature of the decision tree approach, each of the 
rules needed to be explicitly designed and coded into the architect agent and therefore if 
new performance metrics were to be included the entire rule base would need to be 
redesigned. This would also lead to large unmaintainable rule-sets if multiple control 
objectives and conditions needed to be satisfied. A second weakness was that the decision 
Error Performance Congestion Reactivity Control Data Unresponsive Under-Used Isolated
Maximum 0.00 -24.03 0.00 -1.87 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average 0.00 -2.28 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00
Voltage Performance Max Voltage 
(feeder end)
Min Voltage 
(feeder end)
Average 
Voltage
Total Time Single Event 
Maximum
Feeder 1 0.02 -0.001 0.07 -5.63 -5.19
Feeder 2 0.03 -0.001 0.08 -12.05 -6.23
Feeder 3 0.08 -0.004 0.07 -1.66 1.35
Feeder 4 0.07 0.003 0.07 -8.58 0.71
Control Performance Actual 
Demand 
(kWh)
Without 
Restriction 
(kWh)
Total 
Restricted 
(kWh)
Average 
Restricted 
(kWh)
Total 
Restricted (%)
Max Total 
Restriction 
Time (s)
Max Single 
Restriction 
Event (s)
Feeder 1 3.33 2.56 -3.70 -4.12 -6.46 6.96 6.96
Feeder 2 3.19 2.47 -3.32 -3.23 -5.91 7.32 7.32
Feeder 3 3.45 2.61 -4.02 -4.08 -6.81 7.05 7.05
Feeder 4 3.40 2.66 -2.99 -3.03 -5.87 7.05 7.05
Overall 3.34 2.57 -3.50 -3.62 -6.26 7.10 7.10
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tree mechanism relied on a series of crisp binary decisions, whether each decision statement 
was true or false which did not suitable model the nature of the problem. Several sources 
of uncertainty were present within the threshold selection stage, error severities and 
locations – therefore employing a decision system which made certain decisions without 
considering degrees of truth was not necessarily the correct format. Finally the decision 
tree approach required the separation of error formats, and didn’t have the same focus on 
determining the overall state of health of the architecture. For example if the most severe 
error is a reactivity problem traced recorded by several customers, a rebalancing action may 
be triggered, however other issues within the architecture may suggest that a larger scale 
transition is warranted. The process of fine tuning the decision tree would involve the 
resulting of the rule set and further raise the issue of maintaining an extensive set of decision 
branches.   
Overall the decision tree was able to perform error processing, and select the most 
prominent error format present within the architecture. This error format formed the input 
to the decision tree allowing the Architect agent to select an appropriate transition event 
and execute it. This process was able to reduce the severity of errors in the system and 
ultimately create improvements in deviation duration and customer losses. These 
improvements were present in the absence of any attack event therefore it was reasonable 
to assume that in instances where the net performance of the architecture was reduced the 
potential for performance gains were greater during an attack event. Indicating that the 
transitions triggered by the decision making engine were effective and achieved the 
objectives required of them. However the outlined limitations of the decision making 
engine itself indicated that an alternative approach was needed in selecting the appropriate 
transitional action. This alternative approach needed to be focussed on flexibility and 
performing transition decision making in an environment which was rich in uncertainties.  
 A FUZZY BASED DECISION MAKING ENGINE 
In recognition of the limitations of the decision tree mechanism a replacement system was 
based on a fuzzy decision making method. The alternative solution involved combining a 
subset of the performance metrics into a single computational burden value representing 
the overall error state of the architecture. The computational burden figure and its rate of 
change were used as input membership functions to the decision making engine. In terms 
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of output functions, the decision making engine recommends a transition stage referring to 
the following: 
 Stage 1: Rebalancing Action 
 Stage 2: Substitution 
 Stage 3: Activating Dormant Agents 
 Stage 4: Tiered Aggregate promotion  
A higher burden would be associated with a higher stage transition, which involves a more 
drastic reconfiguration event. To adopt principles from the decision tree method, the 
architect does not automatically have to accept the recommendation from the fuzzy 
decision making engine because it is aware of other criteria which would influence 
selecting a transition. The other criteria included the location of the errors detected, the 
availability of resources for promotion or dormant agent activation and the distribution of 
errors. From this additional data the architect had the power to override the 
recommendation through truncated decision tree mechanisms. 
6.6.1 Computational Burden Components 
The two inputs into the fuzzy model were the computational burden and the rate of change 
of that burden. This involved creating a metric which alluded to the severity and scale of a 
series of error types referring to the communication and computational processing elements 
of the agent community. The computational burden value aimed to produce a figure 
describing how much computational stress the architecture was under at any given time, 
this figure was an amalgamation of the following performance metrics as recorded by the 
agent population. The following metrics are used to build the computational burden figure.  
Congestion – The number of messages stored in messages queues at an agent waiting to 
be processed 
Data Flow – Incoming and outgoing data flows are recorded at each point in the network 
and are subject to thresholds describing the maximum amount of throughout that can be 
sustained without increasing the risk of data losses when considering a ZigBee 
communication platform 
Reactivity – Response times between agent pairs – the time taken between a transmitted 
update and the corresponding reply from the target. This time includes the amount of time 
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the message has spent in the message queue of the recipient agent and the time it takes for 
the recipient the process the message and delivers the response. 
Execution Time – An internal form of reactivity which measures the time from the point 
a message has been received to the point where the recipient decides which response to 
select and perform that selection. 
Unresponsiveness – Acts as a more extreme form of reactivity measurement, in the sense 
that if an agent does not receive a message within a specified timeout window from the 
agent it is communicating with it records that agent as being unresponsive. Multiple 
successive missed messages trigger an error alert which is sent to the Architect. 
Each of these error types was accompanied a magnitude, a threshold and timing information 
– which is then stored in the architect’s ‘Error Base’. The error base was a set of linked 
objects which document and store lists of all error reports fitting each of the listed error 
types such that each type could be processed separately. The use of the knowledge base 
provides greater flexibility in the event that other performance metrics were to be added, 
each subsequent metric would be assigned an instance of an error type object which hosts 
all reports for that given type.  
6.6.2 Computing a Computational Burden Indicator 
After filtering the set of error reports, each of the reports pertaining to the error types 
outlined in the previous section was combined to create an overall burden value. The 
following equation in (5) presents the calculation required to compute the figure for the 
computational burden indicator. 
(5)             𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛
=  
∑ (
∑ 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑐1
𝑐𝑛
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠  +  
∑ 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑎𝑔1
𝑎𝑔𝑛
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 )
𝑒𝑡1
𝑒𝑡𝑛
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑠
 
The first step involved calculating the average severity for each of the contributory error 
types with respect to the tier in which those errors are being detected. For example a series 
of reactivity errors recorded at the customer layer will be averaged with respect to the 
number of customers, whereas a series of errors of the same type within the aggregation 
tier was averaged against the number of aggregate agents. The averages for each agent tier 
are added to form an architecture wide value for each of the error types. The final 
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computational burden figure is derived from the architecture wide value divided by the 
number of contributory error types. A second component of the computational burden 
assessment was the rate of change of the figure. The overall burden data was monitored 
using the same techniques each of the agents within the core architecture population used 
to perform the performance monitoring duties. A performance monitor object in the 
Architect agent is supplied with the computational burden figure after each calculation. The 
performance monitor retains a list of recent calculation results to compute a moving average, 
changes in subsequent average calculations determined whether the computational burden 
was increasing or declining. Timestamps between average calculations were then used to 
calculate the rate of which the increases or decreases were taking place.  
Because of the number of metrics involved in the calculation of the burden indicator, each 
of which was initially recorded with differing units – congestion took the form of a number 
of messages, whereas reactivity was measured in second – the final value for the burden 
indicator was declared a dimensionless quantity. A low, medium or high level of 
computational burden was defined by the indicator values defined in the following 
membership functions. Furthermore the uncertainty involved with an indicator rather than 
a crisp burden measurement increased the relevance for defining a fuzzy based decision 
making engine. 
6.6.3 Membership functions 
Following the calculation of a computational burden and the rate of change of burden, the 
next stage in determining which transitional event was required was to pass the two values 
to the fuzzy decision engine. The decision tree approach didn’t apply a transitional event if 
the severity of the largest error was below 110%, thus avoiding the architect reacting to an 
event which posed little thread to overall performance. With this decision making engine 
the threshold limit with regards to action is set with a computational burden of 5, if the 
burden exceeded this base value the fuzzy decision making engine was triggered. Two input 
membership functions processed the two input parameters and are presented in the 
following figure in Fig. 6.11. 
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Fig. 6.11 – Input Membership Functions 
The first input was focused on the magnitude of the computational burden categorising the 
burden level, three stages were defined within the membership function for low, medium 
and high computational burden states. The low membership function covered the smallest 
area because it represents a smaller amount of potential cases and was associated with fewer 
architectural transition mechanisms. The high membership function extended beyond the 
initial range presented in the figure as a result of there being no effective upper limit to 
computational burden. Therefore in order for the recommendation service to be able to 
deliver a response in those more extreme cases the upper bound of membership function 
needed to take this into account. There was a degree of overlap between the functions 
because the computational burden is an amalgamation of a number of performance metrics, 
it created uncertainty as to the actual severity of the error state. Furthermore setting the 
thresholds for some of the performance metrics relied on a series of tests under the presence 
of normal and abnormal communication load. These exercises indicated that depending on 
the results of the initialisation phase the relative communication load varied across different 
points in the aggregation tier. Therefore uncertainty is also present in the individual 
performance metrics based on difference between the normal and abnormal communication 
loads generated during an attack event. As a result of the uncertainties present in the system 
there was no definitive point whereby the burden transition from a low to medium or high 
state and the intermediate areas of the membership functions represented instances where 
two burden conditions were partially true.  
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The second function was responsible for processing the rate of change of the computational 
burden, as with the first function, the rate of change input was composed of three 
membership functions. Anything less than zero indicated that the error state was declining 
and therefore was less likely to require a transition event, whereas any value greater than 0 
indicated that the situation was escalating. The rate of change was only ever truly flat when 
the rate of change was zero, therefore the degree of truth to which the flat membership 
function was satisfied decayed each side of the centre using a triangle function rather than 
a trapezoidal one. 
The output membership function is presented in Fig. 6.12 which converted the fuzzy result 
into classifications for the four architecture transition stages; each of the transitional stages 
was represented by a symmetrical trapezoidal function with a degree of overlap.  
 
Fig. 6.12 – Decision Output Membership Function 
These overlaps indicate the level of uncertainty in each of the potential transition stages 
indicating that certain scenarios may not present with a clear recommendation. In those 
instances the architect would then consider additional information pertaining to the overall 
error state in terms of the location and distribution of the error reports and the number of 
available dormant agents which could be used for the purposes of increasing aggregation 
capacity. Even in cases where the fuzzy system responds with a definitive transition 
recommendation the architect was required to perform a validity check to ensure that 
change which was recommended was feasible and could be implemented. If this was not 
the case the architect had the authority to over-ride the decision and apply a similar 
transition which adhered to the nature of the problem and the available resources. 
6.6.4 Defuzzification and Rule Processing 
With the input and output functions defined the final stage of configuring the fuzzy decision 
making engine was to define a rule set converting the inputs into a recommendation value 
which could be interpreted by the architect.  
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The table presented in Table 6.5 presents the rule base which was used to process the input 
membership functions and derive a transition recommendation. If the rate of computational 
burden was declining to such a degree that is it estimated that the overall error state will 
only persist for a short period of time the fuzzy recommendation function was not triggered. 
Only if the error state was estimated for a prolonged period of time would a 
recommendation be required. Additionally if a low computational burden is detected to be 
declining, no action will be taken by the architect as the condition is improving without the 
need for intervention. Larger incidents reporting with a declining burden were responded 
to as even in a declining state the error state would remain within the architecture longer 
than the threshold time. 
Table 6.5 – Fuzzy Decision Making Rule Base 
 
The overall ruleset indicated that the rate of change of the computational burden acted as a 
modifier with respect to the severity of the architect’s response, an escalating condition was 
treated with a more severe action by the architect. In the same manner, a situation which 
was easing but still remained an ongoing problem was processed through the application 
of a less severe transition event. The final aspect of defuzzification process was the 
selection of the defuzzification method, all designs options were examined through the 
Matlab fuzzy toolbox and this process indicated that the defuzzification method could 
affect a small influence on the shape of the rule surface. This similarity between 
defuzzification methods has also been noted by the authors of [142] whereby centre of 
gravity, bisector and Mean of Maximum have all produced similar results.  Therefore the 
Computational Burden  Burden Rate of Change  Transition Stage 
Low Flat Stage 1 
Low Rising Stage 2 
Medium Declining Stage 1 
Medium Flat Stage 2 
Medium Rising Stage 3 
High Declining Stage 2 
High  Flat Stage 3 
High Rising Stage 4 
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selected defuzzification method was centre of gravity and formed the surface presented in 
in Fig. 6.13. 
 
Fig. 6.13 – Fuzzy Rule Surface 
 JAVA IMPLEMENTATION 
The initial fuzzy system design and evaluation was conducted within the Matlab fuzzy 
toolbox and integration with the agents involved in the self-organising architecture was 
conducted through a command line script triggering Matlab and the relevant function. 
However this process experienced several delays when initiating a new instance of Matlab 
to perform the function and to retrieve the result. Therefore an alternative implementation 
was introduced to alleviate these problems and increase the rate at which the architect agent 
could request a transition recommendation. The solution was to use a java library called 
jFuzzyLogic which could be accessed within the agent rather than making external function 
calls to Matlab. To utilise the library the membership functions and the rule list needed to 
be translated into a format recognisable by the library – which took the shape of a Fuzzy 
Control Language (FCL) file. The first element of this control language file was to define 
the input and output variables, as presented in Fig. 6.14; each of the components presented 
in this chapter was initialised in the source file. 
 
Fig. 6.14 – Defining Fuzzy Variables 
VAR_INPUT 
 burden: REAL; 
 roc: REAL; 
END_VAR 
 
VAR_OUTPUT 
 decision: REAL; 
END_VAR 
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Once the set of variables is declared the next stage defined the shape and scope of the 
membership functions for each of the variables. This segment of the FCL source file is 
illustrated in Fig. 6.15 
 
Fig. 6.15 – Defining Membership Functions within the FCL File 
The final stage of the FCL declaration file considers the rule set which in turn forms the 
rule surface, an identical set of configuration parameters were retained from the design of 
the system within the Matlab tool box and the eight rules defined in Table 6.5 were then 
translated into the FCL format. The translated rule base is presented in the following figure 
in Fig. 6.16.  
 
Fig. 6.16 – Defining the Rule Set within the FCL File 
The fuzzy library was imported by the architect agent only and was initialised at start-up 
by accessing the FCL file. When the architect agent required a transition recommendation 
FUZZIFY burden 
 TERM low: = trape 0 75 175 250; 
 TERM medium: = trape 175 250 500 575; 
 TERM high: = trape 500 575 1000 1075; 
END_FUZZIFY 
 
FUZZIFY roc 
 TERM declining: = trian -5 -2 0; 
 TERM flat: = trian -2 0 2; 
 TERM rising: = trian 0 2 5; 
END_FUZZIFY 
 
DEFUZZIFY decision 
 TERM Stage1:= trape 0 0.125 0.25 0.375; 
 TERM Stage2:= trape 0.25 0.375 0.5 0.625; 
 TERM Stage3:= trape 0.5 0.625 0.75 0.875; 
 TERM Stage4:= trape 0.75 0.875 1 1.125; 
 METHOD : COG; 
 DEFAULT: = 0; 
END_DEFUZZIFY 
RULE 1 : IF burden IS low AND roc IS flat THEN decision IS Stage1; 
RULE 2 : IF burden IS low AND roc IS rising THEN decision IS Stage2; 
RULE 3 : IF burden IS medium AND roc IS declining THEN decision IS 
Stage1; 
RULE 4 : IF burden IS medium AND roc IS flat THEN decision IS Stage2; 
RULE 5 : IF burden IS medium AND roc IS rising THEN decision IS Stage3; 
RULE 6 : IF burden IS high AND roc IS declining THEN decision IS Stage2; 
RULE 7 : IF burden IS high AND roc IS flat THEN decision IS Stage3; 
RULE 8 : IF burden IS high AND roc IS rising THEN decision IS Stage4; 
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it supplied the fuzzy function with burden and rate of change data, and requested the 
evaluated result.  
 TRIGGERING A TRANSITION 
With the output value retrieved from the fuzzy recommendation the architect then had to 
translate this into a reconfiguration action to apply it to the agent population. The output 
membership function defined which stage of transition is recommended for the given error 
state. Before accepting a recommendation the architect had to assess the feasibility of the 
recommended transition based on the current agent population status. For each of the 
transition options the architect had a series of checks to perform before deciding to perform 
the action suggested by the decision making engine. This incorporated elements from the 
initially formulated decision tree concept, and prevented the architect attempting transitions 
which would either not help the architecture or would not be possible based on resource 
availability. 
6.8.1 Rebalancing  
If the fuzzy system recommended performing a rebalancing action the architect checks to 
ensure such a change would have a positive influence. If the architect discovers that the 
agent which was the source of the computational burden error was not one which is 
connected to a large number of customer agents it concludes that rebalancing would be 
ineffective and would suggest a substitution instead. Likewise if the architect discovers that 
while the overall burden is relatively low, but sourced to a wide number of locations it 
would determine that a more reasonable transition would be to offer aggregation support 
as the overall agent population was under strain. 
6.8.2 Substitution 
An alternative recommendation would be to apply a substitution. The architect would look 
at location information for the set of error reports stored in the report list to determine of 
one aggregate was responsible for the errors. If so then the architect would carry out the 
desired transition as recommended, however if the error locations are more disparate then 
a substitution would not be as effective. Therefore a localised transition may not be the 
most appropriate, and a smaller scale version of a higher transition stage is applied, in the 
form of adding a single aggregation agent to the population. 
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6.8.3 Activating Dormant Agents 
When a stage three transition was recommended the architect agent had fewer checks to 
perform. As this was a higher level transition event there were fewer transition options in 
the event that the initial recommendation cannot but fulfilled. The limitation in this case 
was the availability of dormant agents – when the agent population was initially launched 
only a small quantity of dormant aggregates was present. If these agents were activated, the 
architect cannot elect to perform another activation based transition as there were no more 
remaining dormant agents. Instead the architect over-rides the recommendation and 
proceeds to perform a single tier promotion transition. In this transition customer agents 
were promoted into aggregation roles within a single aggregation tier – one customer per 
existing active aggregate. 
 SUMMARY 
This chapter documented the development stages of the decision making engine responsible 
for the delivery of architecture transition events after reviewing performance monitoring 
information retrieved from the agent population. Initially discussing processes surrounding 
error filtration such that only valid reports are considered for analysis, and that the architect 
does not respond to short term events or those with a trivial impact on the performance 
metrics. A preliminary decision tree method was outlined, discussing the responses to each 
of the error formats and demonstrating its effectiveness when presented with an attack 
format in a sample exercise. The overall performance and potential limitations of the 
decision tree approach resulted in the development of an alternative mechanism for 
translating performance data into transitional actions. This alternative mechanism involved 
the employment of a fuzzy based recommendation system which required the 
amalgamation of the performance metrics into a single variable. Therefore a value for 
computational burden was devised in addition to a process for computing the value from 
the supporting performance figures. This variable and its rate of change were used as input 
parameters to the decision making engine which returned a recommended transition stage 
from, the architect could either accept this result or override the decision based on 
additional information, 
The following chapter considers the processes involved in evaluating the self-organising 
architecture presented in the previous chapter and the decision making engine documented 
in this one. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the self-organising architecture an evaluation framework 
was required, a framework defining an electrical network, an agent population and a 
simulation scenario. The goal of the platform was to demonstrate that the transitions and 
overall actions of the self-organising architecture were capable of having a positive impact 
on the performance of both the electrical layer and the communication layer. 
The tests performed in the process of evaluating the self-organising performance differed 
from those presented in chapter 3 because of the nature of the evaluation objectives and the 
agent architecture involved. The previous set of tests was aimed at determining the potential 
for self-organisation through investigating a series of static architectures to extract 
performance information. Those results indicated that depending on the performance 
metric under evaluation differing architecture designs proved to be advantageous, and no 
single design was continually out-performing the others. Consequently that indicated there 
was scope for the introduction of a self-organising architecture. The evaluation processes 
documented in this chapter were aimed at investigating the effectiveness of a self-
organising architecture which was developed in response to the results previously attained.  
The evaluation platform described in this chapter considered two network events which 
required intervention from the agents within the architecture. The first of the events was 
the voltage deviation, a deviation which required the attention of the aggregate level 
controllers and the load shedding responses from the customer layer. Secondly the 
architecture was to be attacked by a low-rate denial-of-service attack; this cyber-threat was 
aimed at disrupting the actions taken during the control phase and therefore interrupting 
the dissemination of control signals.  
In this chapter, the configurations for the components involved within the performance 
evaluation framework are introduced, including the structure and properties of the electrical 
network and the agent architecture.  Furthermore the control problem and attack methods 
are also documented, concluding with the implementation of the environment within which 
the evaluations were performed. Finally the evaluation criteria are illustrated with respect 
to the electrical and communication layer performance. 
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 TEST NETWORK CONFIGURATION 
The core electrical network used throughout the evaluation process was derived from the 
network implemented for the initial series of static architecture tests; a radial configuration 
was developed as illustrated in Fig. 7. 
 
Fig. 7.1 – Network and Agent Topology Diagram 
As illustrated in the diagram, the electrical network contained 340 customers, distributed 
across four radial feeders. Three voltage levels are presented within the network, starting 
with a 33kV grid connection, which was connected to an 11kV central network spine. The 
four feeders which hosted the customer connections were at the 400V voltage level, 85 
customers were connected to each of those feeders. The customer agents were supplied 
with a demand profile which was sourced from the same data set as used in the first round 
of architecture evaluations. A modification was made to the source profiles in order to 
produce a voltage deviation with a significant enough duration to adequately examine the 
potential value of the self-organising architecture. This modification involved extending 
the period of high demand to create a longer term under-voltage situation. 
Additional one PV installation rated at 10kW, and supplied with an appropriate generation 
profile was inserted after the 60th customer on each feeder. Also presented within the figure 
is the association between the components in the network and their agents, therefore 
illustrating the placement of the individual agents in respect of the electrical configuration. 
• 340 Customers with profiles
• 4 PV Generators with profiles
• 4 Active Aggregates (      4 Dormant)
• 4 Central Core Agents 
Observer Architect Gateway Error Generator
170 Performance Evaluation Framework 
 
The aggregation agents were placed at the head of each of the feeders, in addition to the 
four active aggregates; four dormant agents were also added to the initial starting 
configuration.  
Beyond the agents which represented physical components or aggregation points in the 
network, further agents were located centrally and therefore were not associated with a 
specific component. These agents were the Overserved, Architect, Error Generator and 
Gateway agent – the latter agent being a function of the overall test environment discussed 
later in the chapter. 
 AGENT ARCHITECTURE CONFIGURATION 
The previous subsection defined the structure of the physical network and discussed the 
location of the agents, where each of the customer smart-meters and generation components 
was represented by an agent. Additional agents were also present and were either located 
centrally, representing a cloud implementation or a central control room. However this only 
described the location of the agents involved not the communication structure and 
architecture. The interaction between the agents followed a typical architecture as presented 
in Fig. 7.2, this configuration served as the starting architecture for the self-organising 
architecture but also the as the static architecture. 
 
Fig. 7.2 – Typical Smart Grid Communication Architecture 
Smart Metered 
Customer
Generator 
Entity
Local Controller/
Data Collection
Central Server
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The four centrally located agents were considered to be part of the central server entity of 
the architecture. The control was also within the aggregation tier of the hierarchy to 
represent the common concept of local controllers when operating as a static architecture 
the local controllers could only influence customer agents on the same feeder as the 
controller. Contrastingly the initialisation stage created a more distributed communication 
structure whereby customers were able to select which controller they preferred based on 
connectivity. Therefore customers who are connected on the same feeder were not 
necessarily under the observation of the same controller. This process was applied as the 
initialisation stage was considered to be part of the self-organising sequence of events and 
therefore would not be applied to the static architecture. 
 CONTROL SCENARIO 
Each of the customer and generation agents was supplied with a profile dictating its demand 
or generation at any time during the course of the simulation. From the perspective of the 
customer population the objective of the profiles was to create a voltage deviation event 
which presented with long enough duration to create a control problem which required 
continual monitoring by the controllers. On the basis that the simulation period considered 
20 minutes of system operation, the load profiles focussed on exacerbating a period of peak 
demand. This could be a reflection of a series of electric vehicles being connected for 
charging or activation of heat pumps within the customer premises.  
Each customer was responsible for the monitoring of its own voltage level, which reflected 
the voltage of the network bus which the customer was connected to. A persistent voltage 
deviation was reported a customer’s associated controller which triggered the control 
process. The actual control process was delivered through demand side response in the form 
of load shedding actions. A percentage of the population would reduce their demand by 
700W when instructed by a controller. If a customer was placed in a state of load shedding 
it would send a series of messages to the controller to ask whether or not it could relax the 
controls and return to its nominal profile.  
The demand restriction process created a rise in the voltage profile for each of the 
customers, once the voltage at the tail of the feeder was raised above a threshold value of 
0.96 per unit, the controller would respond to the check messages sent by those customers 
under control to inform them that they could release any restrictions put in place.  
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 ATTACK CONDITIONS 
The primary attack method used throughout the testing process was based on a denial of 
service (DoS) attack created through a large amount of unhelpful messages being 
transmitted to target agents. The aim of a denial of service attack was to flood the target 
messages which served no purpose such that conventional operation was interrupted or 
slowed as a result. In the context of a monitoring and control system present within a smart 
grid environment, a denial of service attack has the potential to hold up or even prevent 
control signals from being delivered. The attack also has the potential to create a significant 
backlog of information which prevents information in the form of control requests and 
measurements from reaching their desired destination.  
During the evaluation process the DoS attack was hosted at the customer layer as the 
volume of smart-meters provided a suitable launch platform for the attack event. 
Furthermore the accessibility of the smart-meter hardware presented a system vulnerability 
which could be accessed by a wider range of potential attackers. When an attack event was 
triggered at least one of the customer agents transmitted a large volume of information at 
the aggregate agent it was associated with. The target aggregate was tasked with performing 
control actions in addition to data collection tasks; therefore the goal of the attacker was to 
interrupt the control interaction between customer and aggregate and prevent control 
actions taking place. To ensure the attack event remained within the bounds of a real-world 
example the effective data output from a smart-meter performing an attack was curtailed 
such that it didn’t exceed the transmission capabilities of a 2.4 GHz ZigBee transmitter. 
This transmission technology is planned for the widespread smart-meter rollout within the 
UK, and even taking into account that future technologies may have much higher 
transmission rates, legacy systems will remain connected and limited by their hardware. 
The attacking agent had to share this available transmission capacity with the other core 
functions of the customer agent which include communicating demand information and 
interacting with the gateway agent.  
The following attack formats were applied to the static and self-organising architectures, in 
a series of increasing attack populations: 
7.5.1 Burst Attack 
The burst attack approach involved a short period of time within which the attack traffic 
was transmitted, each of the events lasted 250 seconds and was timed to coincide with the 
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initial request for control. The aim of the attack was to interrupt the control requests and 
therefore reduce the chance that the controller would be aware of an ongoing voltage 
deviation event. Each of the attackers involved in the burst event were triggered 
simultaneously by the error generation agent to concentrate the actions of all attackers. An 
attack of this nature would represent a probing event by an adversary, testing the 
capabilities of the target network. 
7.5.2 Sequential Attack 
A sequential attack consisted of a series burst attacks across the lifetime of the simulation 
each one individual event matching the format of the original burst attack. The sequential 
attack strategy had the objective of performing multiple probing stages each to test the 
architecture after transitional decisions by the architect had been implemented. Over the 
course of a simulation run, three instances of a burst attack were performed with 200 
seconds between each of the events.  
7.5.3 Continuous Attack  
The continuous attack, once it was triggered, lasted for the remainder of the simulation and 
therefore the attack traffic was delivered for a substantially longer period of time in 
comparison to the burst attack incidents.  As with the previous two attack strategies the 
start of the attack was designed to coincide with the start of the control process such that 
once the congestion created by the attack started to build, the architecture was in the process 
of disseminating control signals. However the control mechanism as documented in a later 
subsection requires continual interaction between controller and customer. The continuous 
attack aimed to be able to sever that interaction and therefore prematurely cause customer 
agents to release demand restrictions placed upon them by the controller.  
7.5.4 Static Attacks 
Each of the attack strategies was implemented in two formats, the first of which being a 
static attack – this method ignored the actions of the architect agent and did not respond to 
changes within the architecture. The attacker, or attackers, received a message triggering 
the start of the attack event, and sent the volume of attack traffic to the aggregate it was 
assigned to during the initialisation phase. In the case of the static architecture, the attacker 
was assigned to the aggregate associated with the feeder it was connected to. Regardless of 
the actions taken by the architect agent, throughout the duration of the attack the messages 
were always transmitted to the same target. If the architect agent decided to remove the 
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target from the population by performing a substitution action, the attacker would then be 
transmitting the attack traffic to a dormant agent, thus isolating the attack stream. This was 
indicative of a low sophistication attack strategy, and one which assumed the attacker 
considered a static network of agents. 
7.5.5 Adaptive Attacks 
The second of the attack implementations was the adaptive attack format; this represented 
an escalation in sophistication and one which responded to the decisions made by the self-
organising architecture. In the adaptive format the initiation of the attack remained the same, 
as an attacker would transmit the attack stream to the aggregate it was associated with as a 
result of the initialisation phase. However if the architect decided to perform a transition 
event, and the attacker became associated with a different aggregate – either due to a 
relocation or due to a substitution event – the attacker would then redirect the attack traffic 
towards the new aggregate. The adaptive attack mechanism monitored the agent to which 
legitimate traffic was being transmitted following a transition event and adapted the target 
of the attack traffic accordingly. 
 TEST ENVIRONMENT DESCRIPTION 
To simulate the combination of the agent population and the electrical network a test 
environment was developed, this environment was introduced to remove the number of 
hard coded variables added to the first series of tests. This was due to a greater degree of 
flexibility being required to transition between architectures. The sequential voltage 
calculations were replaced with an external load flow engine, which was supplied with a 
model matching the test network configuration presented in a previous sub-section.  
Due to its accessibility and applicability to the interfacing issue Matpower was selected as 
the eternal load flow engine of choice. Using a load-flow engine lead to fewer restrictions 
in the communication process between agents in the MAS, because under the former 
system several messages had to follow the flow of electricity through the network in order 
to ensure that the calculations retained accuracy and continuity. Therefore it provided more 
opportunities for network freedom and preventing relocation of agents within the MAS 
compromising the flow of information required to perform voltage calculations. If a 
customer was to be relocated under the previous system or an aggregate agent replaced by 
its substitute, restructuring the flow of messages involved in the sequential voltage 
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calculation would create unnecessary complications and potentially compromise the 
accuracy of the information generated by those calculations. Eliminating this concern by 
separating the electrical calculations from the roles and responsibilities of the agent 
population prevents this issue from occurring. 
7.6.1 Setup and Configuration 
The process of connecting the two components is discussed below documenting the 
additional files, data and steps needed to be able to share information between the two 
platforms. The following additional files needed to be included in the process. 
Required Files and Agents  
To develop the interface between the two components, a series of files were required to 
facilitate the process of sharing information between two systems which had no direct 
communication route. The additional files bridged the gap between the agents in JADE and 
the load flow engine in Matlab. 
 Gateway Agent (GA) – The GA was an additional agent which is introduced to 
the population for the purposes of handling the interaction between the Matpower 
load flow engine and the rest of the MAS. This agent performed several roles 
within the architecture, initially the GA processes the components file and passes 
parameters out to the agents. Parameters, such as voltage limits, ratings and initial 
set points, such that the information held by the agent population matches the 
information present within the model file. After this data had been disseminated, 
the GA then turned its attention to triggering the load flow engine and waited for 
the results to be returned. It had to check for the existence of the results file which 
was cleared after each calculation and check for the end of file tag, thus confirming 
that the load flow stage was complete. The remaining duty of the GA was to 
retrieve network information from the agent population, customer demand, 
generation information and use that to re-write the Matpower model such that the 
subsequent load flow was representative of the most recent data from the agent side 
of the simulation. 
 Components File: The components file was a csv document containing all the 
network components, connections and busses – along with each a set of parameters 
for each of those elements. This file allowed the GA to map the set of agent names 
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used by Jade as a method of distinguishing between members of the population to 
the component ID numbers used as part of the Matpower model file format. 
Therefore when the GA was presented with a set of bus voltages, these can then be 
passed onto the agent representing the component connected to that bus. In addition 
to assisting identifying bus ID numbers the component file was also of use to the 
architect agent providing overall network information which is then later used in 
the process of validating the initialization stage and performing architectural 
transitions. 
 Matpower Model File – The Matpower file contained the data and parameters for 
network described in section 7.2, two versions of the Matpower file are used for 
the purposes of the simulation. One version is the original starting configuration 
and the template which was used by the GA as a base to re-write the active version 
of the model. This active file was the file which was accessed by the Matpower 
load flow engine to perform the load flow calculations. 
 Batch File – To trigger a load from the GA, the agent needed to call Matlab from 
the command line, and therefore performed this via the use of a batch script 
containing several commands which navigate to the Matlab root directory 
activating a minimal version of the application loading a Matlab script to manage 
the load flow calculation process.   
 Matlab Script File – Once triggered, Matlab was instructed to run a specific script 
which calls the Matpower load flow engine and loads the model file. In addition to 
performing the load flow phase of the simulation the script file is also responsible 
to handling the results of a load flow operation. The script was also responsible for 
retrieving the results from the calculation and populating an output file with the 
data, formatted so that it was easily parsed by the GA. 
 Results File – The final component of the interface between Jade and Matlab is 
the output from the load flow calculation, this file contains a list of bus ID numbers 
taken from the model file and their corresponding voltage information. This file is 
read by the gateway agent, and agents which have a corresponding network bus 
will be sent the most recent updates from the power simulation side of the process. 
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The documented set of files and agents, operated across a series of steps during the course 
of a simulation, the java side of the system remained in control over any load flow 
calculations. In addition to the set of files other preparations were required before initiating 
a simulation event, these addition stages are described as follows. 
Building the Network Model 
Prior to operating the self-organising architecture and running the simulations the network 
model was developed in IPSA2, this software package was utilised at this stage for the 
ability to visualise the structure of the network. It was also useful run a series of tests to 
ensure that the load and generation profiles delivered a voltage profile which contained a 
deviation event for the control system to tackle and that those deviations do not create 
insurmountable control issues. Finally the software allowed additional information to be 
added to the underlying diagram, information which aided the overall simulation. For 
example individual components could be named, so loads were given a name which 
corresponded with the agent name present within the agent architecture. The source code 
for the model separates different components and lists all their parameters; these parameters 
were then extracted such that they could be used to build the components file, allowing the 
GA to identify how many loads are present and their associated bus ID number.  
Building the Components File 
The second preliminary stage was the creation of the components file which acted as a 
directory of the components and their associated agents which was used by the gateway 
agent to ensure the correct load flow results are disseminated to the corresponding agents. 
The components file as previously discussed was a CSV file containing listing of all the 
relevant entities present in the network model combined with agent information regarding 
the initial starting state of the aggregate population. This file was constructed from IPSA 
model source file which documented each of the component types and their list of 
parameters – therefore the names applied to the components when drawing out the original 
model are associated with their component identifier as well as the identifier for the bus 
they are connected to. 
Building the Matpower model 
A third preparation stage was the conversion process from the initial IPSA model file into 
the modelling format used by Matpower – as both file formats can be accessed in a raw text 
format the conversion script read the IPSA source file and extracted the pertinent 
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information. This information was then re-written into the format dictated by Matpower – 
during the conversion process not all of the information contained with the IPSA file was 
retained. For example there was no separate format for load components as the information 
was recorded at the bus level rather than the component level. Furthermore all components 
are identified by a numerical component index as Matpower does not record any of the 
component names used in IPSA. It was this change in the information format which defines 
the need for the components file such that the GA had the ability to understand which agent 
each of the component identifiers belongs to. 
Building the Agent Population 
The final stage was to manufacture the agent population, given the large number of 
components represented in the network and therefore warranting agents within the self-
organising architecture it was not practical to manually compose each of the agent files. 
Additionally because each customer, generator or aggregation agent may have differing 
parameters based on the network configuration it was also not necessarily feasible to clone 
a series of agents based on a given agent type. As a result a procedure for mass producing 
an agent population was also required. 
This process used agent template files as documented in the appendix section, which 
consisted of the entire agent source code with the variables replaced by placeholder code 
words. An agent manufacturing program written in java would then read through the 
components file and determine how many copies of each agent file to make and which 
parameters to replace the code words with. Other parameters within the manufacturing 
program could also be set to dictate the operation of the simulation – such as selecting load 
and generation profiles from a collection of potential data sets, and controlling profile 
compression rates.  
Producing a population of 340 customers, 4 PV generators and 8 aggregation agents using 
this process would customarily take around 20 minutes to complete. Additional agents such 
as the GA, Observer and Architect agents did not need to be created in this process as they 
did not require manufacturing in bulk quantities.  
7.6.2 Running the Simulation 
With the all of the files and agents created, the remainder the interaction between the 
Matpower load flow engine and the agent population took place during the runtime of the 
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simulation and iterates over a series of stages. The following stages document a simulation 
running without the intervention of an attack event or control actions – focussing on the 
operations required to connect an agent population created in java with an external load 
flow mechanism. 
Step 1 – Forming the Knowledge Base 
The first stage runs acts as an initialisation stage for the interface and is centred on the GA 
and its responsibility to perform the association between the numerical bus identification 
format used by Matpower and the name based format of the agent platform. To perform 
this task the GA processed the components file which contained the network model 
information alongside the relevant agent names the information corresponds to. The GA 
built a knowledge base as an object-oriented representation of the network model, this 
knowledge base is then later used to store up to date parameters received from load flow 
calculations. The UML diagram in Fig. 7.3 documents the structure of the knowledge base. 
 
Fig. 7.3 – Gateway Agent Knowledge Base 
Step 2 – Retrieve Agent Data 
Once the knowledge base was complete the GA began listening for agent updates in the 
form of customer demand and generation agent output data. Each customer was supplied 
with a load profile, to ensure that the total demand varied over time, setting the conditions 
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for an under-voltage event which triggers a control response. This data collection process 
is completed through the agent network, communicated via a series of Agent 
Communication Language (ACL) messages. In this stage the knowledge base acted as a 
lookup service, as the GA received an update from a member of the agent population it 
updates the knowledge base so that it can then be used to write a new iteration of the 
Matpower model file and thus receive load flow information for the current system state. 
Step 3 – Re-write the Matpower Model 
The process of writing the Matpower model file was part of the core loop which controls 
the interaction, every three seconds the GA pulls the information from the knowledge base 
which is continually updated and writes a new Matpower model. To do this the GA read in 
the original version of the Matpower file one line at a time, and lines such as headers, 
section start and end tags, and busses without connected load or generation were copied 
directly to the new file. Other lines needed to be modified for the purposes of injecting the 
most recent data from the knowledge base; these lines were broken into an array of strings 
to make the individual fields accessible. The majority of the fields remained unchanged, 
but customer demand or generation output figures were replaced before the array was 
concatenated into a single line so it could then be transplanted into the new file. Finally an 
‘end of file’ tag is added to the end of the new file such that the GA could determine when 
the file writing process has been completed. 
Step 4 – Executing the Model 
With the new model file completed it was then important to execute a load flow calculation 
and retrieve the results. This was performed through the provision of a file entitled 
“matcall.bat” containing a series of command line instructions to navigate to the root 
directory of the Matlab application and execute a Matlab script. The contents of this batch 
file are presented in Fig. 7.4, where several runtime arguments are passed to Matlab when 
it was executed to ensure that the most minimal version of the engine was triggered. These 
arguments prevented Matlab from opening a full version of the application and only 
accessed the core engine to run the script triggering a load flow calculation.  
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Fig. 7.4 – Batch File 
The Matlab script triggered by the batch file loaded the Matpower model written in step 3 
and performs the load flow calculation. This script was also responsible for the creation of 
the result file which detailed all the voltage magnitudes for each of the buses in the network. 
This information was formatted such that it could later be read by the GA once the load 
flow process is complete. At this stage the GA agent itself was placed on hold, scanning 
for the result file before it can continue to the next stage, it would however still be receiving 
information from the agent population and updating the knowledge base so that the next 
model file writing stage contains the most relevant information. 
 
Fig. 7.5 – Matlab Script 
At the end of the result file is another file end tag, it is this tag that the GA was looking for 
before moving onto the next stage of reading the file. These tags were put in place to avoid 
the GA from prematurely reading the result file and attempting to parse incomplete lines 
of text which in turn would create problems for the GA itself. Once this tag was discovered 
by the GA, it knew that the load flow stage of the loop was complete and it began reading 
the results file and disseminating the information. 
Step 6 – Reading the results  
The final stage of the main loop was the reading of the of the results file, in this instance 
the GA processed the file line by line, where each line contains three pieces of information 
C: 
cd/ 
cd Program Files 
cd Matlab 
cd r2012a 
cd bin 
matlab.exe -nodisplay -nosplash -nodesktop -minimise -r 
run('H:\MATLAB\runLoadFlow.m');exit; 
exit 
output_file = 
'C:\Users\A7178941\EclipseProjects\SelfOrganised\results.csv'; 
mpc =loadcase('ModelFileTMP.m'); 
myopt = mpoption('verbose', 0, 'out.all', 0);  
define_constants; 
results = runpf(mpc,myopt); 
 
buses = [results.bus(:,1), results.bus(:,8), results.bus(:,9)]; 
 
dlmwrite(output_file,buses,'delimiter',',','newline','pc'); 
results_file  = fopen(output_file, 'a'); 
fprintf(results_file, '%s', 'File End'); 
fclose all; 
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Bus ID, voltage magnitude and voltage angle. This information was transferred into the 
knowledge base maintained by the GA using the bus ID as the index value, once the end of 
the file had been reached the GA would then go through the knowledge base and retrieve 
the data for all busses with associated generator or load components connected. Each of 
these components was then sent an ACL message containing the results of the load flow 
for the purposes of performing voltage monitoring 
 IMPLIMENTING CONTROL 
To perform this control function the customer agent observing the voltage deviation needs 
to contact the controller and indicate that a control decision is required. The controller 
however only has a limited number of agents it can request a control response from, based 
on those agents which connected to it during the initialisation stage. Therefore the 
controller assesses the connected population and determines which of those agents are 
electrically nearest to the customer reporting the deviation. This process involves 
communicating with the Architect agent to retrieve a list of agents on the same feeder as 
the control request; this list is compared with the controller’s list of connections. Those 
agents who fall in both lists are both applicable to the deviation and accessible by the 
controller, initially four agents from this list of matches are contacted, and asked whether 
or not they will accept a control command. If the agent will not accept the command it is 
registered as uncontrollable and will not be contacted in the event of future control events. 
Otherwise the controller will ask the agent to apply a control restriction, if the controller 
continues to receive reports of the ongoing voltage deviation further customers will be 
contacted in this manner. During the period of time in which the control restrictions are to 
be applied – any customer who has been issued with a restriction will repeatedly ask the 
controller if those restrictions are still necessary – as per the following diagram Fig. 7.6. 
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Fig. 7.6 – Communication Structure during Control 
The restrictions imposed by the control process are relieved if one of two eventualities takes 
place, firstly if the voltage at the end of the feeder exceeds 0.96p.u. In this case the 
controller will respond to the ‘Is control required’ message informing the customer that 
controls can be lifted. The second eventuality is that there is a significant delay between 
the control query poised by the customer and the reply from the controller – the distance 
between the query and the response will be influenced by the communication load taking 
place at the controller. If the response takes more than 10 seconds – the customer will 
automatically lift the restrictions as it has not been instructed to do otherwise. The rationale 
behind customers under control continually sending query messages is to build a degree of 
dependency between the customer and the controller and insert system whereby the 
customers could return to a level of conventional consumption in the event of a controller 
failure.   
 PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 
Two core points of evaluation were considered in terms of evaluating the performance of 
the self-organising architecture which was faced with two concurrent network issues. The 
first of which was the ongoing voltage deviation and the second was the attack event 
targeting the control tier of the architecture. The first point of comparison was focussed on 
ControllerCustomer A Customer B
Voltage Alert
Is Agent Controllable?
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Is Agent Controllable?
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the voltage control performance, and the ability to maintain controllability during an attack 
event, the objective of all the attack formats was to disrupt the link between the controller 
and the customer and therefore reducing controllability. For example the following figure 
presented in Fig. 7.7, illustrates difference between a scenario with 100% controllability 
and zero controllability. The attacks presented within the research are aimed at creating a 
situation where the net controllability of the network is as close to the red line as possible.  
 
Fig. 7.7 - Controlled and Uncontrolled Voltage Profiles 
Therefore during each of the simulation runs, the voltage profile from each of the agents 
was recorded, with the agent at the end of the feeder being representative of the lowest 
voltages. In contrast the self-organising architecture aimed to minimise any control loss 
and therefore voltage profiles taken from tests utilising the self-organising were intended 
to be as close to the upper threshold illustrated by the green line as possible.   
The second performance criterion was concerned with the communication layer 
represented by the computational burden figures, these burden profiles represented the 
impact of the attack on the number of performance variables monitored by the architecture. 
In addition to the overall burden the individual components of the computation burden were 
also recorded, these components were as follows and as previously defined in chapter 7: 
 Congestion 
 Reactivity 
 Data Flow (Incoming and Outgoing) 
 Unresponsiveness 
 Execution times 
 Under-utilisation 
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Individual burden figures were calculated through totalling the error severities for a given 
error report type and then dividing that figure by the number of agents which could be 
responsible for creating the error. The reason why the additional performance figures are 
calculated was to illustrate the wider performance gains delivered by the self-organising 
architecture. In cases where the voltage profiles indicated a small improvement in terms of 
the control performance, when the additional communication data was examined wider 
implications of the architecture could be investigated. The ability to reduce the burden from 
the perspective of reactivity or congestion would indicate that the self-organising 
architecture can demonstrate properties which would be relevant when dealing with control 
problems with shorter time resolutions – frequency response or protection systems for 
example. Likewise being able to reduce the amount of incoming data present at key 
bottleneck areas in the architecture would be beneficial in systems which are energy 
sensitive. For example if the aggregate agent was not connected to a permanent power 
supply, reducing the communicative load makes the agent more energy efficient and 
therefore extends its lifespan on the power available.  
To demonstrate the monitoring capabilities within respect to computational burden, the 
following figure presented in Fig. 7.8 illustrates an example performance test in the absence 
of an attack event.   
 
Fig. 7.8 – Computational Burden Composition Example 
Four profiles are presented in the figure to demonstrate the range of profiling performed 
during a simulation; the first three consider individual properties of the architecture as the 
simulation progressed. The fourth profile represents an overall burden figure, and the value 
which was used as the input into the fuzzy decision making engine. A series of profiles was 
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recorded from each of the attack format tests with respect to both the static and self-
organising architectures such that they could be compared.  
 SUMMARY 
This chapter documented the configuration and processes required in running and operating 
the simulation. Initially the chapter discussed the design and properties of the electrical 
network considering the location of the associated agents for the components involved. 
This was followed by documenting the nature of the agent architecture and the differences 
between the static and self-organising architectures from the perspective of performing the 
evaluation process. Secondly the chapter considered the requirements for setting up a 
simulation event, taking into account the different source files and supporting files needed 
to perform the simulation. Additional taking into account the processes involved in linking 
the agent architecture based on the JADE agent platform with an external load flow engine 
for the purposes of performing voltage calculations.  
The chapter also documented the attack approaches which are to be applied to the 
architectures to test the effectiveness of the decision making engine and the transitions 
triggered in response to the attack event. Finally the chapter considers the points of analysis 
with respect to the architecture performance in terms of both the voltage control process 
and the communication layer performance.   
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Chapter 8: Results 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The static and self-organising architecture were tested against a series of denial of service 
attacks launched by the customer layer against the set of controllers. The majority of the 
attacks, once triggered lasted for the length of the simulation and were declared to be 
continuous. This format was selected for most of the attacks because they represented the 
most severe instance of each of the attack scales involving increasing numbers of 
customers. Further attacks consider intermittent attacks in the form of burst and sequential 
denial of service events. During the course of a simulation each customer was supplied with 
a demand profile which created an under-voltage event, this event would persist without 
control intervention. Therefore in addition to the presence of a cyber-attack the self-
organising architecture would also have the challenge of performing voltage control 
through the use of demand side response. As previously discussed the control process was 
performed through the transmission of control request and action signals between the 
controller and the customer agent. The role of the attack event was to prevent these signals 
from being interpreted and therefore responded to. If a customer fails to receive a response 
from the controller informing it that the demand side restrictions are still required, the 
customer will cease performing control. 
This chapter presents the results from a range of attacks performed against a static and self-
organising architecture. In addition to documenting the attack events, a set of results are 
also presented which document the performance of the architectures in the absence of 
control and in the absence of an attack event. This chapter is not an exhaustive 
documentation of all test formats considered and focusses on the continuous attacks which 
are presented in greater depth. All results examinations are discussed at the end of the 
chapter and therefore used to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the self-organising 
architecture under examination. 
 BASELINE PERFORMANCE 
As a starting point the simulations were completed without the influence of an attack 
situation and without the control procedure disabled. The purpose of these simulations was 
to demonstrate that the architectures could perform the core control objective and to 
illustrate a level of baseline performance against which later simulations could be compared 
against. 
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8.2.1 Without Control   
The first of the base line tests considered the architecture operating without any 
controllability, therefore illustrating the consequences of total control deterioration. This 
state was the ultimate objective of the attack event, as the stream of messages delivered by 
attackers within the customer layer intended to sever the connection between controller and 
customer. In each instance the voltage profile was extracted from the final customer on 
each feeder as it was this location whereby the impacts of an attack would be most 
significant. The following graph presented in Fig. 8. illustrates the voltage profiles of all 
four feeders when the controllers are deactivated and only function as data collection agents.  
 
Fig. 8.1 – Voltage Profiles without Control 
With control disabled the voltage on each of the feeders falls below the lower threshold and 
fails to recover, indicating the severity of the voltage deviation triggered by the demand 
profiles embedded in the customer layer. The individual profiles exhibited slight 
differences on account of the location of the customer from which the data was extracted 
within the overall network. As second figure presented in Fig. 8.2 illustrates the message 
congestion taking place during the course of the simulation.  
The figure illustrates that the congestion was similar across all four of the aggregate agents 
which functioned as controllers. The data referred to the sampled queue size measurements 
rather than the average data and therefore indicated that congestion in an architecture with 
no additional functionality other than data collection peaked at 120 messages with most 
events containing fewer than 80 messages. 
190 Results 
 
 
Fig. 8.2 – Aggregation Congestion without Control 
Furthermore as the figure represents the congestion as a series of individual events it 
illustrates that those congestion events were not persistent and the aggregates were able to 
clear their backlog of messages quickly. 
8.2.2 With Control 
A second baseline comparison was to re-introduce the control functionality but still remove 
the cyber threat element of the investigation; the purpose of this examination was to 
illustrate the control performance of the architecture in the absence of an external threat. 
Delivering an outcome similar to the absence of any attack event was the goal of the self-
organising architecture which intended to mitigate the threat of an attack and maintain 
controllability. In this case both the static and self-organising architectures were simulated 
as an assessment of the functionality without an attack. The following figure presented in 
Fig. 8.3 illustrates the voltage profiles under the differing architectures. 
 
Fig. 8.3 – Voltage Profiles - No Attack 
191 Results 
 
The figure illustrates that in across each of the feeders, and for both of the architectures, 
the control function was triggered correctly and the deviation was immediately corrected, 
raising the voltage above the threshold value. The self-organising architecture experienced 
no instances of control loss throughout the simulation whereas one feeder in the case of the 
static architecture did experience a degree of control deterioration. To examine the causes 
of this control deterioration, a second figure presented in Fig. 8.4, illustrates the 
computational burden indicator data recorded over the course of the simulation. The figure 
presents the components which contributed towards the overall assessment of 
computational burden in addition to the overall calculated indicator. 
 
Fig. 8.4 – Computational Burden Composition and Comparison 
The figure indicates that the static architecture several errors pertaining to system reactivity, 
however because these errors did not translate into a significantly raised burden indicator, 
the reactivity issue was not widespread throughout the architecture. This reactivity issue 
increased later in the simulation and corresponded with the control loss experienced by 
customers on feeder 2. As the self-organising architecture was able to avoid the occurrence 
of these incidents it indicated that the initialisation stage of the process delivers a stronger 
communication foundation to operate the architecture from as the overall burden indicator 
was considerably lower before any transition event would have taken place. Throughout 
the simulation the self-organising architecture did not experience the increases in reactivity 
and consequently did not observe any instances of control deterioration. The following 
figure presented in Fig. 8.5 examines the response times between the controller and the 
customer layer for the final customer on each feeder.  
192 Results 
 
The figure confirms that the reactivity issues initially diagnosed within the static 
architecture were affiliated with the two feeders which experienced control deterioration, 
and therefore the communication issues were the source of the control loss. As two 
controllers exhibited similar communication traits is could be assumed that these 
controllers were experiencing difficulties in processing the volume of incoming data and 
therefore resulted in slow response times. 
 
Fig. 8.5 – Response Times between Feeder-End Customer and Controller 
The figure also illustrates that the response times across the aggregates in the self-
organising architectures were far more uniform and all aggregates observed similar 
response times. In a practical implementation controllers in differing parts of the network 
would be exposed to variations in performance as a result of variations in component 
vendors, component age or external factors such as interference or weather conditions. To 
diagnose the source of the variation in controller agent performance, the following figure 
in Fig. 8.6 illustrate the incoming data flow received by each of the aggregate controllers 
in the case of the static and self-organising architectures.  
The figure illustrates that the two feeders which observed the increase in controller response 
time and therefore experienced control deterioration were under the control of an aggregate 
which was experiencing a higher volume of incoming data. This contributed to the 
challenges faced by those aggregates and therefore triggered the control loss. However the 
figure also indicates that the self-organising architecture could lead to a more uneven 
distribution of communication load, as aggregate 1 observed data flow rates peaking at 
0.9kB/s greater than the other aggregates. 
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Fig. 8.6 – Incoming Data Flow at the Aggregate Layer 
Furthermore the data illustrated that the self-organising architecture was able to operate 
with aggregates under increased load without compromising the control objective, or 
raising the burden indicator. A final figure presented in Fig. 8.7 illustrates the message 
congestion data extracted from the aggregation tier. 
 
Fig. 8.7 – Congestion at the Aggregate Layer 
The second figure confirms that the two of the aggregates under the static architecture 
collected a larger amount of messages in the message queue – and processing this queue 
caused the control deterioration. However an aggregate which was exposed to a larger 
volume of incoming data did not experience the congestion issues and therefore did not 
experience any control losses when the self-organising architecture was in use. This 
indicated that the provision of a self-organising architecture provided a more stable 
architecture and one which was less susceptible to variances in data production from the 
customer layer. Because any customers which are transmitting updates more frequently 
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than others are distributed across different aggregates during initialisation, their impact on 
the congestion and reactivity properties of the aggregation layer are reduced.  
 PERFORMANCE UNDER ATTACK 
The second section of results discusses the performance of the self-organising architecture 
in the presence of the denial of service attack, in comparison with the same attack being 
perpetrated against the static architecture. Both static and adaptive versions of the denial of 
service attack were delivered using increasing numbers of attackers within the customer 
population.  
8.3.1 Continuous attack with 6% customer involvement  
The first example considers an attack whereby 20 customers are involved with performing 
denial of service attack at the control layer of the architecture, this accounts for 6% of the 
overall customer population. The attack is distributed symmetrically such that each 
aggregate was under attack from 5 customer agents. The voltage profiles for the static 
version of the attack event are presented in the following figure in Fig. 8.8 
 
Fig. 8.8 – Voltage Profiles under Static Attack 
The figure illustrates that as observed in the absence of an attack event, the static 
architecture is vulnerable to control deterioration even in the presence of an attack format 
involving a small number of customers. Two of the three feeders experienced control losses 
across a series of customers when operating under the static architecture. However as 
illustrated in the absence of an attack the self-organising architecture exhibited no such 
deterioration. The following figure presented in Fig. 8.9 illustrates the voltage comparisons 
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when responding to an adaptive variant of the denial of service attack involving the same 
attack population. 
Fig. 8.9 uses the same voltage profiles representing the static architecture as the previous 
figure because in a static architecture the adaptive attack behaves identically to the static 
attack, and only displays adaptive properties in the presence of self-organisation. 
 
Fig. 8.9 – Voltage Profiles under an Adaptive Attack 
The results of the adaptive attack are very similar to those under static attack, and therefore 
indicating that with 6% of customer involvement the number of attackers isn’t significant 
for the adaptive attack mechanism to cause a greater challenge for the self-organising 
architecture. 
In addition to the voltage profiles the attack has an impact on the communication layer of 
the network; the following figure in Fig. 8.10 presents the decomposition of the components 
of the computational burden. 
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Fig. 8.10 – Computational Burden Distribution and Comparison – Static Attack 
The figure illustrates that the computational burden indicator is primarily driven by the 
reactivity and congestion properties in terms of the static architecture. As the attack 
continues the severity of the congestion issues increases, and at 16 minutes they rise rapidly, 
this event again corresponds to the deterioration in control observed by two feeders. In 
terms of the self-organising architecture the primary influence on the computational burden 
indicator was data flow, indicating that the volume of data created by the attack population 
exceeded the recommended limits at the aggregation layer. This burden component 
remained at a similar magnitude throughout the simulation and therefore in the absence of 
other significant components the overall burden indicator for the self-organising 
architecture remained stable. Demonstrating that while the denial of service attack 
manifests through the production and delivery of attack traffic, which is represented by an 
increase in data-flow errors, it is the congestion and reactivity issues created by that data 
which is responsible for control deterioration. Because the self-organising architecture 
creates a more stable platform during initialisation, and rebalances connections when 
necessary, it is able to withstand the influx of attack traffic without forming congestion and 
reactivity problems. In both variants of the attack format the architect agent elected to 
activate a single dormant agent, because all of the aggregates were under-attack therefore 
the recommended substitution action would not be effective. The following figure in Fig. 
8.11 illustrates the impact the process of activating a dormant agent had on data flow at the 
aggregation layer. 
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Fig. 8.11 – Data Flow at the Aggregate Layer - Adaptive Attack 
The figure demonstrates that at the point where the dormant agent was activated the traffic 
received by aggregate four dropped by 2.2kB/s, and the dormant aggregate was exposed to 
the same degree of traffic aggregate 4 was prior to the instruction to activate. This was due 
to the nature of the adaptive attack, when a customer performing the attack was reconnected 
to a differing aggregate – it redirected the attack traffic to the new agent. Therefore in the 
case of the above figure the attackers were moved to the new aggregate, this process 
prevented the build-up of congestion observed by the static architecture and therefore 
prevented control deterioration. Another point of interest is the data flow associated with 
aggregate 2, which did not experience the same increase in data flow during the attack 
period. This was due to a rebalancing action which relocated several customers – and 
therefore the attack traffic was directed to other aggregate agents. 
8.3.2 Continuous attack with 12% Customer Involvement 
An escalation to the previous example increases the number of customers delivering the 
attack to 10 customers per aggregate and involving 12% of the customer population. The 
voltage profiles recorded during a static variant of the denial of service attack is presented 
in the following figure in Fig. 8.12. 
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Fig. 8.12 – Voltage Comparison - Static Attack 
In this example the figure illustrates that no control deterioration was experienced by the 
customers during the attack event, neither the static nor the self-organising architecture 
observed a reduction in control performance. This was also true of the adaptive attack as 
illustrated in Fig. 8.13. In both instances the controllability of the customer layer was not 
influenced by the attack, and therefore the congestion and reactivity issues which were 
present in test with 6% customer involvement could be related more to a configuration 
setting rather than the attack itself. 
 
Fig. 8.13 – Voltage Profile Comparison - Adaptive Attack 
This also accounts for the control deterioration experienced by the static architecture in the 
absence of an attack; in those cases the initialisation stage prevented an unstable starting 
configuration as the customer agents were able to select their own connections. Without 
the initialisation stage, customers are automatically assigned to the nearest aggregate which 
increases the chances of clustering of agents with higher outgoing data-flow rates. The self-
organisation increases the agent diversity and breaks down the clustering effect. 
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8.3.3 Continuous attack with 18% Customer Involvement 
A further escalation increased the number of customers involved in the attack to 60, with 
15 customers per aggregate performing the denial of service attack. The following figure 
in Fig. 8.14 presents the voltage profiles recorded during the static variant of the attack. 
 
Fig. 8.14 – Voltage Profile Comparison - Static Attack 
In contrast to the previous examples, the presence of the denial of service attack had a 
disruptive impact on the controllability under the static architecture. Two of the feeders 
experienced significant control deterioration, while the remaining two experienced the 
same deterioration later in the simulation. In contrast to the examples with fewer attackers 
the widespread nature of the control loss was more indicative of being triggered by the 
attack. The fluctuations in the voltage profiles under the static architecture – specifically in 
the case of feeder 2 – indicated that the customer population was attempting achieve control 
during the attack but the denial of service prevented a stable control connection between 
customer and controller. As a result consistent control over the course of the simulation 
could not be achieved. Additionally the self-organising architecture once again was not 
affected by the attack and displayed no signs of control deterioration. This example 
illustrated the value of the self-organising architecture from the perspective of achieving 
the control objective, this value was also present when processing a more sophisticated 
variant of the attack as illustrated in Fig. 8.15. 
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Fig. 8.15 – Voltage Profile Comparison – Adaptive Attack 
The figure presents an adaptive denial of service attack featuring 18% customer 
involvement across the architecture, and illustrates that even under the presence of a more 
sophisticated attack the self-organising architecture reduces the control deterioration. As a 
feeder end customers under the self-organising architecture experienced a 1.22% increase 
in average voltage, and a reduction in the deviation duration by 408.3 seconds.  
The following figure in Fig. 8.16, illustrates the computational burden indicator and its 
components measured across the duration of the simulation. The data was extracted from 
the simulation using the static denial of service attack. The figure illustrates that the self-
organising architecture was able to reduce each of the computational burden components 
and therefore by extension the overall indicator – which in turn resulted in the ability to 
prevent control deterioration. The congestion and reactivity components were the strongest 
contributors to the computational burden in the static architecture, and the self-organising 
approach achieved a 97% reduction in reactivity and 99.6% in congestion. These significant 
reductions were created through preventing the message queue from building by increasing 
aggregation and further distributing customer connections. 
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Fig. 8.16 – Computational Burden Composition and Comparison - Static Attack 
In terms of managing the data flow, that distribution of connections reduced the data flow 
burden component by 59.5% - overall this created a total computational burden indicator 
reduction of 98.4% over the length of the simulation. The figure also presents the timing of 
the transition events which were triggered by the architect which were as follows: 
1) Rebalancing Action (Stage 1 Transition): Initially the architect performed a 
rebalancing action, whereby 10 customer agents were relocated from their current 
aggregate to a less heavily loaded alternative. This action was the traditional first 
step and was applied as a pre-emptive decision at the first sign of burden rise. 
2) Activating a Single Dormant (Stage 2 Transition): The second action was to 
perform a stage two transition, the decision making engine recommended 
performing a substitution. However the architect determined that the error reports 
could not be traced to a single aggregate agent, therefore a substitution would not 
be effective. Alternatively the architect elected to activate a single dormant agent 
rather than to follow the recommendation. 
3) Activating Dormant Population (Stage 3 Transition): The third decision reached 
by the architect was to activate all of the remaining dormant agents and add them 
to the active population. In this instance the recommendation from the fuzzy engine 
is carried as dormant agents were available. 
4) Promoting Agents (Stage 3 Transition): A fourth transition recommended 
activating the dormant population – but as those agents were activated in the 
previous step the recommendation is over-ruled. As no dormant agents are available, 
the architect promoted customer agents to perform aggregation duties. 
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5) Tiered Promotion (Stage 4 Transition): The final transition performed by the 
architect was the most severe transition available, involving creating a multi-tiered 
aggregation layer. An upper tier is formed through promoting existing aggregates 
up into the new upper tier, while those promoted aggregates are replaced with 
members of the customer population who are also promoted into the lower 
aggregate tier.  
The following figure presented in Fig. 8.17, examines the performance monitoring data 
extracted from the aggregation layer with respect to message congestion. 
 
Fig. 8.17 – Aggregate Congestion - Static Attack 
The figure illustrates that the congestion data recovered from aggregates operating in a 
static architecture demonstrates that the message queues are considerably more heavily 
loaded that those within the static architecture. In the static architecture aggregates 2 and 3 
which were responsible for the two feeders with the highest degree of control deterioration 
experience a sharp rise in congestion earlier in the simulation. This congestion rise 10 
minutes into the simulation corresponds with the control loss, additionally when the second 
two aggregates experience a similar congestion rise after 14 minutes, the control on those 
feeders also started to falter. This confirmed that the ability to manage the volume of data 
created by the denial of service attack has a definite impact on the ability to provide voltage 
control. In contrast the self-organising architecture does not contain aggregates with severe 
congestion issues and therefore communication between customer and controller was not 
compromised, and the control objective was achieved.  
A similar congestion profile was produced in response to the adaptive denial of service 
attack as presented in the following figure: Fig. 8.18. The figure illustrates that the more 
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sophisticated attack proved to be more challenging from a self-organising perspective. 
Aggregate 3 experiences two periods of raised congestion during the simulation, these 
periods were due to the nature of the adaptive attack. 
 
Fig. 8.18 – Aggregate Level Congestion - Adaptive Attack 
As an attacker was moved from one location to another, so was the volume of attack traffic 
it was producing. Therefore an aggregate can find itself under attack from a larger number 
of attackers during the course of the simulation. This rise in the number of attackers created 
the rise in congestion, and therefore required a further transition to alleviate. However it 
illustrated that the decision making engine within the architect agent had the capability to 
recognise that a transition had created an issue and corrected the problem.  
8.3.4 Continuous attack with 24% Customer Involvement 
As a final escalation the number of attackers was raised to 80, which amounted to 24% of 
the total customer population, the voltage profiles for the static variant of the attack is 
presented in Fig. 8.19. 
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Fig. 8.19 – Voltage Profile Comparison - Static Attack 
However in both case of both the adaptive and the static attacks, the self-organising 
architecture was able to prevent control loss. The figure does illustrate that the voltage 
profiles representing feeders on the self-organising architecture were lower by up to 0.5%. 
This indicated that denial of service attack did have an influence on the control performance 
of the self-organising architecture but this was minimal in comparison to the damage done 
to the static architecture. 
The following figure presented in Fig. 8.20 presents the computational burden data from 
the static attack. 
 
Fig. 8.20 – Computational Burden Composition and Comparison 
The figure illustrates the burden information and illustrates a secondary impact of the more 
severe attack event. In addition to preventing the transmission of control signals and 
therefore causing control deterioration, performance monitoring messages are also 
compromised by the denial of service event. Agents within the architecture are no longer 
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able to transmit data to the architect agent, which created the gaps in the data present for 
the reactivity burden component starting at 14 minutes, all performance monitoring data is 
lost at 16 minutes for the static architecture. In contrast the self-organising architecture was 
able to reduce all of the burden elements – congestion was reduced by 95%, reactivity by 
81% and the overall burden index observed a 94.4% reduction. This management of the 
communication variables ensured that the control objectives were still achieved, and that 
performance monitoring data could be accessed throughout the course of the simulation. 
Consequently using self-organisation also prevents a denial of service attack from blinding 
the performance monitoring aspects of the system. 
While the performance monitoring data was not received by the architect agent, the core 
metrics were retained by the individual agents within the agent population, the following 
figure presented in Fig. 8.21 illustrates the response times between customer and controller 
during the static denial of service attack event. 
 
Fig. 8.21 – Response Times between Customer and Controller 
The figure details that under the static architecture the feeders experience a sharp rise in 
response times which equated to the reactivity of the connection prior to observing control 
deterioration. This further confirmed that the communication performance of the 
architecture has a link to the system’s ability to perform the control objective. In contrast 
the self-organising architecture does not experience the same rise in response times and 
therefore the connectivity between customer and controller is stronger throughout the attack. 
As a result the architecture is able to process and successfully respond to control requests 
and control queries which prevented the control deterioration observed by the static 
architecture. 
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8.3.5 Sequential Attack with 24% Customer Involvement 
In addition to the continuous attack formats a further variant of the denial of service attack 
was the sequential attack. This format consisted of a series of burst attacks during the 
simulation, each one launched by a total of 80 customer agents and targeting each member 
of the active aggregate population. Both static and adaptive versions of the attack were 
performed using the sequential format; the following figure presented in Fig. 8.22 
illustrates the voltage profiles extracted from the static variant of the attack. 
 
Fig. 8.22 – Voltage Comparison Profile - Static Attack 
The results that a sequential attack had a less disruptive impact on the control performance 
than the continuous attack of the same magnitude, this was due to the intermittent nature 
of the attack. Between the individual bursts of attack traffic, the aggregation layer was able 
to recover by processing the message queue before the next wave of the attack arrived. In 
the static architecture, the final of the three attack events did trigger control deterioration 
towards the end of the simulation. In contrast the self-organising architecture did not 
observe any control deterioration during the course of the simulation but the control 
response delivered by the architecture was initially weaker. Voltage magnitudes after the 
control were 1.2% lower than those achieved without an attack present. The following 
figure in Fig. 8.23 presents data from the adaptive version of the sequential attack. 
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Fig. 8.23 – Voltage Profile Comparison - Adaptive Attack 
The figure demonstrates that under more sophisticated attack format, the self-organising 
architecture observed a small degree of control loss towards the end of the simulation under 
the final wave of attack traffic. Additionally the initial control response was stronger under 
the adaptive attack than it was under the static attack. The following figure in Fig. 8.24 
illustrates the computational burden data for the adaptive attack. 
 
Fig. 8.24 – Computational Burden Composition and Comparison 
The figure clearly illustrates the three burst events of the sequential attack, and the third of 
the three bursts had a stronger impact on the burden indicator from the perspective of the 
static architecture. As demonstrated in previous examples the congestion component of the 
burden was the dominant feature and the control deterioration took place when the 
congestion rose significantly. The self-organising architecture was able to reduce the 
message congestion within the agent population by 61%, which was a smaller reduction in 
comparison with the continuous attack events. The overall computational burden was 
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reduced by 64% and lowered each of the burden peaks during the individual bursts.  
Another observation is that the self-organising architecture stabilised the burden 
components across all three stages of the sequential attacks. In contrast the final burst event 
of the sequential attack did present with a more severe impact on the communication layer 
– the peak overall burden indicator was 3.2 times larger than the previous peak.  
8.3.6 Extended Runtime 
A final example considers the operations of the self-organising architecture over a longer 
time frame to demonstrate that even in the presence of a longer term denial of service event 
the self-organising architecture was capable of monitoring the deviation through to 
resolution. The following figure presented in Fig. 8.25 presents the voltage profiles 
recorded over 50 minutes of runtime with 18% customer involvement. 
 
Fig. 8.25 – Voltage Profile Comparison 
The figure compares the voltage profiles from the lengthened simulation for the self-
organising architecture against the profiles from the 20 minutes simulation regarding the 
static architecture. The results show that the self-organising architecture did not experience 
control deterioration throughout entirety of the deviation and restrictions applied to the 
customer layer were released between 28 and 33 minutes into the simulation. The presence 
of the attack event did delay the signals to release those restrictions in the case of the second 
feeder but the control objective was not affected. This demonstrated that the self-organising 
architecture was capable operating under the presence of an attack event for a longer period 
of time. An attack population of 24% was not completed for the extended runtime because 
the volume of messages accumulated by the aggregation layer created instability in the 
simulation environment. This was more significant when operating the static architecture 
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where the ability to manage the attack was reduced.  The following figure in Fig. 8.26 
illustrates the data flow at the aggregation layer during the length of the simulation 
 
Fig. 8.26 – Data Flow at the Aggregate Layer 
The figure illustrates that the attack event was continually delivering attack traffic to the 
aggregation layer throughout the extended lifetime of the simulation, which explained the 
delays in sending signals informing customers that load shedding was no longer in place. 
The potential for the attack to influence control performance elapsed after 32 minutes when 
no further deviation events were present. However goal of the architect agent is deliver an 
architecture which manages the computational burden indicator as derived from 
communication performance monitoring. Therefore in the absence of a control objective 
the architect is still responsible for managing other properties such as congestion and 
reactivity. The following figure presented in Fig. 8.27 presents the computational burden 
components during the lifetime of the simulation. 
 
Fig. 8.27 – Computational Burden Composition and Comparison 
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This figure illustrates that the computational burden recorded by the static architecture does 
increase during the later stages of the simulation, more so when the control functions have 
elapsed. However the peaks observed by the self-organising architecture were considerably 
lower than the congestion and reactivity data from the static architecture observed in the 
shorter runtime. As a result the overall burden indicator peaked with a value 4.9 times 
smaller under the self-organising architecture than the static equivalent. On the basis of 
previous examples, the ability to minimise the burden indicator, with specific reference of 
congestion and reactivity is important in reducing the likelihood of control performance 
deterioration.  
 CONCLUSIONS 
An overall assessment of the results indicated that the self-organising architecture does 
deliver several improvements over using a static architecture. These improvements are 
initially delivered through the initialisation stage of the self-organising architecture. 
Because this process involved customer agents ranking the connectivity to each of the 
potential aggregates before making a connection, the resulting greater distribution of 
connections. Customers on the same feeder may be connected to several different 
aggregates, therefore any clustering of agents transmitting larger quantities of data are 
broken up increasing diversity. This was represented the results with no attack present and 
a denial of service event with 6% customer involvement, where control loss was observed 
using the static architecture in addition to corresponding congestion and reactivity issues. 
Similar issues were not present in the case of the self-organising architecture and therefore 
control was not affected, the fact that no significant reconfiguration actions were triggered 
in those instances implied that the initialisation stage was the key factor. 
Attacks consisting 12% of the customer population or lower were not significantly 
disruptive to the control procedure, but as previously indicated the initialisation stage acted 
as a first line of defence and formed a communication structure within which the control 
process was more resilient to attack. In addition to distributing customers’ data connections 
between aggregates the control connections were also distributed. Therefore disabling one 
or two controllers would not have a detrimental impact on the ability to perform voltage 
control, because deviations on one feeder could be responded to by multiple controllers.  
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In addition to the influence of the initialisation phase the self-organising architecture also 
prevented control deterioration in the event of a more severe denial of service attack. Once 
18% of the customer population were transmitting attack traffic the control performance in 
terms of the static architecture suffered. The average voltage at the end of the feeder by 
1.6% to 0.932 per unit in comparison to a configuration without an attack event, whereas 
the self-organising architecture was able sustain an average voltage of 0.945 per unit. When 
the attack population was raise to 24%, the denial of service event disabled control across 
50% of the network and the remaining feeders lost controllability within six minutes of the 
initial control decision. This was not experienced by the self-organising architecture as the 
use of appropriate architecture transitions reduced the computational burden indicator value 
and therefore ensured that all communications relating to performing control were 
completed.  
This demonstrated that there was a connection between the performance of the 
communication architecture specifically in terms of congestion and reactivity, and the 
ability of the architecture to perform the control action. In each of the cases where control 
deterioration was observed, the computational burden data indicated a corresponding rise 
in reactivity and congestion. The influence of these particular burden components was that 
they prevented key messages from being processed at the aggregation tier, and therefore 
customers did not receive the instruction to reduce demand in the case of the most severe 
of the trialled attack formats. As the denial of service attack was directed at the 
communication aspect of the agent architecture, the nature of the control algorithm would 
have limited influence over the ability to avoid control deterioration. This is because at the 
point where the algorithm computes the set points for the controllable components – a 
message is required to apply those settings. A highly congested network would struggle to 
deliver the command and as illustrated in the example with 24% customer involvement – 
control was effectively disabled.  In instances where the control had deteriorated 
significantly the congestion at the control layer had surpassed 10,000 messages waiting to 
be processed, the majority of these messages were generated by the attackers.  
As the self-organising architecture demonstrated an ability to reduce the computational 
burden by over 90% in most cases as a result of preventing large quantities of messages 
from building at the aggregation layer it indicated that the system would have performance 
advantages beyond voltage control. It is envisaged that as the smart grid concept gains more 
momentum and an increasing number of smart-devices are added to the network, the 
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demand on the communication network is also set to increase. Therefore leading to a 
situation where core communication requirements for monitoring and control could result 
in a more congested architecture. This would be further exacerbated through the need to 
perform multiple control objectives at the same time. The ability to manage and reduce 
congestion through self-organisation would be applicable even in the absence of an attack. 
Furthermore the properties of the self-organising architecture indicate that it would be 
suitable in the management of wider control objectives, for example problems involving 
protection devices or frequency response require resolution in a shorter timeframe than 
voltage deviations. Therefore being able to ensure that the communication network is 
capable of responding in a timely fashion becomes more important. 
Overall it can be concluded that the developed self-organising architecture and decision 
making engine is both functional and successful. It was able to improve the ability to 
perform the control objective in the presence of denial of service attacks involving up to 
24% of the customer population.  Additionally it was able to reduce the communicative 
load on the controller layer which prevented control deterioration and illustrated further 
potential applications for the self-organising architecture.  
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Chapter 9: Discussion  
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 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis describes the work undertaken to investigate the relevance of self-organising 
architectures and the subsequent development of a proof concept implementation of such a 
system. In this chapter the potential applicability of such a system is presented, within the 
current power system landscape and the system requirements involved in translating a proof 
of concept development into a real-world roll out scheme. Furthermore this chapter outlines 
additional features which could be included in further developments of the architecture and 
the decision making approaches at the heart of the architect agent. Finally this discussion 
chapter offers avenues of further research using the core self-organising architecture as 
developed over the course of the documented research.  
 DISCUSSION 
Upon review of the final result set and the overall design and development process of the 
self-organising architecture, several points for discussion were raised from the performance 
of the individual stages of operation to the finer points of detail involved with facilitating 
those stages. The following section aims to explore those points of discussion and consider 
their influence of the results which have been presented. 
9.2.1 Performance Overview 
The results suggest that there is value in the self-organising architecture with respect to 
reducing the computational burden. Lowering the burden had positive results on 
performing the voltage control process, as a result of the controllers being under less 
communicative load and can therefore respond to control signals and queries from the 
customer layer of the hierarchy. The first observation is that the attack format delivered 
through a series of noise messages transmitted from compromised smart-meters to the 
control layer experienced consistent control degradation under attacks launched by over 12% 
of the customer population. Therefore under denial of service attacks with fewer attackers, 
the voltage control remained largely unaffected even through the transitional decisions 
performed by the architect in response to the performance monitoring information did 
successfully reduce the computational burden indicator by 65.6% and controller congestion 
by 93.1%. Therefore indicating that in addition to improving control resilience, the self-
organising architecture has value in handling heavily loaded communication architectures. 
As the penetration of monitoring devices and controllable components increases within the 
smart-grid environment will be responsible for more challenging control situations 
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featuring multiple objectives. Reducing congestion and controller response times in such a 
scenario will become more important even in the absence of an attack event and therefore 
find value in the application of a self-organising architecture. Furthermore the self-
organising architecture improved control response times with a small scale attack involving 
6% of customers by 67.9% equating to an improvement of 3.1s on average. Therefore 
indicating that the self-organising architecture could also facilitate alternative control 
objectives such as frequency response or protection, where smaller scale attacks would 
otherwise prove disruptive. The reduction in computational burden delivered through the 
self-organising system may also be applicable to protection systems – which if the system 
is under attack from an adversary intending to cause blackouts or overload physical 
components, being able to deliver protection signals becomes even more important. This 
indicates that while the architect agent was focussed on reducing computational burden as 
this formed the input to the decision making engine, the results have a positive impact on 
influencing the electrical properties of the power system.  
9.2.2 Decision Making Engine 
The core component of the self-organising architecture was the decision making engine, 
which was responsible for translating performance monitoring data into architecture 
transitions. This decision making engine took advantage fuzzy techniques to handle the 
level of uncertainty involved in the calculation of the computational burden indicator, 
which proved to be an appropriate mechanism for evaluating the error state of the 
architecture. The challenge of implementing the fuzzy system involved converting the data 
from the different performance metrics, each of which featured differing units and 
measurement criteria. Therefore each error event was normalised in reference to its 
threshold value, converting it into a severity percentage. Each recorded error report needed 
to be combined with respect to the tier of the architecture the error arose from using the 
severity percentages. Because each of the severities related to a different threshold in 
respect to each of the metrics the burden indicator remained a dimensionless quantity. 
Configuration tests were performed to evaluate which levels of computational burden 
constituted a low, medium or high event and therefore used to calibrate the fuzzy input 
membership functions.  
The output of the fuzzy decision making engine took the form of a recommendation for a 
transition. However the architect agent in which the decision making engine was hosted 
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had the capability for over-riding the recommendation. This would be the case in the event 
that the recommendation was not feasible given the available resources, for example 
denying the activation of dormant aggregates if all available aggregates were active. This 
procedure acted as a functional layer of transition validation before any actions were 
triggered, in each of the simulations, the architect was able to avoid performing impossible 
transitions. The need for the ability to over-ride decisions indicates that a fuzzy decision 
machine engine requires additional support with respect to the location and distribution of 
errors, and the available resources. 
A combination of these properties were proven to be effective as the results demonstrated 
the decision making engine was able to use the burden indicator to deliver effective and 
appropriate architecture transitions. Across the range of attack magnitudes and considering 
both static and adaptive denial of service strategies the computational burden indicator was 
reduced by 89.6%. Furthermore the decision making system was also able to raise the 
average voltage by 1.5% when sustaining the most severe attack format triggered by 80 
customer agents. Therefore it can be concluded that the selected decision making system 
functioned correctly was capable of facilitating suitable architecture reconfigurations.   
9.2.3 Fuzzy Recommendations 
The decision making engine was centred on set of fuzzy membership functions which were 
responsible for recommending a transition event. The computational burden indicator and 
its rate of change were supplied as inputs. A fuzzy based system was used as the core 
element of the decision making engine due to its ability to handle sources of uncertainty. 
Several sources of uncertainty involved in the decision making engine, in terms of the 
thresholds for the individual metrics and the computational burden indicator calculation. 
Therefore it was deemed appropriate to implement a system which was capable of operating 
under these circumstances.  
Alternative approaches to decision making could have also been applied, and prior to the 
implementation of the fuzzy system, the decision making engine was powered by a decision 
tree. This approach was capable of converting performance data into transitions but lacked 
flexibility in terms of incorporating new metrics and relied on definitive decisions without 
taking into account the sources of uncertainty. In both cases the decision making engine 
was playing a reactive role in responding the current state of the architecture and applying 
a transition to reduce the computational load. An alternative approach would be to apply 
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an optimisation approach which assessed all of the potential transition options and select 
the most effective structure for the architecture. This approach was not selected for several 
reasons, the first of which being a lack of a modelling method to validate each of the 
potential configurations before applying one. In power system optimisation is it possible to 
use the physical properties of the network and a series of equations to determine precisely 
what impact a particular change will have on the system state, and therefore being able to 
exhaustively demonstrate which of the parameter sets is the most effective. When assessing 
communication data extracted from a live series of interactions, this validation loop is not 
applicable because of the sources of uncertainties involved. It is not always known what is 
causing the issues in the communication network and therefore making defining an optimal 
configuration less feasible. The level of uncertainty is increased when the architecture is 
under attack from a human adversary, an optimisation mechanism will not be able to devise 
a solution because it will have no information about what the attacker plans to do next. The 
issue faced by the self-organising architecture becomes less about optimality and more 
about maintaining service availability. An attack will not necessarily behave in a 
deterministic manner and therefore cannot be used as a mathematical input into an 
optimisation technique. Therefore for the application presented in this thesis, a fuzzy based 
decision making engine was an appropriate approach. 
It can be accepted that the current design approach could be enhanced through the 
application of a learning and tuning approach to the fuzzy decision making engine whereby 
the architect agent builds a library of events, error states and decisions made with a view 
of retraining the set of membership functions going forward. Under this scenario it may be 
relevant to define and engineer a metric to define effectiveness such that the architect is 
able to determine and remember whether the selected transition event had the desired 
impact on reducing burden and improving control performance. These enhancements 
would add further value to an already proven mechanism and improve the potential for their 
use in wider applications 
9.2.4 Control Selection 
Another design feature employed in the research was the control mechanism. The control 
approach takes advantage of emerging techniques involving the active participation of 
customers in network management. Therefore a demand side response mechanism was 
devised, involving reducing customer demand to resolve an under voltage deviation. The 
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selected control approach required customers to periodically ask the controllers if 
restrictions were needed. This control format was sufficiently able to correct the voltage 
deviation, and in the absence of any attack event, the deviation was resolved within 207 
seconds of first falling below 0.94 per unit. Consequently the voltage was not significantly 
low enough for several minutes and therefore the control mechanism can be considered to 
be effective and successful.  
Alternative voltage control mechanisms are available, and may deliver faster resolution 
times, but this investigation was not a discussion of the overall performance of voltage 
control algorithms. Furthermore the alternative control approaches will also require the 
transmission of data from point of measurement to the controller, and in response the 
controller will need to send control signals to a relevant controllable device. This may take 
the form of signals could be sent to a transformer requesting a tap change or to an energy 
storage device to discharge during peak demand. A denial of service attack directed at the 
controller delivering these signals would experience the same challenges involving 
message congestion and therefore message reactivity. Consequently the control algorithm 
would be under the same pressures as those documented in this research, and therefore the 
selected control method is valid. An additional consideration is that alternative control 
signals may require the interaction of a larger variety of devices and increase the 
complexity of the communication traffic. As the self-organising architecture has proven it 
was capable of improving communication flow through reducing congestion and response 
times, more value would be gained through implementing such a system in the presence of 
an alternative control algorithm. 
9.2.5 Agent Platform 
The self-organising architecture was built upon a set of agents using the JADE agent 
platform, this platform was used due to its ease of use and repeated usage within the 
research community. The agent platform provided tools for examining the inter-agent 
communications which functioned as a troubleshooting tool during the development 
process, and ensured that the architecture was functioning correctly. Some limitations were 
present with the use of java based platform in terms of ultimate scalability as a result of the 
agent platform taking up space within the java virtual machine. As architectures with less 
complex agents can accommodate a larger population, the additional overheads involved 
with providing self-organisation reduced the effective agent capacity of the platform.  
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Other agent based platforms are available such as presage2, and have been applied to the 
smart-grid domain. The use of an alternative platform may respond differently to the attack 
events and experience different levels of congestion, but the self-organising techniques 
discussed and developed in this thesis would remain applicable. The aim of the research 
was not focussed on defining and engineering the most effective agent based control and 
monitoring system. Instead the core objective was the investigation and subsequent 
development of a self-organising architecture for the purposes of providing resilience to 
cyber-attacks. 
An alternative approach – more applicable potentially for a real world deployment would 
build an agent based architecture without the overhead of the over-arching platform. Instead 
agent communication would be communicated via socket connections between 
components with additional encryption and security requirements and a communication 
protocol in line with the existing hardware. Such a format may avoid limitations involved 
with scalability on the behalf of the agent management system when running complex 
agents when considering much wider agent populations. However as a result of not having 
the agent management system, tasks such as name resolution, directory services and 
communication processes would have to be developed in replacement of the functions 
provided by the agent platform.  
9.2.6 Attack Format 
Following the development of the operating components of the self-organising architecture 
a further consideration was to the design and implementation of the attacks launched 
against the system. The selected approach was based on a low-rate denial of service attack, 
targeted at the controller layer. Because this was a novel and emerging research area, no 
previous research had considered the use of self-organisation for the purposes of defending 
against a denial of service attack, no standard model existed. The denial of service attack 
was selected due to it targeting the network layer of the supporting ICT infrastructure, 
therefore influencing inter-agent communications. The aim of the attack was to disrupt the 
flow of information between customer agents and the control layer located at the 
aggregation tier, and therefore trigger control deterioration. Furthermore a denial of service 
attack was one of the core components involved in the Stuxnet and Ukrainian events, thus 
demonstrating its relevance when discussing vulnerabilities in cyber-physical power 
systems.  
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As set of design choices were made in the development of the attack strategy including the 
degree with which the attack was modelled. In the research the attack originated from 
compromised smart-meters – because these devices are readily accessible in customer 
homes and could be connected to other smart devices over an internet connection. This 
therefore made them reasonable targets from an attacker’s perspective. Given the 
significant number of potential permutations for number of attackers, distribution of 
attackers, attack duration, severity and sophistication, performing an exhaustive 
examination of all possible formats was not feasible. Therefore a continuous attack 
approach was the core focus of the investigation as this represented the longest duration for 
each of the compromised customer populations and was supported by additional 
examinations of burst and sequential attacks. A secondary decision choice relating to the 
use of smart-meters at the launch platform for the attack was the volume of attack traffic. 
The designed volume of data transmitted from each compromised smart-meter was 
configured such that it fell in line with the transmission capabilities of the smart-meters 
designed for the current UK rollout. Therefore the strength of the denial of service attack 
was limited by the properties of the attacking hardware; an adversary delivering attack 
traffic from an external source would be able to deliver a more intensive attack volume.  
Alternative attack mechanisms such as false data injection or a man-in-the-middle attack 
may require additional functions and an alternative approach from the self-organising 
architecture. This is because these attack methods do not necessarily impact on the 
communication volumes and data evaluated by the performance metrics devised in this 
thesis. The onus would be on data verification and restructuring the architecture on the 
account of a trust vector applied to those agents delivering false information. Such attack 
methods would be the domain of future work which would add further value to the results 
illustrated in this thesis. 
9.2.7 Scalability  
As described earlier in this thesis, scalability is one of the core properties of a self-
organising system allowing them to accommodate large numbers of components. Therefore 
part of the initial development and research presented in chapter thee, scalability was one 
of the metrics used to differentiate between individual architecture topologies and assess 
relative performance. Each of the architecture designs was evaluated with three differing 
customer agent populations of 540, 1080 and 1640 agents in addition to generation and 
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aggregation agents in supporting roles. The investigations demonstrated that the scalability 
of an architecture was related to its design and the manner in which the communication 
between agents was managed, increasing aggregation improved scalability. This research 
also determined that a configuration without dedicated aggregation agents struggled 
considerable in managing data flow when the number of agents was increased. Therefore 
such a configuration was not considered for implementation in the final self-organising 
architecture as an option which the Architect agent could select as part of a transition 
mechanism. Using preliminary research as the input and foundation for the development of 
the self-organising architecture allowed for scalability criteria to form part of the design 
process and eliminate known sources of scalability issues early on. The disaggregated 
architecture was one a known source of scalability issues because generation agents were 
required to accept the responsibilities of performing aggregation in addition to their core 
objectives, as the number of agents increased so did the congestion at those agents resulting 
in longer response times and reduced controllability.  
Within the developed self-organising architecture itself the scalability of the system can be 
influenced by several factors including the number agents involved and the communication 
structure those agent form. But the simulation environment can play an equally influential 
role in determining the scalability of the architecture, while the multi-agent approach is 
composed of numerous individual elements interacting with one another – the entire 
population is overseen by a single agent platform hosted on a local machine. The design 
choice to utilise a single machine was motivated by the impracticalities involved in 
developing agents on hundreds of individual devices, which would have become even more 
impractical when considering populations over 1,600 agents as examined in the preliminary 
research in chapter three. In terms of a potential physical deployment of the self-organising 
architecture the individual agents could easily be hosted on small devices such as Arduino, 
mBed or Raspberry Pi style platforms and therefore locally hosted environments would not 
create a scalability issue. 
The simulation environment is driven by a java virtual machine which is reliant on its own 
allocation of virtual memory in the form of heap space, each agent active within the 
simulation environment occupies space in this virtual machine and within the heap space. 
A larger agent population therefore requires a larger proportion of the available heap space 
and therefore each agent has less headroom in which to operate. Due to the increased 
functional requirements of the agents involved in the self-organising architecture the upper 
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limit on sustainable agent populations within the virtual machine was reduced, hence 
simulations were not conducted to the same magnitude of those in chapter three. A further 
aspect of heap space management relates to messaging between agents, each transmitted 
message exists within the virtual memory until it has been processed by the recipient at 
which time it is handled by the java garbage collection process. If the virtual memory 
requirements of the simulation exceed the maximum available heap space, the simulation 
is automatically terminated – which in turn limits maximum runtime. As more congested 
architectures will consume more virtual memory, their maximum runtime is shortened in 
comparison to an architecture with fewer unread messages. Therefore a system which is 
capable of minimising the congestion within the architecture would create benefits for 
scalability and the self-organising architecture presented in this research improves the 
scalability potential in comparison to a static version of the same agent population.  
As computational limitations of the host machine were the core source of potential risks to 
scalability concerns it can be determined that the set of agents as a whole demonstrate 
scalable properties. Each of the stages of the self-organising architecture implement 
adapted versions of generic techniques which in their native research domains have been 
claimed to be scalable, and the methodologies could be translated into a variety of platforms 
beyond the agent based approach. For example in the case of an infrastructure of 
independent sensors, the same processes and functions can be applied but without the 
limitations of a single local system. The central agents in the system – Observer, Architect, 
and Gateway – would be located within a central resource which would have sufficient 
computational power to process initialisation states, performance monitoring data and 
reconfiguration interactions.  
9.2.8 Evaluation Approach 
Examining the evaluation method takes into account the platforms and simulation 
environment applied to both the development stage and the performance testing format. All 
the simulations were completed on a single platform hosting the agent population and the 
supporting load flow calculations within Matpower. This process was selected on account 
of the available resources and the tools used to develop the self-organising architecture. 
With 365 agents involved in the self-organising architecture it was not practical to engineer 
a system with each agent running on separate hardware communicating over a network. 
Some of the agents could have been implanted on different machinery but a decision choice 
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was made to deliver an even playing field for each of the agents and therefore minimising 
the number of external influences. 
Alternative approaches may involve introducing physical components and additional 
simulation tools in a lab based environment to further research. In this initial proof-of-
concept stage it was relevant to remove external influences or points of failure from the 
testing regime such that the strongest influences over the performance were down to the 
interaction between members of the agent population and their response to triggered attack 
events. Introducing physical components would require additional interfacing work and 
would be seen as a further step now that the self-organising architecture has been proven 
in simulation.   
For example introducing a real-time power-systems simulation environment may encounter 
difficulties when communicating with the java based agent platform. Several agents would 
require being redesigned to match the capabilities and settings of the simulation platform. 
In this thesis it was discussed how the agent platform interacted with a static load flow 
engine provided through Matpower. However those requirements would change when 
operating with a real-time simulation tool, as different elements of the simulation may be 
handed over to the power-system tool rather than being modelled within the agent 
population itself. For example load and generation profiles would be the concern of the 
power system model rather than being rendered by the individual agents. Further work in 
co-simulation or real-time simulation would be advantageous and would add value to the 
work completed in this thesis but was not the subject of the presented research. 
 RESEARCH APPLICATIONS 
The end product devised based on the preceding research had been developed on the basis 
of inspiration from concepts and methods drawn from a range of domains and tested using 
a java based multi-agent platform. Several applications can be drawn from the research 
both in terms of the power systems domain but also in the wider research community. 
9.3.1 Architecture Selection 
An initial contribution focuses on the relevance of the architectural design of the control 
and monitoring infrastructure. Structuring and managing the interaction between agents, 
data collection points, controllers and administrative agents is beneficial in terms of 
communication management. Improving communication management then has benefits for 
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the physical element of a cyber-physical system. Control signals delivered by agents to 
embedded controllers within the network management environment are ultimately subject 
to delays and latencies generated by the communication layer and therefore improving the 
performance of the communication layer has a positive impact on controllability. The early 
research described in this thesis demonstrated that the design of the monitoring architecture 
favoured certain properties either in the form of lowering communication congestion, or 
improving robustness to failure. Therefore in the absence of self-organising architectures 
in the short term, specific static architectures may be deployed in smart grid projects. In 
such a scenario the control and communication architecture should become as important a 
design choice as the electrical infrastructure and deployment of emerging technologies such 
as energy storage, renewables and power electronics. Both aspects of the cyber-physical 
system would need to be designed to complement one another, and be designed with each 
other in mind. For example if a prospective smart grid development is anticipated to 
incorporate a large amount of volatile distributed generation units – an architecture 
specifically designed with reactivity in mind would be more appropriate. On the other hand 
a system focussed on residential smart-metering where pricing updates, DSR signals are on 
a minute time-scale and are less time sensitive it would be more applicable to structure the 
architecture around scalability and congestion management.  
9.3.2 Property Extraction 
Secondly the individual properties of the self-organising architecture can be applied as 
further design choices in support of those previously highlighted. For example the 
dissemination of customer and aggregate connections formed by the initialisation stage of 
the self-organising architecture created a more stable foundation for operating the 
communication network. This is of particular use in respect of building in fault tolerance 
into the design of the ICT infrastructure without an excess of redundant hardware. The 
initialisation process creates an overlapping communication mesh whereby control signals 
for one area of the network are distributed across multiple controllers. As a result the loss 
of multiple controllers does not necessarily result in the loss of controllability over the 
network population, additional redundancy can be added through a connection between the 
controllers and a central server with both physical and ICT network topology information 
such that any network knowledge lost through failure can be reclaimed by other nodes in 
the architecture.   
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The performance monitoring aspect of the self-organising architecture can also have further 
reaching applications and illustrates the importance of being able to continually measure 
the condition or usage of ICT assets within the network. The communication and 
monitoring components of the system may not have the same commercial value of larger 
power system assets. As a result the replacement of failed components does not carry the 
same economic penalty, but being able to used monitoring techniques for the purposes of 
assessing state of health can be beneficial. Components will be communicating 
measurements of the hardware under observation and additional parameters could be added 
to that data stream to perform self-diagnostics.  
Additional performance criteria would be needed in a real world implementation that 
document the physical health of the components – temperature and humidity sensing may 
indicate potential hardware failure. The architect agent in the developed self-organising 
architecture used these reports to detect predominantly software related issues – message 
congestion, slow response times. This information could be used in association with a wider 
spread of metrics as a potential method for predicting component lifespans and informing 
a maintenance schedule. Self-monitoring data delivered by the components may be 
interpreted by a human controller, or processed by a decision making engine to add self-
monitoring capabilities to a static architecture. 
9.3.3 A Self-Organising Architecture 
While each of the components of the developed self-organising architecture has value in 
isolation the system as a whole would be applicable for a smart-grid implementation. 
Additional work would be required in physical rollout of a self-organising architecture, but 
the overall concept has been illustrated as being fit for purpose and with demonstrated 
benefits. Therefore the work in this thesis could be considered as a foundation investigation 
providing cyber-security benefits through self-organisation. Even in the absence of a cyber-
threat being able to monitor for failures within the IT network or indications of pending 
failure or performance loss could be useful when considering network management systems. 
 IMPLEMENTING A SELF-ORGANISING ARCHITECTURE 
During this research the system was developed and evaluated through simulation, however 
in terms of transferring a similar system into a physical rollout there are a number of 
considerations which would need to be addressed.  
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9.4.1 Control and Monitoring Hardware/Software 
At the core of the system is a series of agents – each representing either a physical 
component located within the network, or a service provided by a central server or a cloud 
based solution. Therefore as part of a rollout process it is important to consider the hardware 
required in providing the monitoring and control capabilities envisaged. The first 
component is the customer smart-meter, at present smart-meters are in the process of being 
increasingly prominent in providing usage information to suppliers as part of the smart-
meter roadmap. However as a result of the manner, in which the energy market in the UK 
is configured, the meters are provided by the energy suppliers and therefore neighbouring 
customers may receive differing models of meter. Therefore a degree of interoperability is 
required between differing versions of smart-meter, furthermore these meters may require 
multiple communication channels for separating consumption data transmitted to the 
supplier from control actions supplied from the network operator.  
A second consideration refers to the devices responsible for performing data collection 
points or controller services. The location, communication capabilities and hardware 
configurations of these devices is important to consider. The self-organising concept 
presented in this thesis considered agents which are not physically mobile and can be 
connected to a permanent power supply and thus removing potential concerns for battery 
life and energy efficiency. However it is entirely feasible that in a real-world deployment 
certain agents may not have readily available access to a power supply and therefore are 
battery operated. In this scenario the acts of the architecture to reduce message congestion 
and communicative load will in turn have a positive impact on the battery life of those 
components. A variety of agents with and without power supplies would change the 
dynamic of the self-organising architecture. Certain agents would be prioritised over others 
such that those agents running off a consumable power source are recognised as 
components to manage more efficiently than others.  
A final set of agents to consider in a real world implementation are the observer and 
architect agents, these being centralised entities would either be physically located at a 
control station on a server or hosted by a cloud computing service. In each case multiple 
instances of these agents could be hosted on the same hardware are respond to different 
network zones, for example on central control room may operate several domains. With 
respect to the gateway agent, its purpose within the simulation was to interact with the 
Matpower representation of the network and report voltage information back to the agent 
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population. In a physical implementation it is not necessarily the case that such a stage 
would be omitted as system modelling may form an important part of the control stage in 
the form of state estimation. As previously indicated an optimisation approach may not be 
feasible when processing attack information and issuing architecture transitions, but it does 
form an important role in power system control. Maintaining access to a system model 
updated with information from the agent population could be useful in running validation 
assessments of planned control actions, or for the purposes of running optimisation 
techniques. The gateway agent could also be co-located with the observer and the architect 
and collect information from the agent population. Alternatively multiple network models 
could be maintained at local controllers and therefore each controller will adopt 
functionality used by the gateway agent. 
9.4.2 Communication Infrastructure 
Outside of a simulation environment the communication between elements of the 
architecture have to be considered. At present deployed smart-meters in the UK 
communicate data through infrastructure managed and monitored by the Data 
Communications Company [143] and regulated by Ofgem. Therefore the core 
communication infrastructure is in place and described in the following figure - Fig. 9. - 
sourced from [143], indicating that the data is delivered through the wide area network 
through to a set of users. On this basis it could be considered that the ICT infrastructure 
would be capable of hosting such a system, as bandwidth availability will naturally increase 
in the future and could accommodate a larger scale deployment of the architecture.  
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Fig. 9.1 – Current Smart-meter Communication Structure 
In the event of the implementation of a self-organising architecture the architect agent 
would have to utilise this infrastructure to send the relevant messages to the customer layer 
and to data collection points within the communication layer of the above diagram. The 
performance monitoring information would likely be received by the network operator as 
while the self-organising architecture predominantly impacts on the communication 
architecture, those transitions are made for the benefit of the electrical network.  
9.4.3 Security Considerations 
All parties involved with utilising the infrastructure are obligated to operate under the smart 
energy code as defined in [144] with authentication protocols outlined in [145]. One of the 
primary concerns presented in the documentation is data access, Fig. 9. indicates that other 
than the network operators and suppliers the data can be transmitted to third party users. 
Therefore there is an authorisation step which involves user certification and encryption 
key access to ensure that the process is not being exploited. 
Other security concerns are present at the opposite end of the communication structure in 
the link between the customer smart-meter and the wide area network. Controls will be 
needed not only to validate that the smart-meter is a registered but also the content being 
transmitted from it. While it is not be feasible to create a system which is capable of being 
immune to all forms of cyber threat, defence mechanisms can be used to prevent attacks 
from adversaries with a limited skill set or with limited resources, therefore reducing the 
number of attack events which can bypass security procedures. 
Finally the integrity of the smart-meters themselves could be vulnerable to malicious use. 
In the presented research, compromised smart-meters acted as the launch platform for a 
denial of service attack event. This represented the scenario whereby the firmware of the 
device had been modified or malware installed which had the capability of sending a wave 
of attack traffic to the controller. This may be more of an issue if the smart-meter supports 
the use of open source software [146], while there are numerous benefits to the usage of 
open source code, there are inherent risks of that code can be modified and exploited within 
the meter itself. Open source software may extend to third party applications as the smart-
meter becomes more central in a home energy management context. The applications 
would need to be moderated and verified before being released for public consumption to 
prevent the distribution of malware or exploits. Furthermore the third party applications 
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would need to be limited to certain levels of access with respect to which information they 
can view or modify, and communications generated by the app should be restrained within 
the home area network and not released into the wider communication enviroment. 
 DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL 
Over the course of the research period a functioning self-organising architecture was 
developed which successfully delivered performance improvements across several network 
management criteria. However there are some potential improvements which could be 
made if the research was carried forwards, these improvements would further enhance 
value of the self-organising architecture. 
9.5.1 Decision Making 
The first development stage would focus on the decision making engine within the architect 
agent – the version presented in this thesis contains fuzzy logic based recommendations 
informed by performance monitoring data. This service can be enhanced through the 
addition greater awareness of the physical properties of the network, for example voltage 
data could become a further input into the decision making process. Therefore the architect 
would be more likely to make larger scale transformations if it was aware of a deepening 
voltage deviation and knew that such a transition would make a positive impact on voltage. 
While voltage information was recorded and used for control purposes it did not form an 
input to the decision making engine. This was a design choice which was made because the 
architect agent could not influence the control algorithm, and was tasked with performing 
structural reconfigurations within the agent population. Secondly the denial of service 
attack was launched against the network layer of the architecture and therefore the 
performance metrics were centred on responding to the cyber-threat. As with the 
computational burden data the architect would need to be provided with the voltage 
magnitude at the most severely affected bus and the rate of change of that voltage. To 
provide such information an updated voltage monitoring mechanism would need to be 
installed within the customer layer, such that it maintains a record of previous voltage 
readings in the same manner that the communication metrics are monitored. This would 
likely be implemented through the provision of an additional voltage control object rather 
than internal agent behaviour as it was developed over the course of the presented research. 
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In addition to the use of physical properties as method of informing the decision making 
processes, it may also be beneficial to provide additional filtering and knowledge to the 
transitions made as a result of the decision making. The research demonstrated that there 
were instances where the actions of the architect introduced an aggregate agent into the 
active population only to create an increase in computational burden rather than reducing 
it. To avoid such a scenario the architect would need to perform a selection process on the 
available dormant agents to ensure those that are activated would not become problematic. 
Locational awareness may also be useful in sculpting transformation events, firstly in terms 
of activing dormant agents which are in close proximity to the area of the network requiring 
the additional aggregation capacity. Furthermore this location data could prove useful when 
selecting substitute agents and structuring the initialisation stage of the process.   
Once a decision has been completed a further point of expansion would be to add memory 
of transition events to the architect agent – such that it can learn from previous decisions 
and the effective impact they had. Therefore using former knowledge to inform future 
decisions, or override recommendations from the fuzzy decision making engine – 
alternatively the machine learning process could redefine the fuzzy membership functions 
on the basis of previous transition events.   
9.5.2 Modularity 
A secondary development step would be to introduce greater modularity, as this would 
improve the ability to evaluate a larger set of scenarios – especially when coupled with an 
automated testing system as presented in the previous sub-section. A modular approach to 
the development of the self-organising system improves the ability to perform comparison 
studies between different networks, control algorithms and decision making methods 
without having to rebuild a large percentage of the overall system. Furthermore if larger 
elements of the system remain the same comparison between swapped modules become 
more valid.  
9.5.3 Automation 
In addition to improvement the implementation of the functionality of the system, it would 
also be beneficial to improve the automation of the testing process. Unlike conventional 
power system simulation techniques where the system states are calculated based on the 
physical properties and hours of simulation can be completed in seconds, the self-
organising architecture operates in real time. The multi-agent system operates inside a 
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virtual machine on the workstation and is runs in a continuous fashion instead of discrete 
time steps, and therefore a simulated hour requires an hour of actual runtime. This is 
exacerbated by the additional time required to extract the information from the agent output 
files and process the data. In order to improve this process a method of automating a test 
regime would prove useful, to implement such a system a supervisory program would need 
to be developed which could read from a list of test configurations and build the relevant 
agent population and models. The program would then insert the correct files into the main 
simulation directory to perform the desired test case, as illustrated in the following figure 
presented in Fig. 9.2.  
The presented automation process requires a supervisory application which has the 
capability building files relevant to the set of cases needed and triggering the main 
simulation. The first step is to load the series of test configurations which define the number 
of tests to be implemented and the properties of each of those tests which may include the 
following: 
Source Network – This defines which network model is the test to be performed on the 
supervisor program will set all references to components and model files within the 
gateway agent such that at runtime the correct. 
 
Fig. 9.2 – Structure of a System Automation Process 
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 Agent Population – This defines which agents are required for the simulation and 
the distribution of customers, aggregates and generator agents as contained within 
the components file. The supervisor would read the components file and determine 
which agents are needed. 
 Attack Conditions – These are the settings applied by the error generator agent, 
determining which attack is to be applied and the associated severity of that attack, 
defining the number of attackers, targets, duration and quantity of attack events 
taking place within the simulation. 
 Network Properties - Additional settings determining the number of customer 
agents willing to provide control and the level of control offered by those customers. 
These properties may also include variations on the control approach, thresholds in 
performance monitoring or in the decision making engine. 
 Architecture Properties – The architecture properties include settings which 
define the starting architecture in the form of control placement, aggregate capacity 
and number of tiers. Settings may also involve alternate approaches to the decision 
making engine and transition approaches 
 Simulation Properties – Finally the simulation settings contains parameters which 
sculpt the nature of the simulation, including the desired duration of the simulation, 
directories for output files and post-simulation data processing scripts. 
Once the configuration for a given test scenario has been processed by the supervisor it will 
then need to construct an agent population which represents these settings. It will use the 
components file as a guide to the quantities and initial set points for the entities involved in 
the simulation. To perform this task the supervisor needs a set of agent templates, which it 
then uses to build the agent population by inserting the correct parameters loaded from the 
configuration into placeholders in the template. Completed agents are then placed inside 
the simulation directory before the supervisor triggers a simulation. Once the required 
runtime has elapsed the supervisor will then need to terminate the simulation and extract 
the results files generated by each of those agents such that they are not over-written by 
subsequent simulations. Finally the supervisor will need to call a Matlab script, to process 
the raw data files and produce a set of results. 
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 FURTHER RESEARCH 
While the self-organising architecture completed in the process of this research 
demonstrated the effectiveness of the concept and delivered improved resilience in the 
presence of an attack event, there are additional uses and scope for such a system. The 
following avenues for additional research building on the findings present cases for 
widening the scope of potential applications and lead to further developments. 
9.6.1 Attack Diversity 
The first research path considerers the possibility for increasing the attack diversity, in the 
current research the attack formats are based on low-rate denial of service attacks and 
operate through targeting a volume of attack traffic at crucial elements of the agent 
hierarchy. This strategy is a definitive attack on the communication network and leaves a 
trace in the form of data traffic anomalies in the form of increased congestion, 
unresponsiveness and reduced reactivity. Therefore the performance monitor has a 
signature to detect. Other attack formats will leave a different impact on the system and 
therefore require a different approach or an extension of the current decision making system. 
Therefore the self-organising architecture will need to be enhanced to include additional 
self-healing properties, these properties could include command validation stages, trust 
levels between sensors and data collection points and enhanced communication protocols.  
Further attack formats may be launched against the electrical component of the cyber-
physical system in the form or malware installed directly at the control point or the 
controller. In this case the network traffic may not exhibit any anomalies and therefore an 
additional level of continuous monitoring would need to be implemented on the various 
modelled electrical components to detect deviations. This would add physical network data 
to the performance monitoring input to the decision making engine and therefore more 
informed transitional events can be executed.  
9.6.2 Control Diversity 
The network under investigation in this research focussed on a voltage control problem and 
the control procedure is implemented through widespread demand side response. This 
solution was created to demonstrate the impact of attack formats on a command structure 
which relied on communication signals to trigger control actions and maintain demand 
reduction until such time it could be relieved. Additional control algorithms should be 
included in future developments of this work, so that the self-organising architecture can 
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be assessed when attempting to maintain multiple network variables. These control 
approaches may require the inclusion of additional controllable components within the 
network configurations including transformers, energy storage, soft open points and 
electric vehicles. A more diverse control base will increase the complexity and importance 
of the control signals flowing through the communication network. It will also increase the 
baseline level of traffic and lead to a system which is increasingly heavily loaded in the 
absence of an attack, therefore increasing the reliance on the self-organising architecture to 
reduce the computational burden. Furthermore if communication signals are lost or ignored 
as a result of attack traffic the consequences for these components could be more significant 
as these components may suffer damage if not controlled correctly. 
In addition to introducing further algorithms to the simulation, additional control problems 
could be considered with differing consequences should the network under attack fail to 
mitigate the impacts of the attack. Scenarios can be evaluated such that the attack would 
lead to equipment damage or outages, and therefore presenting the case that a self-
organising architecture could have economic value. 
9.6.3 Network Diversity 
A further approach would be to widen the range of networks upon which this concept is 
applicable – in the presented research the self-organising architecture is applied to the 
distribution level whereby smart-meters are determined to be the lowest level component. 
This is presented within the context of a radial distribution network composed of 340 
customers across four feeders – even within this voltage level there is a large range of 
components, configurations and populations that can be considered. These additional 
configurations may be used for differing control scenarios or to evaluate differing attack 
strategies based on the components involved in the network.  
A more rural network may contain fewer customers but would cover a larger geographical 
area with greater risk of interference from natural barriers. While these networks may be 
less likely to come under threat from a cyber-attack, the exposed nature of the components 
may present different challenges through failure and maintenance accessibility. In terms 
both of the electrical and communication networks. The performance monitoring aspect of 
the self-organising system may be more useful in feeding information into a maintenance 
schedule such that locations with limited accessibility which can only be observed remotely. 
Furthermore it may be the case that the architecture is applied to a higher voltage level 
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whereby instead of smart-meters being the lowest level component within the hierarchy, 
that role could be assumed by substations and the scope of the architecture could be 
translated to the transmission level. The core principles of the self-organising architecture 
presented in this work are applicable to differing levels of the power system. Agent based 
control mechanisms have been applied to microgrids and island systems and therefore 
adding a level of self-organisation would also be a feasible extension.  
9.6.4 Co-Simulation 
A final set avenue for further research would be to add to the simulation environment 
through the addition of modelling approaches for the communication layer. Interfacing a 
communication simulation tool with the agent architecture would enable the ability to 
model the latencies between nodes, and the properties of the ICT infrastructure, information 
which in turn could be used to inform the decision making aspect of the system through 
selecting agents closer to the point of failure in terms of communication distance to be 
promoted rather than estimating that distance through response times.  
This approach would also allow experimentation through evaluating communication 
technologies and the effective range over which the system could be implemented – while 
the current test configuration considers a customer population 340 customers, the 
individual are less than a kilometre in length. Other environments may span a much wider 
area and being able to model the impacts of communicating with sensor and controllable 
entities which may have poor connectivity due to be being rural or under strong intermittent 
interference would add depth and applicability to the functions of the self-organising 
architecture. 
9.6.5 Practical Experimentation 
Aside from the set of expansions to the simulation element of the configuration, a different 
path would be to introduce hardware into the testing environment – which could be applied 
across differing aspects of the overall system. First of all considering the agents themselves 
and separating them from a single host configuration, multiple agents could be installed on 
raspberry pi style platforms. The interaction between physical components and simulated 
representations may deliver differing phenomena as a result of the messages being 
transmitted over a physical network and introducing additional properties involving actual 
bandwidth and communication delays. 
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A second avenue for introducing practical elements into the system is to include lab based 
testing in the form of physical or emulated controllable load, generation and storage devices. 
Therefore the operations completed by the architect agent aiming to perform actions to 
minimise commutative load and computational burden can be seen to impact on real world 
equipment.  
 SUMMARY 
This chapter documented an evaluation of the processes involved with developing the self-
organising architecture, discussing the design choices and potential limitations involved 
with the both the system itself and the test framework. Furthermore this chapter considered 
the potential implications for the research on the wider power systems community. 
Additionally the challenges involved with deploying such as system in practice were 
discussed from the perspective of the hardware, communication infrastructure and security 
concerns. Finally the chapter presented as series of potential development avenues if the 
self-organising architecture was to be enhanced for the purposes of improving future 
research applications and improving the evaluation and testing framework to facilitate 
additional experimentation. 
Finally further research directions were suggested; directions which could further 
demonstrate and enhance the value of self-organising architectures for use in smart grid 
and over-arching power systems domains. Overall results were positive and exhibit 
encouraging properties which could be further developed through the means discussed in 
the chapter or used to build similar systems for alternate energy vectors or control problems.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusions  
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 OVERVIEW  
The research presented in this thesis began with an investigation of differing multi-agent 
architectures for the purposes of performing voltage control in a radial distribution network. 
The investigation concluded that no single static architecture proved to be the most resilient 
against all of the attack formats and therefore and indicated that a self-organising 
architecture would be an appropriate solution to improving resilience. A subsequent 
literature review supported the experimental evidence that self-organising architectures are 
more applicable when being used to improve robustness. Consequently a self-organising 
architecture was developed which featured three stages of operation. An initialisation state 
satisfied the self-organising requirement of establishing an endogenous global order, 
utilising mechanisms adapted from the EDETA and Tic-Tac-Toe Architecture solutions. 
Furthermore a performance monitoring stage allowed the architecture to be continuously 
aware of its state. Finally a fuzzy based decision making engine was implemented for the 
purposes of translating performance data into effective architecture transitions. When 
tested against a series of denial of service attacks, the self-organising architecture was able 
to reduce the impact of the attack on the communication variables and also prevented 
voltage control deterioration even under the most severe of tested attack formats. 
This chapter outlines the key findings of the conducted research across the different stages 
of the investigation process; it also discusses how the research objectives presented in the 
first chapter have been fulfilled. 
 KEY FINDINGS 
The key findings and the contributions of the investigations conducted throughout the 
course of this research are as follows. 
1. The structure of a multi-agent architecture can influence its control and 
communication performance. Levels of congestion, reactivity, message efficiency 
and the ability to deliver control signals were all affected by the number of agents 
in the architecture and the distribution of aggregation agents. Across the 16 different 
control and communication architectures examined, no single design proved to be 
the most effective for all performance metrics. This was also reflected in response 
to handling an attack event, demonstrating that the robustness of a system was also 
linked to the architecture design. Therefore a self-organising architecture which 
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could switch between configurations would be beneficial, especially with respect to 
resistance to attacks. 
2. A denial of service attack is able to prevent the dissemination of control signals as 
a result of increasing message congestion at the controller layer by up to 16,000 
messages. Consequently response times between controller and customer increased 
by up to 8.2 seconds, therefore severing a control connection and triggering control 
deterioration. 
3. A novel self-organising architecture was developed for performing voltage control 
in smart grids, adapting techniques from wireless communication, vehicle and 
sensor networks. The developed architecture featured three operational stages and 
could construct a stable starting configuration. 
4. A fuzzy based decision making engine was developed which could analyse several 
different performance metrics normalised into a single computational burden 
indicator. The decision making engine could translate the indicator and its rate of 
change into an architectural transition action.  
5. Monitoring and responding to issues within the communication layer of a cyber-
physical smart grid can result in beneficial performance outcomes for control of 
physical components. 
6. The use of self-organisation is appropriate and beneficial for use within an agent 
based network management system with respect to initialising a collection of agents, 
forming connections between architectural tiers and preventing control 
deterioration in the presence of a denial of service attack containing up to 24% of 
the customer population.  
7. The developed self-organising architecture was capable of reducing the 
computational burden indicator by at least 64% and by over 90% in the majority of 
examples. Therefore indicating applicability beyond cyber-security in processing 
heavily loaded smart grid communication architectures. 
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 FULLFILLMENT OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Three research objectives were set at the beginning of this thesis where are as follows: 
1. Evaluate comparative performances across differing control and communication 
architectures in the context of distribution network management with a view to 
determining the potential role for implementing self-organisation. This 
investigation aimed to determine what the benefits would be of providing self-
organisation within the control and communication architecture and why self-
organisation is an appropriate approach for cyber-security. 
The first of the research objectives considered the evaluation of a range of control and 
communication architectures involved with performing voltage control. The aim of the 
evaluation was to determine the performance differences between the differing 
architectures with respect to robustness to an attack event. Additional communication level 
performance was also considered in terms of message congestion, reactivity, message 
efficiency – and the ability to perform the voltage control objective. This investigation 
discovered that, the structure of an architecture has a strong influence on the control, 
communication and robustness performance, structures with a greater concentration of data 
collection points exhibited stronger performance in terms of message congestion and 
reactivity. Architectures with fewer aggregation agents performed stronger in terms of 
message efficiency. In addition to the structure of the architecture, increasing the agent 
population also created variations in performance in each of the examined criteria, as 
scalability improved through increasing the number of aggregates. 
Overall the results demonstrated that no single architecture design can deliver the strongest 
performance across all scales and all of the recorded metrics. A total of 16 alternate control 
and communication configurations were implemented and examined against 
communication performance, control performance and robustness performance. Out of the 
total set of configurations only the disaggregated architecture demonstrated poor 
performance across a wider range of test scenarios and therefore was not considered for use 
in the self-organising system development. This illustrates that the presence of data 
aggregation points is crucial in developing smart grid agent architectures. The research 
discovered that the most prominent driver for implementing self-organisation was in 
response to failure or in the event of a cyber-attack, which was supported by self-organising 
applications presented in literature as documented in chapter 4.  
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The conclusion for the first research objective was that there is definitive value in the use 
of self-organising architectures specifically in response to unexpected events affecting the 
agent population. A planning stage could design an architecture to favour specific 
properties relevant to the control objective of the agent population or to account for an 
estimated volume of communication load. However a cyber-attack event cannot be 
adequately planned for and therefore developing an architecture with the capability to 
respond to such an event would be an advantage. 
2. Develop and implement an agent population with functioning self-organisational 
properties including architecture formation, contemporaneous monitoring and 
decision making.  
The second objective required the development of a self-organising architecture with the 
ability to determine its own initial configuration based on a set of input parameters, perform 
continuous performance monitoring and effect appropriate reconfiguration actions. The 
comparative metrics implemented in the fulfilment of objective 1, were translated into 
performance monitoring criteria which acted as inputs to a decision making engine. The 
development process was successful as all of the desired functions were implemented and 
demonstrated to be functional. Furthermore the fulfilment of the objective illustrated that 
developing an agent based self-organising architecture was feasible with current 
technologies, and therefore future implementations have the potential for further 
performance gains. 
Three stages of operation were developed as part of the self-organising architecture, the 
first of which was an initialisation stage which served as a functional method of connecting 
customer agents with controllers and being able to distribute the connections between 
individual controllers. This process was able to assign each customer and generation agent 
a valid connection and no agents were left isolated during initialisation. Secondly a 
performance monitoring stage extracted relevant information from the agent population 
relating to communication performance. Individual agents monitored their own parameters 
and any observed anomalies were reported to the architect agent, this system allowed 
efficient delivery of error reports and a flexible approach to incorporating future 
performance monitoring criteria. A final stage involved a fuzzy based decision making 
engine which translated performance data into transitions which could be successfully 
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triggered by the architect agent. Each transition event formed a stable configuration and no 
connections were dropped during the process and no communication signals were disrupted. 
Overall this objective was fulfilled, as the implemented self-organising architecture was 
able to perform the three stages of operation successfully, furthermore the agent population 
interfaced with an external load flow engine modelling an electrical network. This therefore 
ensured that the self-organising architecture was also capable of performing voltage control 
and customer data collection in addition the self-organising properties.  
3. Examine the performance of the developed self-organised system in the presence 
of external network threats in the form of cyber-attack events with respect to control 
and communication performance. These performances are also examined with 
respect to a static architecture undergoing the same cyber-attack conditions with the 
objective of learning which variables are affected by an ongoing attack. A further 
learning outcome is to identify whether a communication variables have an impact 
on the electrical performance of a network while under attack. To determine 
whether the self-organising architecture can improve electrical performance by 
improving communication layer performance.   
The final objective evaluated the self-organising architecture when it was exposed to a 
series of low rate denial of service attack events. From the series of tests applied to the self-
organising architecture it was concluded that smaller attack events, whereby 6% of the 
customer population were perpetrating the denial of service attack the attack was not 
significant enough to warrant the use of architecture transitions. As the attack was scaled 
up to involve 24% of the customer population, without the assistance of self-organisation 
control was lost to 50% of the electrical network under investigation. Whereas with the use 
of self-organisation all customers received control signals to correct the voltage deviation, 
demonstrating that the self-organising approach was capable of maintaining controllability 
during a denial of service attack event. Additionally the results demonstrated that the self-
organising architecture was able to reduce the computational burden by at least 64% and 
by 90% in the majority of cases, therefore illustrating that the performance advantages of 
the self-organising architecture extend beyond the electrical layer. Finally these figures 
indicated the correlation between correcting issues within the communication layer and the 
resulting positive impacts on control performance. 
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 SUMMARY 
In summary this research has demonstrated that the vision of increasing the amount 
observability and controllability within future smart grids and enhancing the cyber-physical 
infrastructure brings with it a set of new challenges. These challenges arise from the number 
of components communicating data and requiring control signals, this in turn increases 
amount of data flowing through the communication infrastructure. With the increased 
reliance on ICT components, there is the further challenge created through the risk of cyber-
threats against the power system. The research determined that the application of a self-
organising architecture is an effective mechanism for reducing the consequences of facing 
these challenges and one which offers the flexibility associated with future network 
concepts. The work illustrated that a static architecture could suffer control deterioration as 
a result of a denial of service attack, whereas a self-organising architecture could continue 
to achieve the control objective. The self-organising approach has considerable room for 
further research, especially with respect to processing additional cyber-threats which 
remain an interesting and expanding research topic and where self-organising architectures 
could one of the defensive tools in future developments. 
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